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Introduction
1
1. INTRODUCTION
Oligopoly markets have always been in the spotlight of industrial organization
research, for good reasons: Regulators want to devise socially optimal competition
policy, while entrepreneurs study strategic interactions to pursue the upper hand in
competition. This dissertation presents several models of Markov-perfect industry
dynamics, as well as their applications to the analysis of entry, exit, and competitive
conduct in oligopoly markets.
The models of Markov-perfect industry dynamics studied in this dissertation be-
long to a larger class of structural models. In the recent decades, thanks to advance-
ments in game theory, econometrics, and computational economics, structural mod-
els have taken their place on the empirical industrial organization research agenda.
In this new research paradigm, researchers explicitly model firms’ behavior in an
equilibrium context to give empirical work a solid microeconomic foundation. These
models are estimable in the sense that their underlying primitives can be estimated
from observed market outcomes.
The marriage of economic theory and econometrics brings at least two benefits.
First, it helps researchers to circumvent the lack-of-data issue in empirical research.
For instance, data on entry costs and payoffs are often unavailable to researchers.
Bresnahan and Reiss (1991) propose a model of oligopoly competition to infer these
values using numbers of firms and market sizes, which are commonly available from
administrative data. Second, it provides a vehicle for counterfactual policy exper-
iments. Because the causal relation between primitives and market outcomes is
modelled explicitly, the structural models are not subject to the “Lucas critique”
(Lucas, Jr. 1976). Therefore, researchers are able to quantify markets’ responses
to policy changes that shift primitives. For instance, Bresnahan and Reiss’s model
allows us to examine what would happen to market concentration if the government
reduces licensing levies.
Spearheaded by Maskin and Tirole (1988a, 1988b) and Ericson and Pakes (1995),
models of Markov-perfect industry dynamics receive attention for their theoretically
and empirically appealing features. First, these models entail plausible assumptions
on firms’ behavior. They have multiple periods in which firms make optimal decisions
based on time-varying information. Compared to static models, they provide an
environment that better fits the dynamic nature of oligopoly competition. Second,
models of Markov-perfect industry dynamics can explain not only the “snapshot”
of market structures, but also the structures’ transition over time. Therefore, they
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facilitate the econometric analysis of longitudinal datasets, which are increasingly
available.
Despite these attractive features, their complexity limits their application. As
demonstrated by Besanko, Doraszelski, Kryukov, and Satterthwaite (2010), these
models often suffer from equilibrium multiplicity. In general, even after reasonable
refinement, the number of equilibria remains unclear, rendering the computation of
all equilibria nearly impossible and the results of policy experiments dubious. What
is worse, researchers have no reliable algorithm to quickly compute any equilibrium.
In the models developed in this dissertation, I attempt to make a breakthrough
on equilibrium unicity and computation. In Chapter 2 (based on Abbring, Camp-
bell, and Yang 2012a) of the dissertation, my co-authors and I develop a tractable
model for the computational and empirical analysis of infinite-horizon Markov-
perfect oligopoly dynamics. It features aggregate demand uncertainty, sunk entry
costs, stochastic idiosyncratic technological progress, and irreversible exit. We de-
velop an algorithm for computing a symmetric equilibrium quickly by finding the
fixed points of a finite sequence of low-dimensional contraction mappings. If at
most two heterogeneous firms serve the industry, the result is the unique “natu-
ral” equilibrium in which a high profitability firm never exits leaving behind a low
profitability competitor. With more than two firms, the algorithm always finds a
natural equilibrium.1 We present a simple rule for checking ex post whether the
calculated equilibrium is unique, and we illustrate the model’s application by as-
sessing the robustness of Fershtman and Pakes’ (2000) finding that collusive pricing
can increase consumer surplus by stimulating product development. The hundreds
of equilibrium calculations this requires take only a few minutes on an off-the-shelf
laptop computer. We also present a feasible algorithm for the model’s estimation
using the generalized method of moments.
In Chapter 3 (based on Abbring, Campbell, and Yang 2012b), we develop a
dynamic econometric framework for the analysis of entry, exit, and competitive
1In a companion paper, Abbring, Campbell, Tilly, and Yang (2012), we analyze the simpler
version of this model in which all firms have the same technology. We show that the simpler
model has an essentially unique symmetric Markov-perfect equilibrium. The simpler model is rich
enough for a range of applications, such as the welfare analysis of licensing requirements, start-up
subsidies, and environmental laws. Although firm-level heterogeneity is ignored, the model’s light
computational burden makes it easy to accommodate market-level heterogeneity. Moreover, its
analysis provides a starting point for the analysis of more general models. Due to the preliminary
status of this work, it is not included in this dissertation.
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conduct in oligopolistic markets. This framework only requires panel data on the
demand and producer counts of geographically dispersed markets over time. It
is a dynamic extension of Bresnahan and Reiss’s (1990; 1991) framework for the
analysis of static competition in a cross-section of markets. Our extension facilitates
the empirical analysis: sunk entry costs and uncertainty. Moreover, it is needed
for the consistent measurement of static market primitives, such as the toughness
of competition. Our model’s timing and expectation assumptions help to select
an essentially unique Markov-perfect equilibrium that can be computed quickly by
solving a finite sequence of dynamic programming problems with low-dimensional
state spaces. We apply our model to the empirical re-analysis of sunk costs and the
toughness of competition in the US market for dental services, using Bresnahan and
Reiss’s (1993) panel data on the number of dentists across geographical markets in
the US.
In Chapter 4 (based on Yang 2012), I extend and apply the model developed in
Chapter 2 to analyse creative destruction in the Dutch retail grocery market. In this
market, technological innovations in inventory, logistics, and sales give grocery chain
stores a profitability advantage over old-fashioned local stores. With chain stores
advancing, local store incumbents gradually exit. Two questions concerning this
creative destruction process are central to competition policy. How do chain stores
make entry decisions? How does a chain store’s entry impact incumbent stores’
profitability and survival? In this paper, I develop a tractable dynamic oligopoly
model to examine these two questions. All of the model’s Markov-perfect equilib-
ria that survive natural refinements can be quickly computed by finding the fixed
points of a sequence of low-dimensional contraction mappings. I estimate this model
using observations of grocery stores’ entry and exit in small Dutch municipalities.
The average sunk cost of entry in some cases is multiple times a store’s expected
discounted profit, possibly because Dutch zoning regulation greatly limits potential
entrants’ locations. The high average sunk cost considerably delays chain stores’
expansion. An entering chain store reduces local incumbents’ net present values by
26% to 62%. A policy experiment with the estimated model shows that cutting
average sunk costs by 40% almost doubles chain store entry.
Proofs, computational details and some supplementary materials are collected in
the appendices. The replication packages including the Matlab code implementing
the computation and estimation routines are published on the authors’ websites.
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2. SIMPLE MARKOV-PERFECT INDUSTRY DYNAMICS
2.1 Introduction
This paper supplies fast and simple computational methods for important special
cases of Ericson and Pakes’ (1995) model of dynamic oligopoly. These cases feature
aggregate uncertainty, sunk entry costs, and stochastic firm-specific technological
progress; but they exclude choices with dynamic consequences other than entry and
exit. This simplification facilitates a range of equilibrium characterization, existence,
and uniqueness results that are not available for the more general framework. More-
over, it enables the development of algorithms that calculate equilibria by finding
the fixed points of a finite sequence of low-dimensional contraction mappings. These
results can be used to explore some key aspects of Ericson and Pakes’ model with
very low computational cost. This is often useful in itself, and can serve as a first
stage of a richer analysis with a more complex specification.
Existing methods for equilibrium computation iterate on a “Bellman-like” oper-
ator that maps future payoffs into current payoffs. These iterations are notoriously
slow, especially with the high-dimensional state spaces required by oligopoly applica-
tions. Furthermore, this operator, unlike Bellman operators for single-agent decision
problems, need not be a contraction and may not have a unique fixed point. This
paper develops relatively rich analytical results and effective computational meth-
ods for a comparatively simple model. It shares this approach with Abbring and
Campbell’s (2010) analysis of last-in first-out oligopoly dynamics. They consider
a dynamic extension of Bresnahan and Reiss’ (1990) static entry model that can
naturally be applied to the empirical analysis of market level entry and exit data
(Abbring, Campbell, and Yang, 2012b). Timing and expectational assumptions
simplify its equilibrium analysis: Otherwise homogeneous firms move sequentially,
oldest first; and older firms never exit expecting to leave a younger firm behind. The
present paper contributes more directly to the analysis of Ericson and Pakes’ frame-
work and its potential applications, because it allows for idiosyncratic technological
progress in a model with simultaneously moving incumbent firms. However, our
computational method resembles that of Abbring and Campbell (2010) by finding
the fixed points of a finite sequence of contraction mappings with low-dimensional
state spaces.
Our results leverage one key insight into the structure of payoffs in a symmet-
ric Markov-perfect equilibrium: The expected payoffs from continuation equal the
payoffs from being outside the market, zero, in any state in which the equilibrium
6
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strategy prescribes exit with positive probability. This allows us to calculate firms’
expected continuation values at some nodes of the game tree without knowing ev-
erything about how the game will proceed thereafter. Our results demonstrate how
to use these initial calculations to recover all equilibrium payoffs and actions. For
this task, it is very helpful to know beforehand that adding an active firm to an
industry weakly reduces all other firms’ equilibrium continuation values. We prove
that this intuitive property must hold if at most two firms can serve the industry
at one time. This guarantees that the equilibrium we calculate is unique. For the
more general oligopoly case, we show that if a natural Markov-perfect equilibrium
with such monotonicity exists, then it is unique. In this case, the algorithm we pro-
pose always computes it. If no such equilibrium exists, then our algorithm can be
easily adapted to find all equilibria satisfying a desirable property we call “one-shot
renegotiation proofness”.
The remainder of this paper proceeds as follows. The next section presents the
model’s primitives. It also discusses the equilibrium concept used, natural Markov-
perfect equilibrium. As in Cabral (1993), the restriction to “natural” equilibrium
requires no firm with high flow profits to exit leaving a lower-profitability rival in
the market.
Section 2.3 covers the special case of a market that can support at most two active
firms. The proofs of equilibrium existence and uniqueness are constructive, and so
they naturally generate an algorithm for equilibrium computation. Its central steps
find the fixed points of a finite number of low-dimensional contraction mappings.
We apply the results to a numerical analysis of the effects of relaxing short-term
price competition on welfare-enhancing product development, earlier explored by
Fershtman and Pakes (2000).
Section 2.4 begins with extending the algorithm for the duopoly model to the gen-
eral oligopoly case. We first consider natural equilibria in which adding incumbent
firms weakly lowers continuation values. If such a “payoff-monotone” equilibrium
exists, it is essentially unique and the algorithm computes it. Next, we illustrate
with an example that an incumbent’s expected discounted payoff may increase with
the number of incumbent firms. This violation of payoff monotonicity is caused
by the entry deterring effects of competition. It enables two types of equilibrium
multiplicity. The first arises from the failure of some incumbent firms to coordinate
on survival when this is mutually beneficial; the other occurs when multiple mixed
strategies leave incumbents indifferent between exit and continuation. We propose
7
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to exclude the first type of multiplicity by requiring equilibria to be “(one-shot) rene-
gotiation proof”. We show that the payoff-monotone equilibrium, if it exists, is also
the unique renegotiation-proof equilibrium and extend the algorithm to compute
all the renegotiation-proof equilibria in the case that a payoff-monotone equilibrium
does not exist. The final section presents a simple generalized method of moments
procedure for the model’s estimation.
2.2 The Model
In Ericson and Pakes (1995), a countable number of firms with heterogeneous pro-
ductivity levels serve a single industry. Entry requires the payment of a sunk cost,
and exit allows firms to avoid per period fixed costs of production. Surviving in-
cumbent firms choose investments that stochastically improve their technologies.
Exogenous stochastic increases in the knowledge stock outside the industry increase
the quality of an outside good and thereby decrease all incumbent firms’ profits
simultaneously. These outside knowledge shocks are embodied in potential entrants
to the industry.
Two main changes to Ericson and Pakes’ primitive assumptions facilitate our
demonstration of Markov-perfect equilibrium uniqueness and our algorithm for its
rapid computation. First, we assume that each firm’s productivity progresses stochas-
tically and exogenously, instead of allowing firms to make costly investments that ac-
celerate technological progress. Second, we entertain aggregate shocks that decrease
or increase the profits of incumbent firms and potential entrants alike, whereas the
aggregate shocks in Ericson and Pakes decrease the profits of incumbents but not
those of potential entrants. Under our assumptions, incumbents are never replaced
by more profitable entrants; Ericson and Pakes allow for such creative destruction.
2.2.1 Primitive Assumptions
The model consists of a single oligopolistic market in discrete time t ∈ Z? ≡
{0, 1, . . .}. A countable number of firms potentially serve the market. These are
indexed by f ∈ Z? × N. Below we refer to f as the firm’s name. At a given time
t, some of the firms are active, and the others are inactive. Each active firm f has
8
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Start with
(Ct, Nt)
Firm f earns
pi(Nt, Ct, K
f
t ) if active
Entry
decision
(t, 1)
Entry
decision
(t, 2)
a = 1; Pay ϕ & enter a = 0; Pass & earn 0
a ∈ [0, 1]
Entry
decision
(t, Jt + 1)
Simultaneous
continuation
decisions
Nature chooses Kft+1 using
Π if firm f is active and
chooses Ct+1 ∼ Q(·|Ct).
Go to next period
with (Ct+1, Nt+1)
Figure 2.1: The Sequence of Events and Actions within a Period
an idiosyncratic productivity type Kft that takes values in K ≡ {1, . . . , kˇ}.1 Stack
the numbers of active firms with each productivity level at time t into the kˇ × 1
vector Nt, the market structure. Initially, no firms serve the market: N0 equals a
vector of zeros. Subsequently; entry, stochastic productivity improvement, and exit
determine its evolution.
Figure 2.1 illustrates the sequence of events and actions within a period t. It
begins with the inherited values of two state variables, Nt and a scalar index of
demand Ct ∈ [cˆ, cˇ], with cˇ <∞. With these in place, the active participants receive
their profits from serving the market. For a type Kft firm within the market structure
1Here, “productivity” reflects all variables that can influence a firm’s flow profit, even those
that have nothing to do with the physical production technology.
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Nt, these equal pi(Nt, Ct, K
f
t ).
Our first assumption restricts the flow profit function pi. For its formal statement,
we use ιk to denote a kˇ×1 vector with a one in its kth position and zeros elsewhere,
and set ι0 equal to a kˇ × 1 vector of zeros. With this convention n + ιk denotes a
market structure with at least one type k firm.
Assumption 1 (Monotone and Bounded Profits). For all productivity types k ∈ K,
demand states c ∈ [cˆ, cˇ], and market structures n ∈ Zkˇ?:
1. For all d ∈ (c, cˇ], pi(ιk + n, c, k) ≤ pi (ιk + n, d, k);
2. for all l ∈ K with k < l, pi(ιk + ιl + n, c, k) < pi(ιk + ιl + n, c, l);
3. for all l ∈ K, pi(ιk + n+ ιl, c, k) < pi (ιk + n+ ιl−1, c, k);
4. for some −∞ < pˆi, pˇi <∞; pˆi ≤ pi(ιk + n, c, k) ≤ pˇi;
5. for some κ(k) > 0, pi(ιk + n, c, k) → −κ(k) as the number of firms in n goes
to infinity; and
6. pi(ιkˇ, cˇ, kˇ) > 0.
Assumptions 1.1–3 require that a firm’s profits increase with demand and its own
productivity and decrease with the number and productivity of its competitors.
Assumption 1.4 says that a firm’s flow profits are bounded. Assumption 1.5 states
that a firm’s profits are strictly negative if the number of its competitors is sufficiently
large. Here, κ(k) represents a type k firm’s per-period fixed cost. By Assumption
1.5, κ(k) ≤ −pˆi <∞. Assumption 1.6 excludes the trivial case that firms never have
positive profits, by requiring that profits are strictly positive in the most favorable
state.
After production, firms with names (t, 1), (t, 2), . . . make entry decisions sequen-
tially in the order of their names. These continue until a firm chooses to remain out
of the industry. We denote the number of entrants in period t with Jt, so the name
of the first potential entrant choosing to stay out of the market and thereby ending
the period’s entry stage is (t, Jt + 1). The cost of entry is ϕ > 0. After paying this
cost, the entrant immediately joins the set of active firms with productivity type 1.1
1Since entrants’ productivity types evolve before their first period of production, we can use
the distribution of Kft+1 given K
f
t = 1 to distribute new firms’ types nontrivially. That is, the
assumption that all entrants have Kft = 1 is not overly restrictive.
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A firm with an entry opportunity cannot delay its choice, so the payoff to staying
out of the industry is zero.
After the entry decisions, all active firms— including those that just entered the
market— decide simultaneously between survival and exit. Exit is irreversible but
otherwise costless. Firms’ entry and exit decisions maximize their expected profit
streams discounted with β < 1.
In the period’s final stage, Ct and the firms’ productivity types evolve. The
demand index evolves exogenously according to a first-order Markov process. We
denote the conditional distribution of Ct+1 with Q (c Ct) ≡ Pr (Ct+1 ≤ c Ct), and
the corresponding probability density function with q(c Ct). Each firm’s idiosyn-
cratic productivity type follows an independent Markov chain with a common (kˇ×kˇ)
transition matrix Π. Its typical element is Πk,k′ ≡ Pr
(
Kft+1 = k
′ Kft = k
)
. Follow-
ing Ericson and Pakes (1995), we assume that the idiosyncratic productivity types
never regress:
Assumption 2 (No Productivity Regress). Π is upper diagonal.
We further assume that Kft+1 (weakly) stochastically increases with K
f
t .
Assumption 3 (Monotone Productivity Dynamics). For all k′, k, l ∈ K such that
k < l,
Pr
(
Kft+1 ≥ k′ Kft = k
)
≤ Pr
(
Kft+1 ≥ k′ Kft = l
)
.
This assumption gives high technology firms no worse advancement opportunities
than low technology firms have.
2.2.2 Markov-Perfect Equilibrium
A Markov-perfect equilibrium is a subgame-perfect equilibrium in strategies that are
only contingent on payoff-relevant variables. For a potential participant f = (t, j)
contemplating entry these are Ct and the market structure M
f
t just after f ’s possible
entry. The latter equals period t’s initial market structure Nt augmented with j type
1 entrants: M ft ≡ Nt+jι1. Denote the market structure after the period’s final entry
with ME,t ≡ Nt + Jtι1. If firm f is contemplating survival in period t, the payoff-
relevant variables are this market structure, the current demand index (Ct), and its
productivity type (Kft ).
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A Markov strategy for firm f is a pair (afE, a
f
S) of functions
afE :
{
(i1 +m, c) ;m ∈ Zkˇ?, c ∈ [cˆ, cˇ]
}
−→ [0, 1] and
afS :
{
(ik +m, c, k) ;m ∈ Zkˇ?, c ∈ [cˆ, cˇ], k ∈ K
}
−→ [0, 1].
This strategy’s entry rule afE assigns a probability of becoming active given an entry
opportunity to each possible value of (M ft , Ct). Similarly, its survival rule a
f
S assigns
a probability of being active in the next period given that the firm is currently active
to each possible value of its payoff-relevant state (ME,t, Ct, K
f
t ). Since calendar
time is not payoff-relevant, we hereafter drop the t subscript from all variables. A
symmetric equilibrium is an equilibrium in which all firms follow the same strategy
(aE, aS). In the remainder of the paper, we focus on symmetric equilibria and drop
the superscript f from the firms’ common strategy.
Throughout the paper, we will focus on equilibria in which a high productivity
firm never exits when a low productivity competitor survives. Formally, we define a
natural Markov-perfect equilibrium as follows:
Definition 1. A natural Markov-perfect equilibrium is a symmetric Markov-perfect
equilibrium in a strategy (aE, aS) such that for all k, l ∈ K, k < l; m ∈ Zkˇ?; and
c ∈ [cˆ, cˇ];
aS(ιk + ιl +m, c, k) > 0 implies aS(ιk + ιl +m, c, l) = 1.
Cabral (1993) restricts attention to natural equilibria in a model with deterministic
productivity progression.
Firms’ expected discounted profits in two of each period’s nodes are of particu-
lar interest, the post-entry value and the post-survival value. The post-entry value
vE(ME, C,K) equals the expected discounted profits of a type K firm in a market
with demand index C and market structure ME just after all entry decisions have
been sequentially realized. Since it gives the payoffs to a potential producer from
entering in each possible market structure that could arise from other players subse-
quent entry decisions, it determines optimal entry choices. The post-survival value
vS(MS, C,K) equals the expected discounted profits of a type K firm facing demand
index C and market structure MS just after all survival decisions have been realized.
It gives the payoffs to a surviving firm in each possible market structure following
firms’ simultaneous continuation decisions, so it is central to the analysis of exit.
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The value functions vE and vS satisfy
vE(mE, c, k) = aS(mE, c, k)E [vS(MS, c, k) ME = mE] , (2.1)
and
vS(mS, c, k) = βE [pi(N ′, C ′, K ′) + vE(M ′E, C ′, K ′) MS = mS, C = c,K = k] .
(2.2)
Here and throughout, we denote the variable corresponding to X in the next period
with X ′. The conditional expectation in (2.1) is computed given that the firm of
interest continues, and embodies the use of aS by all other active firms. It accounts
for firms’ possible use of mixed strategies. The conditional expectation in (2.2)
accounts for the use of aE by all potential participants with entry opportunities in
the next period as well as the exogenous evolutions of C and the firms’ productivity
types.1
For (aE, aS) to form a symmetric Markov-perfect equilibrium, it is necessary and
sufficient that no firm can gain from a one-shot deviation from it (Fudenberg and
Tirole, 1991, Theorem 4.2):
aE(m, c) ∈ arg max
a∈[0,1]
a (E [vE (ME, c, 1) M = m]− ϕ) and (2.3)
aS(mE, c, k) ∈ arg max
a∈[0,1]
a E [vS(MS, c, k) ME = mE] . (2.4)
The conditional expectations in (2.3) and (2.4) equal those in (2.1) and (2.2).
Before proceeding to examine the set of natural Markov-perfect equilibria, con-
sider one uninteresting source of equilibrium multiplicity. With an equilibrium in
hand, change one player’s action at a particular node of the game. If this change
gives the same payoff to the player in question and all other players’ equilibrium
actions at that node remain optimal, then this change forms a second equilibrium.
In our model, this situation can arise when the payoff to entry equals zero and when
the payoff to survival as the only firm of a given type equals zero. To eliminate this
difficulty, we require firms in such situations to choose inactivity.
Definition 2. A Markov strategy (aE, aS) with corresponding payoffs vE and vS
defaults to inactivity if for all m ∈ Zkˇ?, c ∈ [cˆ, cˇ], and k ∈ K;
1In Appendix 5.2.1.1, we present the two distributions underlying the conditional expectations
in (2.1) and (2.2) in detail.
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• vE(ι1 +m, c, 1) = ϕ implies aE(ι1 +m, c) = 0 and
• vS(m, c, k) = 0 and mk = 1 implies aS(m, c, k) = 0.
The remainder of the paper restricts attention to equilibria with strategies that
default to inactivity.1
2.3 Duopoly
It is helpful to begin the model’s analysis with one additional restriction: At most
two firms can be active at once. Throughout this section, we represent duopoly
market structures with ιk + ιl with k, l ∈ K∪ {0}. The following lemma arises from
this simplification.
Lemma 1 (Monotone Payoffs in the Duopoly Model). In a natural Markov-perfect
equilibrium, for all c ∈ [cˆ, cˇ] and k ∈ K, vE(2ιk, c, k) ≤ vE(ιk, c, k) and vS(2ιk, c, k) ≤
vS(ιk, c, k).
Proof. See Appendix 5.1.1.1.
Lemma 1 states that a duopolist facing a rival of the same type always has a lower
value than it would have without the rival present. With its help, we develop the
duopoly model’s analysis in three stages. First, we examine the special case without
heterogeneity, kˇ = 1. This introduces the model’s most important moving parts
without undue complication. We then generalize this slightly in Section 2.3.2 by
adding a second productivity type and walking through the procedure for equilibrium
calculation. Section 2.3.3 formalizes this procedure into an algorithm for an arbitrary
kˇ and then establishes equilibrium existence and uniqueness results. Finally, Section
2.3.4 uses this algorithm for numerical analysis of the effects of technological progress
and demand uncertainty on industry dynamics. This illustration demonstrates that
the natural Markov-perfect equilibrium’s computational simplicity.
1Note that we do not restrict the game’s strategy space to include only strategies that default
to inactivity.
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Figure 2.2: Reduced-form Representation of the Duopoly Continuation Game
Survive Exit
Survive
vS(2, c)
vS(2, c)
vS(1, c)
0
Exit
0
vS(1, c)
0
0
Note: In each cell, the upper-left expression gives the row player’s payoff. Please see the text for
further details.
2.3.1 One Productivity Type
When firms have identical productivity types by assumption, the restriction to a
natural equilibrium merely requires symmetry of players’ strategies. The type dis-
tribution is trivial, so we write pi(N,C, 1) as pi(N,C) and make the analogous sub-
stitution for the value functions throughout this example’s development. Here, we
construct a symmetric Markov-perfect equilibrium for this case in three steps.
Step 1: Calculation of vE(2, ·), vS(2, ·), and aE(2, ·). The equilibrium construc-
tion begins with a characterization of the duopoly payoffs vE(2, ·) and vS(2, ·). In
a Markov-perfect equilibrium, the survival rule aS(2, c) forms a Nash equilibrium
of the static simultaneous-move game with payoffs given by the expected continu-
ation values in demand state c. Figure 2.2 gives the reduced-form representation
of this game with the two pure strategies “Survive” and “Exit”. The upper-left
expression in each cell is the row player’s payoff. A firm that survives while its
rival exits earns the monopoly post-survival value vS(1, c). Both firms receive the
duopoly post-survival payoff vS(2, c) following joint survival. This adds the dis-
counted duopoly flow payoff pi(2, C ′) to the discounted duopoly post-entry payoff
vE(2, C
′). Consequently, it satisfies a special case of Equation (2.2):
vS(2, c) = βE [pi(2, C ′) + vE(2, C ′) C = c] .
Suppose that vS(2, c) > 0. Lemma 1 guarantees that vS(1, c) > 0, so in this
case “Survive” is a dominant strategy. If instead vS(2, c) < 0, then a symmetric
equilibrium strategy must put positive probability on “Exit”. That pure strategy’s
15
2. SIMPLE MARKOV-PERFECT INDUSTRY DYNAMICS
payoff always equals zero. Since vE(2, c) equals the symmetric equilibrium payoff to
this game, these facts together yield the following special case of Equation (2.1):
vE(2, c) = max {0, vS(2, c)}
= max
{
0, βE [pi(2, C ′) + vE(2, C ′) C = c]
}
.
(2.5)
The right-hand side defines a contraction mapping, so this necessary condition
uniquely determines vE(2, ·) and, using (2.2), vS(2, ·). This is the key technical
insight that makes the calculation of the model’s Markov-perfect industry dynamics
simple. Although duopoly is not an absorbing state for the industry, we can cal-
culate the equilibrium duopoly payoffs without knowledge of the firms’ payoffs in
possible future market structures. This is because firms’ common post-entry value
in a symmetric equilibrium equals zero unless joint continuation is individually prof-
itable.
With the duopoly post-entry value in hand, we can proceed to the problem of a
potential entrant facing a single incumbent. By Equation (2.3), this firm enters if
vE(2, c) > ϕ and stays out of the market if vE(2, c) ≤ ϕ. For all c,
aE(2, c) = I {vE(2, c) > ϕ} . (2.6)
Note that this rule defaults to inactivity. When C has an atomless distribution, it
almost surely prescribes the same action as any other entry rule consistent with profit
maximization that does not default to inactivity. For this reason, our requirement
that the potential entrant default to inactivity has no substantial economic content.
Step 2: Calculation of vE(1, ·), vS(1, ·), aE(1, ·), and aS(1, ·). We proceed to
consider the monopoly payoffs, a potential entrant’s decision to enter an empty
market, and an incumbent monopolist’s survival decision. Because an incumbent
monopolist choosing to survive will earn vS(1, c), the post-entry value to a monop-
olist in (2.1) reduces to
vE(1, c) = max {0, vS(1, c)}
= max
{
0, βE
[
pi(1, C ′) + aE(2, C ′)vE(2, C ′) + (1− aE(2, C ′)) vE(1, C ′)
∣∣∣ C = c]}.
Given vE(2, ·) and aE(2, ·) from Step 1, the right-hand side defines a contraction
mapping that uniquely determines vE(1, ·) and, using Equation (2.2), vS(1, ·). It
is not difficult to demonstrate that the vE(1, c) and vS(1, c) so constructed always
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weakly exceed, respectively, vE(2, c) and vS(2, c) from Step 1; so that the constructed
value functions are consistent with the requirements of Lemma 1.
The post-entry value of a potential monopolist in demand state c equals vE(1, c)
if no second firm enters (with probability 1− aE(2, c)) and vE(2, c) if a second firm
enters (with probability aE(2, c)). Consequently, the unique entry rule for a potential
duopolist that defaults to inactivity is1
aE(1, c) = I {[1− aE(2, c)] vE(1, c) + aE(2, c)vE(2, c) > ϕ} . (2.7)
The corresponding unique monopoly survival rule that defaults to inactivity simply
equals
aS(1, c) = I {vS(1, c) > 0} .
Step 3: Calculation of aS(2, ·). The first two steps have determined the only
possible post-entry and post-survival values, as well as an entry rule and a monopoly
survival rule that are consistent with them. This last step completes the equilibrium
strategy’s construction by determining a duopoly survival rule that satisfies (2.4).
As we noted above in Step 1, equilibrium requires aS(2, c) = 1 if vS(2, c) > 0.
All that remains undetermined is the survival rule when vS(2, c) ≤ 0. If profit
maximization would require even a monopolist to exit (i.e. vS(1, c) ≤ 0), then
both duopolists exit for sure and aS(2, c) = 0. If instead vS(1, c) > 0, then the
reduced-form continuation game above has no pure-strategy equilibrium. In its
unique mixed-strategy equilibrium, each firm’s survival probability leaves its rival
indifferent between exiting (and getting a payoff of zero for sure) and surviving.
That is, in demand states c such that vS(2, c) ≤ 0 and vS(1, c) > 0, the indifference
condition
aS(2, c)vS(2, c) + (1− aS(2, c)) vS(1, c) = 0
uniquely determines aS(2, c).
2
1Using that vE(2, c) ≤ vE(1, c) and that aE(2, c) satisfies (2.6), (2.7) can be simplified to
aE(1, c) = I {vE(1, c) > ϕ}.
2The mixed strategy so derived prescribes that both firms exit for sure if vS(1, c) = 0, as the
required by our restriction to strategies that default to inactivity.
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2.3.2 Two Productivity Types
We now proceed to adapt the basic ideas presented above to the case with two
productivity types. In the interest of expositional clarity, we denote the higher
productivity type with the intuitive H (instead of 2) and the lower type with L
(instead of 1). We construct this case’s unique natural Markov-perfect equilibrium
in six steps. Just as before, these steps take us through a finite partition of the
state space. In each of the first five steps, we compute the equilibrium payoffs in the
states considered by finding the unique fixed point of a contraction mapping. The
results from the completed steps are used as inputs in the following steps. Figure
2.3 illustrates this sequence of computations. The construction ends by specifying
the unique strategy that supports the equilibrium payoffs in the sixth step.1
Step 1: Calculation of vE(2ιH, ·,H) and vS(2ιH, ·,H) As depicted by the upper-
left panel in Figure 2.3, we start the equilibrium construction by considering a market
populated by two type H firms. The analysis in this step is a carbon copy of the first
step of the previous example. The simultaneous-move survival game between two
type H firms is analogous to the one in Figure 2.2, and Lemma 1 guarantees that
“Survive” is the dominant strategy if joint continuation gives both firms positive
payoffs. Therefore, finding the fixed point of a contraction mapping analogous to
that in (2.1) yields vE(2ιH, ·,H). The continuation payoff vS(2ιH, ·,H) immediately
follows.
Step 2: Calculation of vE(ιL+ιH, ·,L), vS(ιL+ιH, ·,L), aE(ιL+ιH, ·), and aS(ιL+
ιH, ·,L). A type L firm that chooses to survive advances to H with probability
ΠLH and remains unchanged with probability ΠLL ≡ 1 − ΠLH. In a natural MPE,
the survival of the type L firm guarantees survival of any type H rival, so the
continuation value vE(ιL + ιH, C,L) must satisfy
vE(ιL + ιH, c,L) = max
{
0, vS(ιL + ιH, c,L)
}
=βmax
{
0,ΠLLE [pi(ιL + ιH, C ′,L) + vE(ιL + ιH, C ′,L)|C = c]
+ ΠLHE [pi(2ιH, C ′,H) + vE(2ιH, C ′,H)|C = c]
}
.
1The Atari 400 computer appearing in the illustration went on sale in November 1979 and had
8K of RAM.
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Figure 2.3: Equilibrium Computation for a Duopoly with Two Productivity Types
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0
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1
1
0
1
2
0
1
0
STOP
0
2
1
1
0
1
2
0
1
0
Value functions calculated
Value functions in hand
Number of type L firms
Number of type H firms
Market structure with one firm of each type
Note: There are five possible market structures. Each divided rectangle represents one of them,
and each collection of five rectangles displays the value functions being calculated (in red) and the
value functions already in hand (in blue) at one stage of the algorithm (which is Section 2.3.3’s
Algorithm 1 with kˇ = 2).
Since vE(2ιH, ·,H) is in hand from Step 1, this defines a contraction mapping in
vE(ιL + ιH, ·,L). With its fixed-point in hand, we can then easily compute vS(ιL +
ιH, ·,L),
aE(ιL + ιH, c) = I{vE(ιL + ιH, c,L) > ϕ},
and
aS(ιL + ιH, c,L) = I{vS(ιL + ιH, c,L) > 0}. (2.8)
Step 3: Calculation of vE(ιH, ·,H), vS(ιH, ·,H), vE(ιL+ιH, ·,H), vS(ιL+ιH, ·,H),
aS(ιH, ·,H), and aS(ιL+ ιH, ·,H). A market with a type H monopolist incumbent
attracts an entrant next period if and only if aE(ιL+ ιH, C
′) = 1, so vE(ιH, ·,H) and
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vE(ιH + ιL, ·,H) together satisfy
vE(ιH, c,H) = max
{
0, vS(ιH, c,H)
}
=βmax
{
0,E
[
pi(ιH, C
′,H) + aE(ιL + ιH, C ′)vE(ιL + ιH, C ′,H)
+ (1− aE(ιL + ιH, C ′)) vE(ιH, C ′,H) C = c
]}
.
(2.9)
Step 2 determined aE(ιL + ιH, ·), so the only unknowns in (2.9) are the value
functions. Since a continuing type H duopolist facing a type L rival remains a
duopolist with probability aS(ιL + ιH, c,L), and aS(ιL + ιH, c,H) = 1 whenever
aS(ιL+ ιH, c,L) > 0 in a natural equilibrium; these value functions must also satisfy
vE(ιL + ιH, c,H)
= aS(ιL + ιH, c,L)vS(ιL + ιH, c, ιH) + (1− aS(ιL + ιH, c,L)) vE(ιH, c,H)
= aS(ιL + ιH, c,L)β
(
ΠLLE[pi(ιH + ιL, C ′,H) + vE(ιL + ιH, C ′,H)|C = c]
+ ΠLHE[pi(2ιH, C ′,H) + vE(2ιH, C ′,H)|C = c]
)
+ (1− aS(ιL + ιH, c,L)) vE(ιH, c,H).
(2.10)
We have vE(2ιH, ·,H) from Step 1 and aE(ιL+ιH, ·) and aS(ιL+ιH, ·,L) from Step 2,
so together, (2.9) and (2.10) determine vE(ιH, ·,H) and vE(ιL + ιH, ·,H). Obtaining
vS(ιH, ·,H) and vS(ιL + ιH, ·,H) from these is straightforward.
The consequent type H monopoly incumbent’s survival rule equals
aS(ιH, c,H) = I{vS(ιH, c,H) > 0}. (2.11)
Similarly, the survival rule for a type H incumbent in a market with a type L
competitor equals aS(ιL + ιH, c,H) = I{aS(ιL + ιH, c,L) > 0 or vS(ιH, c,H) > 0}.
In a natural equilibrium that defaults to inactivity, aS(ιL+ ιH, c,L) > 0 implies that
aS(ιL + ιH, c,H) = 1 and vS(ιL + ιH, c,H) > 0. Using this, and the intuitive result
that vS(ιH, c,H) ≥ vS(ιL + ιH, c,H) (which is proved as part of the proof of Lemma
1), this type H incumbent’s survival rule can be simplified to
aS(ιL + ιH, c,H) = I{vS(ιH, c,H) > 0}
.
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Step 4: Calculation of vE(2ιL, ·,L), aE(2ιL, ·), and vS(2ιL, ·,L). Next, we con-
sider a duopoly market with two type L firms. If both firms choose survival, then
their idiosyncratic shocks could change the market structure to either of the duopoly
structures considered in Steps 1-3 or leave it unchanged. Lemma 1 guarantees that
if the value of simultaneous survival to either incumbent is positive, then joint con-
tinuation is the only Nash equilibrium outcome of their survival game. Therefore,
vE(2ιL, ·,L) satisfies
vE(2ιL, c,L) = max
{
0, vS(2ιL, c,L)
}
=βmax
{
0,Π2LLE [pi(2ιL, C ′,L) + vE(2ιL, C ′,L)|C = c]
+ ΠLLΠLHE [pi(ιL + ιH, C ′,L) + vE(ιL + ιH, C ′,L)|C = c]
+ ΠLHΠLLE [pi(ιL + ιH, C ′,H) + vE(ιL + ιH, C ′,H)|C = c]
+ Π2LHE [pi(2ιH, C ′,H) + vE(2ιH, C ′,H)|C = c]
}
.
The only unknown on its righthand side is vE(2ιL, ·,L), so we can use this Bellman
equation to calculate it. With this in hand, we determine vS(2ιL, ·,L) and construct
the rule for entry into a market with one type L incumbent as
aE(2ιL, c) = I{vE(2ιL, c,L) > ϕ}. (2.12)
Step 5: Calculation of vE(ιL, ·,L), vS(ιL, ·,L), aE(ιL, ·), and aS(ιL, ·,L). If a
type L monopolist chooses survival, then one of four market structures will prevail
after the next period’s entry decisions, depending on the incumbent’s idiosyncratic
shock and on the decision of a potential entrant:
vE(ιL, c,L) = max
{
0, vS(ιL, c,L)
}
= max
{
0,ΠLLE
[
pi(ιL, C
′,L) + aE(2ιL, C ′)vE(2ιL, C ′,L)
+ (1− aE(2ιL, C ′)) vE(ιL, C ′,L)|C = c
]
+ ΠLHE
[
pi(ιH, C
′,H) + aE(ιL + ιH, C ′)vE(ιL + ιH, C ′,H)
+ (1− aE(ιL + ιH, C ′)) vE(ιH, C ′,H)|C = c
]}
.
(2.13)
Given the value functions and entry strategies calculated in Steps 1–4, the right-
hand side of (2.13) defines a contraction mapping with vE(ιL, ·,L) as its fixed point.
With this, we get vS(ιL, ·,L).
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The post-entry value of a potential monopolist in demand state c equals vE(ιL, c,L)
if no second firm enters (with probability 1−aE(2ιL, c)) and vE(2ιL, c,L) if a second
firm enters (with probability aE(2ιL, c)). Consequently, the unique entry rule that
defaults to inactivity is1
aE(ιL, c) = I {[1− aE(2ιL, c)] vE(ιL, c,L) + aE(2ιL, c)vE(2ιL, c,L) > ϕ} . (2.14)
The corresponding monopoly survival rule is
aS(ιL, c,L) = I{vS(ιL, c,L) > 0}.
Step 6: Calculation of aS(2ιH, ·,H) and aS(2ιL, ·,L). Steps 1–5 have deter-
mined all equilibrium continuation values, entry rules, and survival rules for firms
facing no identical rival. All that remains is to determine the exit rules for duopolies
of identical firms. Their construction parallels that from the case with homogeneous
firms: Unless either survival or exit is a dominant strategy, both firms mix between
the two pure actions to leave each other indifferent between them.
aS(2ιL, c,L) =

1 if vS(2ιL, c,L) > 0,
vS(ιL,c,L)
vS(ιL,c,L)−vS(2ιL,c,L) if vS(2ιL, c,L) ≤ 0 and vS(ιL, c,L) > 0
0 otherwise.
aS(2ιH, c,H) =

1 if vS(2ιH, c,H) > 0,
vS(ιH,c,H)
vS(ιH,c,H)−vS(2ιH,c,H) if vS(2ιH, c,H) ≤ 0 and vS(ιH, c,H) > 0
0 otherwise.
This concludes the equilibrium construction. When at most two firms can simul-
taneously serve the market, adding productivity heterogeneity increased the number
of steps required from two to six. However, we can still construct the equilibrium
by calculating the fixed points of a sequence of contraction mappings.
2.3.3 Equilibrium Existence, Uniqueness, and Computation
We next extend the six-step calculation of duopoly equilibrium with two technology
types to allow for an arbitrary kˇ ≥ 1. The resulting algorithm consists of two proce-
dures, which we present as flow charts in Procedures 1 and 2. The first computes all
1Using that vE(2ιL, c,L) ≤ vE(ιL, c,L) and that aE(2ιL, c) satisfies (2.12), (2.14) can be
simplified to aE(ιL, c) = I {vE(ιL, c,L) > ϕ}.
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payoffs, survival rules for duopolists facing strictly higher productivity types, and
rules for potential entrants facing an incumbent. The second procedure calculates
the survival rules for duopoly incumbents with weakly higher productivity types
and the rule for a potential entrant facing an empty market. We emphasize that
the algorithm calculates candidate equilibrium strategies and continuation values by
denoting these with α and w instead of a and v.
Procedure 1 has an outer-loop and an inner-loop. In the outer-loop, the pro-
ductivity type for the weakly better firm, indexed by h in Procedure 1’s flow chart,
decreases from kˇ to 1. For each level of h, the weakly worse firm’s productivity type,
indexed by l in Procedure 1’s flow chart, decreases from h to 1 in the inner-loop. For
every (h, l) pair, the post-entry value of the type l firm that faces a type h rival—
wE(ιl + ιh, ·, l)— is computed as the fixed point of the operator Th,l defined by
Th,l(f)(c) = max
{
0, T Sh,l(f)(c)
}
, (2.15)
with
T Sh,l(f)(c) ≡ βE
[∑
i,j
ΠhiΠljpi(ιi + ιj, C
′, j)
+
∑
(i,j)6=(h,l)
ΠhiΠljwE(ιi + ιj, C
′, j) + ΠhhΠllf(C ′) C = c
]
.
The function T Sh,l(f) gives the post-survival value of a type l firm that faces a type
h competitor and that takes its next period’s post-entry value to be f(C ′) if both
firms’ productivity types remain the same and equal to the (candidate) equilibrium
value otherwise. Because further entry is impossible and productivity cannot regress
(Assumption 2), its evaluation only requires the equilibrium values wE(ιi+ιj, ·, j) for
(i, j) 6= (h, l) such that i ≥ h and j ≥ l. Since Procedure 1 proceeds in descending
order of (h, l), these post-entry values are in hand when T Sh,l(f) is computed. The
function Th,l(f) gives the post-entry value of a firm in the same state and with the
same take on its next period’s post-entry value. Its specification in (2.15) embodies
the natural equilibrium requirement that a type h > l firm never exits while the
type l firm survives. Evaluating T Sh,l at the fixed point wE(ιl + ιh, ·, l) of Th,l gives
wS(ιl + ιh, ·, l). Finally, if l < h, then firm l’s survival rule is set so that it prescribes
survival if wS(ιl + ιh, ·, l) > 0 and exit otherwise.
When l equals 1, the next step computes the strategy of a potential entrant
facing a type h incumbent, the monopoly payoff for a type h firm and the duopoly
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START
h ← kˇ
Details for Th,l, T
S
h,l, Th
and T Sh are in the Main
Text. Hereafter, ←
means “assignment”.
l ← h
wE(ιh + ιl, ·, l)← fixed point of Th,l
wS(ιh + ιl, ·, l)← T Sh,l [wE(ιh + ιl, ·, l)]
l < h?
αS(ιh + ιl, ·, l) ←
I {wS(ιh + ιl, ·, l) > 0}
l = 1?l ← l − 1
αE(ιh + ι1, ·)← I {wE(ιh + ι1, ·, 1) > ϕ}
{wS(ιh + ιk, ·, h); 0 ≤ k < h} ← T Sh [wE(ιh + ι·, ·, h)]
{wE(ιh + ιk, ·, h); 0 ≤ k < h} ← fixed point of Th
h = 1?h ← h − 1
Return wE, wS, αE(ιh + ιl, ·),
and αS(ιh + ιl, ·, l) for l < h.
STOP
Yes
No
Yes
No
Yes
No
Procedure 1: Initial Equilibrium Calculations for the Heterogeneous Duopoly Model
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payoff for a type h firm facing a type k rival (for all 0 ≤ k < h) as the fixed point
of the operator Th defined by
1
Th(f)(c, k) = max
{
0, αS(ιh + ιk, c, k)T
S
h (f)(c, k) + [1− αS(ιh + ιk, c, k)]T Sh (f)(c, 0)
}
,
with
T Sh (f)(c, 0) = βE
[∑
i
Πhipi(ιi, C
′, i) + Πhh (1− αE(ιh + ι1, C ′)) f(C ′, 0)
+
∑
i>h
Πhi (1− αE(ιi + ι1, C ′))wE(ιi, C ′, i)
+ ΠhhαE(ιh + ι1, C
′) (I{h = 1}wE(2ι1, C ′, 1) + I{h > 1}f(C ′, 1))
+
∑
i>h
ΠhiαE(ιi + ι1, C
′)wE(ιi + ι1, C ′, i) C = c
]
,
in which
g(C ′, 1) =
{
f(C ′, 1) if h > 1,
wE(2ι1, C
′, 1) if h = 1,
and, for k > 0,
T Sh (f)(c, k) = βE
[∑
i,j
ΠhiΠkjpi(ιi + ιj, C
′, i)
+
∑
j
ΠhhΠkjf(C
′, j) +
∑
i>h
∑
j
ΠhiΠkjwE(ιi + ιj, C
′, i) C = c
]
.
Evaluating its right-hand side requires, apart from the function f ,
• the entry rule of a potential entrant facing an incumbent with productivity
type no less than h,
• the corresponding post-entry values for the incumbent,
• the survival rules for rivals with types k < h, and
• the corresponding post-survival values.
Again, previous computations using higher values of h, l determine all of these before
this computation begins.
1The expression for Th is correct for any value of αS(ιh + ι0, ·, 0). For definiteness, set αS(ιh +
ι0, ·, 0) ≡ 0.
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START
Specify c ∈ [cˆ, cˇ], h ∈ K, and l ∈ {0, 1, . . . , h}
Get wE(·) and wS(·) from Procedure 1
h > l ?
αS(ιh + ιl, c, h) ←
I {wS (ιh + ιl, c, h) > 0}
h = 1 ?
αE(ι1, c) ←
I {wE (ι1, c, 1) > ϕ}
wS(2ιh, c, h)
> 0?
αS(2ιh, c, h) ← 1
wS(ιh, c, h)
≤ 0?αS(2ιh, c, h) ← 0
αS(2ιh, c, h)← wS(ιh, c, h)
wS(ιh, c, h)− wS(2ιh, c, h) . (2.16)
STOP
Yes
No
Yes
Yes
No
Yes
No
No
Procedure 2: Calculation of Candidate Survival Rule for the Heterogeneous Duopoly
Model
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Procedure 2 complements Procedure 1 by determining the entry rule for a poten-
tial monopolist and the survival rule for a firm with weakly better productivity type.
All but one of these rules are pure and reflect the values of entry and continuation
as expected. The survival rule is mixed when both firms have the same type, the
payoff to joint continuation is negative, and the payoff to monopoly continuation is
positive. By construction, the resulting probability of survival lies in (0, 1].
Algorithm 1 (Duopoly Equilibrium Calculation). Compute a candidate equilibrium
strategy (αS, αE) and payoffs wS and wE in two steps.
1. Use Procedure 1 to compute wE, wS, αE(ιh + ι1, c) for all h ∈ K, and αS(ιh +
ιl, c, l) for all h, l ∈ K such that l < h and all c ∈ [cˆ, cˇ].
2. Use Procedure 2 to compute αE(ι1, c) for all c ∈ [cˆ, cˇ] and αS(ιh + ιl, c, h) for
all h ∈ K, l ∈ {0, . . . , h}, and all c ∈ [cˆ, cˇ].
Because the candidate payoffs are determined as the unique fixed points of con-
traction mappings, Algorithm 1 always returns unique candidate equilibrium payoffs
and hence a unique candidate equilibrium strategy. We further verify that the can-
didate equilibrium strategy forms a natural Markov-perfect equilibrium, with the
equilibrium payoffs equal the candidate ones. Using Lemma 1, we also show that
any equilibrium payoff should satisfy the conditions defined by operators Th,l and
Th. This leads to the natural Markov-perfect equilibrium’s uniqueness.
Proposition 1 (Equilibrium in Heterogeneous Duopoly Model). There exists a
unique natural Markov-perfect equilibrium. Algorithm 1 computes its payoffs and
strategy. The equilibrium payoffs vS = wS and vE = wE. The equilibrium strategy
aS = αS and aE = αE.
Proof. See Appendix 5.1.1.1.
2.3.4 Application
We apply our heterogenous-duopoly model to the welfare analysis of an R&D race
game. Consider a market for some new good. In period t, Ct consumers populate the
market. All of these consumers have the same utility function, which is quadratic
in the quantity of the new good consumed. Consequently, total demand for the new
good at time t and price p equals Ct(a− p)/b, for some parameters a, b > 0. A firm
supplying q units of this good receives a surplus Ctpq.
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Firms must invent the good before they can supply it to the market. This requires
that they enter the market, incur an entry cost ϕ, and subsequently invest in R&D,
at a fixed cost κ(k). There are several milestone stages in the invention process,
marked by 1, 2, . . . , kˇ. New entrants start in stage 1 and, as long as they stay in
the market and pay the fixed cost κ(k) according to their current stage k, progress
through the successive R&D stages according to a Markov chain with transition
matrix Π. Once a firm reaches the final stage kˇ, it has invented the product and can
start selling it in the market. The fixed cost κ(kˇ) still needs to be paid to produce
the good. An active firm may exit the market in any stage of the R&D race to avoid
paying future fixed costs.
We assume that at most two firms are active in the market at any give time. If
only one firm is active in stage kˇ, it sells the good at the monopoly price. If two
firms are selling the good, they set symmetric quantities to maximize qop + λqrp,
where qo and qr denote the firm’s own quantity and that of its rival, and λ indexes
the level of collusion. If λ = 0, these two firms are Cournot competitors. At higher
values of λ, they collude more. If λ = 1, then they operate as if they are branches
of a monopoly firm that split their joint monopoly revenues evenly.
This game embodies Fershtman and Pakes’ (2000) key “semi-collusion” assump-
tion that firms may collude in setting quantities (or prices) but not when choosing
R&D investment. Unlike Fershtman and Pakes, we take the level of collusion as
exogenously given and ignore the intensive margin of the firms’ strategic R&D in-
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vestments.1 This focus on the (entry and exit) decisions to participate in the R&D
race allow us to apply the heterogenous-duopoly model to analyze industry dynamics
and welfare under different levels of collusion. We find that the model is sufficiently
rich to replicate one of Fershtman and Pakes’ main findings: Consumers may benefit
from collusion, unlike in static models that take the industry structure as given. Intu-
itively, the direct negative effect of collusion on consumer welfare through weakened
competition in the product market, well known from static models, is counteracted
by a positive effect on R&D participation that increases product availability and
product market competition.
To obtain this result, we first compute the model’s unique natural Markov-perfect
equilibrium for each value of λ between 0 and 1, with a 0.01 increment. Through-
out, we specify Q(·|C) to approximate a random walk in the logarithm of C with
innovation variance 0.32, reflected off of the state space’s upper and lower bound-
aries, ln cˆ = −1.5 and ln cˇ = 1.5. We assume annual observations and set β = 0.95.
Also, we specify demand parameters a = 20 and b = 2. These parameters imply
that a monopoly firm earns a profit of 50 from every consumer per year, and a
duopolist under Cournot competition receives about 22.22. We set a modest fixed
cost κ(k) = 20 for all k, and a large sunk cost investment ϕ = 470. Together with the
specification of the C process, these values imply that the annual monopoly surplus
1Alternatively, we can endogenously determine a sustainable level of collusion using the follow-
ing procedure, under the retaliation scheme that any deviation is followed by Cournot competition
until all firms’ exit (Fershtman and Pakes 2000). (i) Compute the Cournot (λ = 0) producer
surplus function piCournot and its associated natural Markov-perfect equilibrium payoff vCournotE .
(ii) Compute the collusive surplus function piC,0 under λ = 1, and its associated natural Markov-
perfect equilibrium payoff vC,0E . (iii) For all c ∈ [cˆ, cˇ], check if collusion can be sustained under the
threat of future retaliation,
piD,0(c, 2ιkˇ, kˇ)− piC,0(c, 2ιkˇ, kˇ) ≤ vC,0E (c, 2ιkˇ, kˇ)− vCournotE (c, 2ιkˇ, kˇ)
in which piD,0 is the surplus that a firm receives when its competitor produces a collusive quantity,
and it deviates to produce an optimal quantity. For those c’s that the inequality fails to hold,
we need to adjust the collusive quantity to eliminate the incentive to deviate. The new collusive
quantities under all c lead to a new and (weakly) lower collusive surplus function piC,1. (iv) Repeat
step (ii) and use piC,1 to compute the associated collusive equilibrium payoff vC,1E . Then, use v
C,1
E
to repeat the comparison in (iii), and update the deviation-proof collusive surplus function to piC,2.
Continuing with this procedure, we get a weakly decreasing sequence of surplus functions piC,i,
and this sequence is bounded from below by piCournot. Therefore, this procedure is guaranteed to
converge to a collusive surplus function, which is induced by a collusive quantity for any given level
of c, and is sustainable with the threat of future retaliation.
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ranges from −8.84 to 204.08. An annual surplus ranging from −15.04 to 79.59 goes
to a duopolist under Cournot competition. Even for a monopoly firm, recovering
the sunk cost of entry requires several years of production under a good level of C.
On the R&D process, we assume that kˇ = 4, and that the Markov transition matrix
Π is such that firms either progress one stage or remain put: Πk,k = Πk,k+1 = 0.5 for
all k < kˇ and Πkˇ,kˇ = 1. Under these values, the average time until R&D success for
an ever-presenting firm is about 5.9 years. More than three quarters of R&D trials
should be successfully completed within seven years.
After computing the equilibrium for each value of λ, we use the equilibrium
strategy to simulate the market’s evolution over 100 periods, starting from a fixed
c0 = 2.718 and an empty market. This level of C guarantees an annual surplus of
115.9 for a monopolist and 50.4 for a Cournot-duopolist. We repeat the simulation
10,000 times, drawing new demand and type transitions in each simulation, but using
the same random draws across the different values of λ. To analyze the impact of
collusion on welfare, we compute, for each level of collusion λ, the discounted sum
FP (λ) of all firms’ revenues net of all firms’ fixed costs and entry costs over the
100 periods, and the discounted sum CS(λ) of the consumer surplus over the 100
periods, both averaged over the 10,000 simulation runs. We assume that consumers
have the same discount factor as firms. The total surplus TS(λ) ≡ FP (λ) +CS(λ).
The upper-left and upper-middle panels of Figure 2.4 show CS(λ) and FP (λ)
for each value of λ, as a proportion of the competitive market’s total surplus TS(0).
First, if λ increases from 0, CS(λ) gradually increases and FP (λ) gradually de-
creases. Then, CS(λ) jumps up and FP (λ) jumps down. At higher levels of collu-
sion, increases in λ decrease the consumer surplus and increase firms’ profits.
Clearly, for low values of λ, the positive effect of increasing collusion on R&D
investment dominates its direct weakening effect on product market competition.
Figure 2.4’s bottom-left panel sheds further light on this. It plots the number of
active firms for each λ, averaged over the 100 periods and all the simulation runs.
We observe a gradual increase and then an upward jump in the number of firms,
paralleling the increase and jump in the consumer surplus. If λ is low; that is,
with little or no collusion; no entrant facing a monopoly market can recover the
sunk cost of entry, even when demand is at its highest level. Therefore, markets
with little collusion are often monopoly markets. If λ increases, firms expect higher
payoffs from a duopoly product market, and are more willing to participate in the
R&D race, even if one firm is already in this race. The value of λ at which the
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Figure 2.4: Welfare Analysis for Various Levels of Collusion
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number of firms and welfare jump is the level of collusion above which two firms
enter immediately, in the initial demand state c0.
This increase in the number of firms improves the consumer surplus in two ways.
First, it improves product availability. Specifically, in this example, on average the
first product reaches the market faster with higher levels of collusion (see Figure 2.4’s
bottom-middle panel). Second, it mitigates the anticompetitive effects of collusion,
by ensuring that consumers are more often charged the (collusive) duopoly price,
which, for all λ < 1, is lower than the monopoly price. At low levels of λ, the
consumer welfare enhancing effects dominate the direct negative effects of increased
collusion.
In contrast, as is clear from Figure 2.4’s bottom panels, at higher levels of collu-
sion, the market is often served by the maximum number of two firms. Consequently,
further increases in λ have only small effects on the number of firms serving the mar-
ket and the speed at which the product becomes available. Therefore, at higher levels
of collusion, the direct effects of collusion dominate, and the consumer surplus grad-
ually falls if λ increases. Nevertheless, the benefits from earlier consumption under
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full collusion (λ = 1) ensure that CS(1) > CS(0).
The variation of FP (λ) with λ almost mirrors the variation of CS(λ). If λ
crosses the level at which two firms immediately enter the market, instead of one,
the total fixed cost incurred is doubled, but the total revenue is less than doubled.
Consequently, FP (λ) jumps down. For similar reasons, FP (λ) falls gradually if λ
increases at lower levels of collusion. In contrast, at higher levels of collusion, the
market is usually a duopoly and the market structure does not change much with
increases in λ. Consequently, the positive effects of such increases on the collusive
duopoly price dominate, and FP (λ) increases. Finally, FP (1) < FP (0), because
of scale savings: The monopoly price is usually charged at either collusive extreme,
but two firms, instead of one, often incur fixed costs under full collusion.
Figure 2.4’s upper-right panel plots the total surplus as a fraction of the com-
petitive market’s total surplus. At low levels of collusion, an increase in λ increases
TS(λ). In particular, the upward jump in the number of firms leads to an upward
jump in the total surplus. At these levels of collusion, the positive effects of increased
product market competition and earlier consumption on consumer welfare dominate
its negative effects on firms through price decreases and fixed cost increases. At
higher levels of collusion, the total surplus falls with increases in λ, because R&D
activity is hardly affected and the negative welfare effects of collusion familiar from
static models dominate.
In this specific example, as in static models that take the market structure as
given, full collusion in the product markets lowers welfare below that in a competitive
market: TS(1) < TS(0). However, unlike in such static models, the competitive
market is often served by only one firm and monopolistic pricing is common under
both levels of collusion. Consequently, the result that full collusion lowers total
welfare cannot be explained by the usual negative welfare effects of collusive pricing.
Instead, it is due to the waste of fixed costs caused by excess entry of producers,
which is not offset by the gains from earlier consumption.1
Although collusion in the product market improves social welfare under certain
circumstances, policy makers may be further interested in how close it can bring
the second best total surplus to the first best. To address this question, we consider
a social planner’s problem. In each period, this social planner decides to start,
maintain, or shut down up to two independent R&D processes to maximize the
1Obviously, this result can be reversed if consumers are impatient and/or have much larger
weight in the total surplus than producers do.
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expected discounted sum of total surplus. When the product is finally invented,
the social planner charges the marginal cost 0 to ensure that the total surplus is
maximized at the spot product market. We compare the first best total surplus with
those generated under full collusion (λ = 1) and full competition (λ = 0). Comparing
to the first best, the loss in total surplus in second best situation comes from two
sources. The “static” source is the conventional deadweight loss in monopoly or
duopoly market. The “dynamic” source is the waste of sunk costs and fixed costs
when firms excessively participate in R&D and the loss in consumer welfare when
firms’ insufficient participation in R&D leads to late invention of the product. In
this experiment, we use the same set of parameter values for the static payoffs, the
R&D process, the fixed cost, and the demand process as the previous ones. Because
sunk cost poses an obvious barrier to entry and has a large impact on the market
structure, we compare the total surplus under 51 equidistant values of ϕ between
150 and 350. For each of these values, we first compute the model’s unique natural
Markov-perfect equilibrium under the cases of social planner, full collusion, and full
competition. Then, we simulate the market evolution for 50 periods, starting from
an empty market and three levels of initial demand with c0 = 0.368 (low demand),
c0 = 1 (median demand), and c0 = 2.718 (high demand) respectively. We repeat
the simulation 10,000 times, drawing new demand and type transitions in each
simulation, but using the same random draws across the different values of ϕ and
c0.
We plot the results from this experiment in Figure 2.5. The solid lines indicate
that the second best total surplus is achieved by competition, while dash lines in-
dicates that collusion generates the second best. In the upper panel, we depict the
ratio of the second best total surplus, averaged over 10,000 simulation runs, to its
first best counterpart. In the middle panel, we plot the difference in the average
number of active firms over the 50 periods between the first and the second best.
The difference between the first and the second best in the average number of periods
before product invention is plotted in the lower panel.
When demand starts from low and ϕ is low, competition produces a second best
total surplus which is merely 30% of the first best. Compared to the social planner’s
case, fewer firms participate in the market, resulting a larger deadweight loss in the
static product market. The product is also invented 5-10 periods later, which is a
dynamic source of consumer welfare loss. For higher values of ϕ, collusion gener-
ates a second best total surplus. Compared to the social planner’s case, more firms
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Figure 2.5: Social Planner v.s. Second Best
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participate in the market and the product is invented around 5 periods earlier. The
excessive participation, albeit leads to the waste of sunk costs and fixed costs, al-
leviates the deadweight loss in the product market and allows consumers to enjoy
the product earlier. Therefore, the second best total surplus under collusion ranges
from 25% of the first best to slightly over 50% as ϕ varies. Nevertheless, at least
40% of the total surplus is unrealized when initial demand is low, regardless of ϕ’s
value. Markets like this (e.g., orphan drugs) most pressingly calls for policy maker’s
intervention. When demand starts from median, we observe a similar pattern: sec-
ond best is achieved by competition for low values of ϕ and by collusion for high
values of ϕ. For ϕ below 300, the second best total surplus is around 40% of the first
best. When ϕ is above 300, firms’ excessive participation is aggravated comparing
to when ϕ is low, resulting in a much earlier invention of the product and a much
smaller deadweight loss in the product market. Both factors contribute to a second
best total surplus which is more than 60% of the first best. When demand starts
from high, second best total surplus is always achieved by competition regardless of
ϕ’s value. Unlike the cases with low and median initial demand, where competition
leads to firms’ insufficient participation and late invention of the product, firms ex-
cessively participate when the initial demand is high and ϕ is low. For high values of
ϕ, firms’ participation is almost identical to the first best situation: a monopoly firm
enters from the beginning and serves the market. Although this monopoly market
exhibits a high deadweight loss, the second best total surplus is still around 70% of
the first best with the dynamic source of surplus loss almost absent.
It is worth stressing that these results are obtained at a very low computational
cost. In both experiments, for any particular value of λ or ϕ, with 301 grid points
for C and the parameter values in use, we can solve the model’ natural Markov-
perfect equilibrium within one second using Matlab on a PC. Even with β = 0.995
(monthly data) and kˇ = 10, which implies a state space with over 33,000 points, we
can solve the model in about 5–30 seconds on a PC.1 This feature of our framework
makes it a useful complement to existing richer, but computationally more forbid-
ding, framework for the analysis of industry dynamics. For example, Fershtman
1We use value function iteration to compute the fixed points of the contraction mappings,
which simplifies our code, but results in a (slow) linear convergence rate of β. To cope with this
issue, one can turn to more sophisticated approaches (see Judd, 1998, for a survey). For example,
Ferris, Judd, and Schmedders’s (2007) Newton-based method ensures global convergence with a
quadratic convergence rate.
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and Pakes’ framework allows for a more detailed study of collusion dynamics by
modeling, among other things, the intensive margin of R&D investment. However,
their framework’s comparative richness comes at a substantial computational cost:
It makes the replication of their results across different parameter values very hard.
In contrast, our framework allows us to quickly examine the welfare implications of
collusion for a wide range of parameter values.
2.4 The General Model
We now turn to the general model, with an arbitrary numbers of firms. First note
that there exists a finite upper bound on the number of firms that will ever be active
in equilibrium. Let mˇ equal the largest n ∈ N such that
pi
[
ιkˇ + (n− 1)ι1, cˇ, kˇ
]
+
βpˇi
1− β > 0.
Assumption 1 ensures that 1 ≤ mˇ <∞ exists. It also implies that, for all n > mˇ, an
incumbent firm that starts a period with n − 1 competitors has negative expected
discounted profits. Using this, it is easy to prove
Lemma 2 (Bounded Number of Firms). In a natural Markov-perfect equilibrium,
vE(m, c) = 0 and vS(m, c, k) < 0 for all m ∈ Zkˇ? such that |m| > mˇ, c ∈ [cˆ, cˇ], and
k ∈ K.
Here, |m| ≡∑kˇk=1 mk denotes the number of firms in m. Lemma 2 implies that no
firm will enter if the resulting number of active firms, including incumbents surviving
from the previous period and the current period’s earlier entrants, would be larger
than mˇ. With |N0| = 0, this implies that we can analyze the model’s equilibria on
a state space restricted to market structures m with mˇ firms or less.
The central difficulty of the equilibrium analysis is that the equilibrium payoff
function does not necessarily satisfy a monotonicity property analogous to that of
Lemma 1: Adding an active firm to the industry weakly decreases other firms’ pay-
offs. In Section 2.4.1, we first analyze a type of equilibrium in which the payoffs still
retain the monotonicity property. We can straightforwardly extend Algorithm 1 and
use a sequence of contraction mappings to efficiently compute such an equilibrium,
if it does exist. This monotonicity property is the key to establish the essential
uniqueness of this type of equilibrium. However, since the monotonicity property
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does not always hold in the general model, this type of equilibrium may not exist. In
Section 2.4.2, we discuss a simple example in which the monotonicity of equilibrium
payoffs is violated and multiple equilibria emerge. In some of those equilibria, some
incumbent firms could strictly improve their payoffs by playing another equilibrium.
We focus on the other equilibria that are renegotiation proof and establish their
existence. An extension of our algorithm can compute all such equilibria, if C has a
discrete distribution.
2.4.1 Payoff-Monotone Equilibrium
We define an equilibrium to be payoff-monotone if the equilibrium payoffs satisfy
conditions analogous to the ones in Lemma 1.
Definition 3. A Markov-perfect equilibrium is payoff-monotone if its equilibrium
payoff functions satisfies vS(m, c, k) ≥ vS(m + ιk, c, k) and vE(m, c, k) ≥ vE(m +
ιk, c, k) for all (m, c, k).
We showed in Section 2.3 that duopoly firms of the same type choose to continue
whenever joint survival is individually profitable, because the heterogenous duopoly
model’s equilibrium payoffs satisfy Lemma 1. This property allows us to construct
a sequence of contraction mappings in Algorithm 1 to compute the unique natural
Markov-perfect equilibrium. Similarly, in the general model, hypothesize that there
exists a payoff-monotone natural Markov-perfect equilibrium. Then, if continuation
renders the payoff to all firms of the same type positive, continuation is the dominant
strategy for these firms in this equilibrium. Following the argument leading to
condition (2.5) in Section 2.3.1, we can establish similar necessary conditions on
equilibrium payoffs. For instance, in the market with mˇ type kˇ firms, a payoff-
monotone equilibrium payoff vE(mˇιkˇ, c, kˇ) necessarily satisfies
vE(mˇιkˇ, c, kˇ) = max{0, βE[pi(mˇιkˇ, c′, kˇ) + vE(mˇιkˇ, c′, kˇ)|C = c]}. (2.17)
The right hand side of (2.17) defines a Bellman operator that uniquely determines
vE(mˇιkˇ, ·, kˇ).
Note that the heterogeneous duopoly model and the general model only differ in
the number of firms and share essentially the same dynamic specification. There-
fore, Algorithm 1 can be naturally extended to solve for the payoff-monotone natural
equilibrium, by computing the fixed points of a sequence of contraction mappings.
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Similarly to Algorithm 1, we partition the state space, order the parts, and compute
the equilibrium in a corresponding sequence of steps. Each step covers the compu-
tation on a single part of the state space. We order the steps so that all results that
are needed in later steps are passed on from earlier steps.
The partition and its order are defined using an oriental lexicographic order.
Definition 4. Oriental lexicographical superiority (OLS)  is a relation over Rn.
For any pair of vectors x, y ∈ Rn, x  y if xn > yn, or (xn = yn and xn−1 >
yn−1), or , . . . , or (xn = yn and xn−1 = yn−1 and . . . and x1 > y1).
The phrase “oriental” reminds us to read x and y from right to left when com-
paring them, as in Arabic and Hebrew. In the previous sections, we have implicitly
used an ordering based on OLS; the equilibrium payoff for a more superior market
structure is always computed before the payoffs in any state it is superior to. For
example, in Section 2.3.1’s example,  is equivalent to > on R1 and the payoff to a
duopolist is computed first, followed by the payoff to a monopolist. In Section 2.3.2,
the sequence of all possible non-empty market structures in the decreasing order of
OLS was {2ιH, ιH + ιL, ιH, 2ιL, ιL}. When computing the equilibrium payoffs and
strategy, we partitioned the state space into five parts according to this sequence and
visited them following this order.1 Furthermore, this ordering extends to Algorithm
1 as well; the index pair (h, l) in Procedure 1 is decreasing in OLS. This ordering
ensures that equilibrium payoffs and entry/survival rules necessary for computation
in later steps are calculated in earlier steps.
We construct the algorithm for the general model following the same ordering.
There are
(
mˇ+kˇ
kˇ
)− 1 = (mˇ+kˇ)!
kˇ!mˇ!
− 1 possible non-empty markets.2 First, we partition
the state space into (mˇ+kˇ)!
kˇ!mˇ!
−1 parts. Each step of the algorithm computes the payoff
on one of these parts. Suppose that the i-th ranked market structure in the OLS
sequence is mi. Let ki = min{k ∈ K;mik > 0} be the lowest type of active firm
in mi and Mmi be the set collecting all the market structures that have the same
numbers of type-ki, type-ki + 1, . . ., and type-kˇ firms as mi does. In the i-th step,
the algorithm computes a type-ki firm’s payoffs facing every market structure in
1When computing the payoff under ιH, we also revisited ιH + ιL. Nevertheless, this step is
initiated by considering ιH.
2Allocating mˇ firms among kˇ + 1 types (the kˇ + 1-th type for “inactivity”) is mathematically
equivalent to lining up mˇ identical balls and kˇ identical separators. This results in
(mˇ+kˇ
kˇ
)
different
combinations, one of which corresponds to the case where all firms belongs to the kˇ + 1-th type,
or the empty market.
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Mmi for all c. Since this part of the state space is constructed from mi, we say that
it is indexed by mi, and hence refer to mi as the indexing market structure.
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Algorithm 2 (Calculation of a Candidate Equilibrium for the General Model).
START
mˇ ← max{n ∈ N; pi(ιkˇ + (n− 1)ι1, cˇ, kˇ) +
βpˇi
1− β > 0}
αS(·) ← 1, αE(·)← 0, wE(·)← 0
i ← (mˇ+ kˇ)!
kˇ!mˇ!
− 1
Order all elements from the set {m ∈ Zkˇ; 1 ≤ |m| ≤ mˇ}
by . Denote the obtained sequence with m1,m2, . . ..
ki ← min{k ∈ K;mik > 0}
Mmi ←
mi +
ki−1∑
k=1
ιkmk; |mi|+
ki−1∑
k=1
mk ≤ mˇ

HiS ←
{
(m, c, k);m ∈Mmi , k = ki
}
For all H iS ∈ HiS, compute wE(H iS) as the fixed point of
(Tf)(H iS) = max {0, βE [pi(N ′, C ′, K ′) + g(H i′S ) H iS]} , with
g(H i′S ) =
 f(H
i′
S ) if H
i′
S ∈ HiS
wE(H
i′
S ) if H
i′
S ∈ Hi+1S
⋃
. . .
⋃
H
(mˇ+kˇ)!
kˇ!mˇ!
−1
S
,
and wS(H
i
S) = βE [pi(N ′, C ′, K ′) + wE(H i′S ) H iS].
miki = 1?
or ki = 1?
i ← i − 1
For all c ∈ [cˆ, cˇ] and
m ∈ Mmi+jιki ,∀0 ≤ j ≤ mˇ − |mi|,
compute survival/entry rule.
i = 1?
STOP
Yes
No
Yes
No
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Algorithm 2 starts with computing the candidate post-entry payoff wE for a type-kˇ
firm facing the most superior market structure mˇιkˇ. Then, it proceeds in steps with
each step’s indexing market structure following the decreasing order of OLS. When
computing wE in each step, the ordering of the algorithm ensures that the relevant
entry and survival rules for entrants and incumbents with lower productivity types
than the firm of interest have been determined in previous steps. When the firm
of interest continues, possible productivity progression and entry lead to a market
structure more superior than the indexing one. The ordering of the algorithm again
ensures that these more superior market structures have been covered in previous
steps. Therefore, apart from function f , we have all the values required to evaluate
T , a contraction mapping with a unique fixed point wE(HS).
1
Procedure 3 computes the survival and entry rules for specific values of (c,m).
In this procedure, when firms are randomizing between survival and exit, the mixing
probability is chosen to be one of possible probabilities that solves the indifference
condition (2.18). If unilateral deviation from exit is not profitable, firms can also
choose to exit with probability one. We can compute the survival and entry rules
for all c ∈ [cˆ, cˇ] and m ∈ Mmi+jιki ,∀0 ≤ j ≤ mˇ − |mi| by running Procedure 3 in
parallel sessions.
The Bellman equation for wE in Algorithm 2 defines the necessary condition for
any payoff-monotone natural Markov-perfect equilibrium payoff. We show that if
one such equilibrium exists, not only we are able to compute it using Algorithm 2,
but also we can prove its essential uniqueness.
Proposition 2 (Payoff-Monotone Equilibrium in the General Model). If there exists
a payoff-monotone natural Markov-perfect equilibrium, it is the unique such equilib-
rium and Algorithm 2 computes it. The post-entry equilibrium payoff function is wE
and the equilibrium strategy is (αS, αE).
Proof. See Appendix 5.1.1.2.
Note that Algorithm 2 always returns some candidate equilibrium strategy and
payoffs. It does not require wE to be monotone as in Definition 3. After computing
wE, we can check whether it satisfies this monotonicity condition. If it does, then
we have found the unique payoff-monotone natural Markov-perfect equilibrium. If
1Computing the market structure transition matrix conditional on firms’ strategy is conceptu-
ally straightforward. We describe the details in Appendix 5.2.1.2.
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mi, ki
Specify c ∈ [cˆ, cˇ] and m ∈ Mmi+jιki , 0 ≤ j ≤ mˇ − |mi|
mki = 1 ?
αS(m, c, k
i) ←
I[wE(m, c, k
i) > 0]
wE(m, c, k
i)
> 0?
αS(m, c, k
i) ← 1
Find all p’s ∈ [0, 1) satisfying,
mki−1∑
j=0
(1− p)mki−1−jpj
(
mki − 1
j
)
wS(m− (mki − 1− j)ιki , c, ki) = 0.
(2.18)
wS(m
i, c, ki)
> 0?
αS(m, c, k
i) ← 0
or one of the p’s
αS(m, c, k
i) ←
one of the p’s
ki = 1 ?
αE(m, c) ← I{w(m +
jι1, c, 1) − ϕ >
0,∀0 ≤ j ≤ mˇ − |m|}
CONTINUE
Yes
No
Yes
No
No Yes
No
Yes
Procedure 3: Calculation of Candidate Entry/Survival Rule for the General Model
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it does not, we show in the next section that the output of Algorithm 2 still defines
a natural Markov-perfect equilibrium.
2.4.2 Renegotiation Proof Equilibrium
Proposition 2 implies that a payoff-monotone natural Markov-perfect equilibrium
does not exist if wE is not monotone as in Definition 3.
In Appendix 5.3.1, we present a simple example in which equilibrium payoffs
are not monotone and there are multiple natural Markov-perfect equilibria. In this
example, we consider an industry with at most three active firms. We assume that
firms can be type H or type L. For two type H duopoly firms contemplating
survival, the example is constructed so that any type L potential entrant will never
find it profitable to enter this market, if these two firms jointly continue to the next
period. This way, the type H duopolists deter any future entry by joint survival
and enjoy a high duopoly surplus forever. If instead one of the firms exits, then
two type L firms will enter the market and remain active thereafter. The surviving
type H firm will only receive a low triopoly surplus. Connecting this example to the
static survival game depicted in Figure 2.2, we set payoffs such that, for some c, the
post-survival value satisfies vS(2ιH, c,H) > 0 > vS(ιH, c,H). Therefore, although
“Survive, Survive” remains an equilibrium in this static game, “Exit, Exit” emerges
as another equilibrium. Also, there could be equilibria involving mixed strategies.
Indeed, we show in Appendix 5.3.1 that we do have three possible equilibrium actions
at this particular point of the game tree. Namely, to survive for sure, to exit for
sure, and to survive with some probability. We further demonstrate that multiple
mixing probabilities may emerge when three firms are randomizing between survival
and exit because joint survival is not profitable.
We distinguish two sources of equilibrium multiplicity using this example. One
comes from the incumbents’ failure to jointly continue if this is profitable. If the two
type-H firms can coordinate on continuation, they can strictly improve their equi-
librium payoffs. It seems reasonable to assume that they are able to “renegotiate”
to joint continuation whenever this is profitable. Henceforth, we restrict attention
to equilibria with the desirable property that firms sharing the same states cannot
form a self-enforcing agreement by changing their common strategy at the current
node of the game and thereby strictly improve their continuation payoffs. We call
this property renegotiation proofness.
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Definition 5. A natural Markov-perfect equilibrium is (one-shot) renegotiation proof
if, for any (m, c) pair, no one-shot agreement satisfying the following properties can
be negotiated:
• all firms in the agreement change their survival actions once;
• the agreement is self-enforcing, so no firm in the agreement has incentive to
unilaterally deviate from the agreed action;
• if one type k firm is in the agreement, all type k firms are; and
• the payoffs to all firms in the agreement are strictly improved.
In any equilibrium, a firm earns positive payoffs only when continuing for sure.
Therefore, if all firms of a certain type can strictly improve their payoff by changing
their actions, it must be the case that (i) the actions must be changed from exiting
with positive probability to surviving with probability one, and (ii) the actions of
joint continuation must give all firms in the agreement positive payoff. Therefore,
this refinement has bite only when all incumbents of certain type(s) could coordi-
nate on sure joint continuation and earn positive payoffs, but will not unilaterally
continue if others do not. Note that in the duopoly model, Lemma 1 ensures that
both incumbents of the same type continue for sure if joint continuation renders
payoff positive. Therefore, no further improvement is possible via renegotiation.
Consequently, the natural equilibrium in Section 2.3 is renegotiation proof. The
monotonicity in Definition 3 also ensures that same type incumbents continue for
sure if continuation payoffs are positive. Therefore, payoff-monotone equilibrium in
the general model is also renegotiation proof.
In each step of Algorithm 2, firms of interest always choose to continue if they ex-
pect positive payoff from continuation. Therefore, the Bellman equation for wE is a
necessary condition on wE for a renegotiation proof natural Markov-perfect equilib-
rium. We verify that (αS, αE) forms a renegotiation proof natural equilibrium. We
further show that Algorithm 2 always delivers some (αS, αE) as its outcome, which
proves the existence of a renegotiation proof natural Markov-perfect equilibrium.
Proposition 3 (Renegotiation Proof Equilibrium in the General Model). Algorithm
2 always computes some (αS, αE) and this strategy (αS, αE) forms a renegotiation
proof natural Markov-perfect equilibrium. So, a renegotiation proof natural Markov-
perfect equilibrium always exists.
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Proof. See Appendix 5.1.1.2.
If a payoff-monotone equilibrium exists, its post-entry equilibrium payoff wE is
determined by the same necessary conditions as those for the renegotiation proof
equilibrium. Furthermore, recall that we have proved in Proposition 2 that the
mixing probability is always unique for the payoff-monotone equilibrium, and such
equilibrium is the unique outcome of Algorithm 2, so that we have the following
corollary to Proposition 2.
Corollary 1. If there exists a payoff-monotone natural Markov-perfect equilibrium,
it is also the unique renegotiation proof natural Markov-perfect equilibrium.
If there is no payoff-monotone equilibrium, the restriction to renegotiation proof
equilibrium eliminates the equilibria involving exit and mixing actions when joint
continuation is profitable. However, when joint survival is not profitable and more
than two firms are randomizing between survival and exit, multiple equilibrium
mixing probabilities may emerge, as we illustrate in the example in Appendix 5.3.1.
The restriction to renegotiation proof equilibrium is silent on which probability to
select. Therefore, each distinct equilibrium mixing probability leads to a different
equilibrium survival rule. Algorithm 2 requires the unique input of payoffs and rules
computed in the previous steps. (In Section 2.4.1, Algorithm 2 simply selects an
arbitrary mixing probability to continue when the multiplicity arises.) So, when
multiple survival rules emerge in course of the algorithm, we can proceed the algo-
rithm in parallel “branches” with a different survival rule for each branch to compute
different renegotiation proof natural Markov-perfect equilibria. In Appendix 5.2.1.3,
we prove that the number of renegotiation proof natural Markov-perfect equilibria
is finite if C is discrete. We also extend Algorithm 2 so that it computes all renego-
tiation proof natural Markov-perfect equilibria in parallel branches.
2.4.3 Application
In Section 2.3.4, we used simulation to study a two-horse R&D race. This required
the values of all the model primitives. In practice, these parameters have to be esti-
mated from data. In this section, we propose a feasible nested fixed-point algorithm
to estimate the model’s key parameters using market-level data on entry, R&D pro-
gression, and exit. In particular, we focus on recovering the fixed cost of R&D and
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the sunk cost of entry. These market determinants are of great strategic interest to
firms, and therefore usually not available to researchers from other sources.
Suppose that we can estimate the transition distribution for the demand state
Q(·|C) and the demand function Ct(a − p)/b directly from census data and a con-
sumer survey. Furthermore, we can estimate the type transition matrix Π directly
using observed R&D progression frequencies. For now, assume that the sunk entry
cost ϕ is known and focus on estimating the fixed cost κ. We estimate κ using an (in-
efficient) general method-of-moments (GMM) procedure that matches moments of
the market transitions implied by the model to their empirical counterparts. Specifi-
cally, we search for a value of the fixed cost parameter that minimizes the sum of the
squared differences between the model-implied and empirical moments. The GMM
estimator is computed using a nested fixed-point procedure, in which the model is
solved using Algorithm 2 for each trial value of the fixed cost parameter.
We use a Monte Carlo experiment to assess the performance of this algorithm. In
this experiment, we assume that at most three firms can simultaneously operate in a
market. The distribution Q(·|C), the transition matrix Π, and the demand function
Ct(a− p)/b on each market are identical to those in Section 2.3.4. The sunk cost ϕ
is set to 50. In this experiment, we do not consider collusion: Firms receive Cournot
payoffs after they have passed all R&D stages. In each Monte Carlo simulation, we
first simulate 10 periods of market activity for 500 independent oligopoly markets.
Both the initial pre-entry market structure and the initial number of consumers are
drawn randomly. We construct the GMM criterion from two sets of conditional
moments:
1. the expected post-entry numbers of firms of each type conditional on the pre-
entry market structure and the current period’s number of consumers; and
2. the expected post-survival numbers of firms of each type conditional on the
post-entry market structure and the current period’s number of consumers.
Figure 2.6 plots the histogram of the estimates of κ from 200 Monte Carlo sim-
ulations. Despite the limited size of the simulated data sets, κ is estimated with
reasonable accuracy. The average time spent on the estimation is around 80 sec-
onds.1
1Intel Core 2 Duo CPU T9300 @ 2.5GHz, 4GB RAM.
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Figure 2.6: Histogram for κ’s estimates. True κ = 20.
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Sunk Costs, Entry, & Exit in Dynamic
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3.1 Introduction
This paper develops a dynamic econometric framework for the analysis of entry,
exit, and competitive conduct in oligopolistic markets. This framework only re-
quires panel data on the demand and producer counts of geographically dispersed
markets for the estimation of its primitives, which include firms’ sunk costs and
the toughness of competition. The empirical framework builds on the theoretical
model in Abbring and Campbell (2010). It has an essentially unique Markov perfect
equilibrium in which a firm produces no longer than any incumbent active when
it entered. This equilibrium can be computed quickly by solving a finite sequence
of dynamic programming problems with low-dimensional state spaces. Exploiting
this simplicity, we develop and implement a Nested-Fixed-Point algorithm for the
maximum-likelihood estimation of the model.
Our framework is a dynamic extension of Bresnahan and Reiss’ (1990; 1991)
models for the analysis of static competition in a cross-section of markets. In those
papers, Bresnahan and Reiss propose a class of static firm entry models to estimate
entry’s impact on competition using entry thresholds. Each one gives the market size
necessary to support a certain number of firms. Potential entrants start operation
only when market size raises their expected revenue above the sunk costs of entry.
Therefore, how incumbent firms’ expected revenues fall with each additional entrant
can be inferred from the ratios of subsequent entry thresholds. Bresnahan and Reiss
(1993) extend their earlier static entry model to a two-period one and distinguish
between entry and exit thresholds. Because only entrants pay one-off sunk costs of
entry, they can estimate sunk costs of entry from the difference between entry and
exit thresholds.
Entry and exit is an essentially dynamic process. Using static models to measure
the market determinants of this process can lead to serious bias. Abbring and
Campbell (2010) provide an example showing that a static model overlooks firms’
option value to exit in future, hence entry thresholds are biased downwards by the
presence of firms that entered in the past in markets with negative demand shocks.
To consistently measure the static and dynamic primitives of oligopoly markets,
such as the toughness of competition and the sunk costs of entry, Abbring and
Campbell develop a game-theoretical model for an infinite horizon oligopoly market.
In this market, the number of consumers who demand the industry’s services evolves
stochastically. Entry requires paying a sunk cost, and continuing operation incurs
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fixed costs. When continuation is no longer profitable, incumbents choose to exit
to avoid these per-period fixed costs. In this model, firms make exit decisions in
the order of their ages. Abbring and Campbell show that there is an essentially
unique Markov-perfect equilibrium in a ”last-in first-out” (LIFO) strategy, in which
a younger firm never produces longer than any older incumbents.
As specified, observed demand and producer counts are deterministically related
in Abbring and Campbell’s model. To apply it to analyse market data, we in-
troduce shocks that satisfy a market-level version of Rust’s (1987) key conditional
independence assumption. This leads to an estimable model describing the market
structure dynamics for an industry’s geographically dispersed markets in relation to
these markets’ sizes. We extend Abbring and Campbell’s results to show that an
essentially unique LIFO Markov-perfect equilibrium exists in this model, which can
be quickly computed by solving for the fixed points of a finite sequence of contraction
mappings.
The speed of our equilibrium computation allows us to employ a Nested Fixed-
Point (NFXP) algorithm to estimate the model. This algorithm requires calculating
firms’ equilibrium strategy many times in course of the estimation. To illustrate
the feasibility of our estimation approach, we recollect Bresnahan and Reiss’s (1993)
panel data on dentists in U.S. local markets, and focus on comparing their empirical
results with our findings from the fully dynamic structural analysis.
The remainder of this paper proceeds as follows. The next section presents the
model’s primitives. It introduces the equilibrium concept and provides the equilib-
rium existence and uniqueness results required for our empirical analysis. . Section
3.3 discusses in detail how estimation can be carried out by using the NFXP algo-
rithm. Section 3.4 presents the estimation results. Section 3.5 concludes. Proofs
and tables are included in the Appendices.
3.2 The Model
The model is an econometric extension of the model of oligopoly dynamics developed
by Abbring and Campbell (2010). It features stochastic demand, as well as shocks
to fixed and sunk costs. Firms make sequential entry decisions and decide on exit
in the order of their tenure. The model has an essentially unique Markov-perfect
equilibrium in a LIFO strategy.
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3.2.1 Primitives
There is a countably infinite number of firms that are potentially active in the
market. At time 0, N0 = 0 firms are active. After that, firms’ entry and exit
decisions determine the number of active firms in each later period. The number of
firms at period t is Nt for t ∈ {1, 2, . . .}. The number of consumers who demand
the industry’s service is indexed by a scalar Ct and is bounded between cˆ ≥ 0 and
cˇ <∞.
Figure 3.1 illustrates the sequence of events and actions within a typical period
t using a portion of the game tree. It begins with values inherited from period
t− 1 for the demand Ct−1, a market-level random cost shock Wt−1, and the number
of producers Nt. A new demand level Ct and cost shock Wt are drawn from a
first-order Markov transition distribution with density f(Ct+1,Wt+1|Ct,Wt, ζ; θf ), in
which θf denotes a vector of parameters and ζ is a vector of time-invariant market-
level characteristics. All firms observe these realizations. Afterwards, all active
firms serve the market, and earn profits pi(Nt, Ct, ζ; θpi) − κ exp(Wt−1). The vector
θpi collects the parameters of the surplus function pi. The inherited Wt−1 affects the
active firms’ fixed cost κ.
We assume that the surplus increases with demand and decreases with the num-
ber of competitors.
Assumption 4 (Monotone Producer Surplus). The surplus function satisfies
1. pi(n, c, ζ; θpi) ≤ pi(m, c, ζ; θpi) for all n,m ∈ N such that n > m;
2. pi(n, c, ζ; θpi) ≤ pi(n, d, ζ; θpi) for all c, d ∈ [cˆ, cˇ] such that c < d; and
3. limn→∞ pi(n, c, ζ; θpi) = 0 for all c ∈ [cˆ, cˇ].
Here and throughout, we use lower case letters to denote random variables’ realiza-
tions.
After receiving their static payoffs, these active firms decide whether they will
remain in the market. Exit allows a firm to avoid future fixed costs, which depend
on the realized value of Wt. Exit is irreversible but otherwise costless.
Older firms are given priority in committing to continuation. We index all firms
in this model by assigning a name j ∈ N to each of them. The firm that makes the
first entry decision in the market’s initial period has name J0 = 1. Each succeeding
potential entrant has a name equals its predecessor’s plus one. In period t, the rank
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Start with
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Figure 3.1: The Sequence of Events and Actions within a Period.
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of an active firm with name j, denoted as Rjt , is the order of its name among all
active competitors. This equals one for the firm with the lowest name (or the firm
entered first among all incumbents), and it equals Nt for the firm with the highest
name (or the firm entered last among all incumbents). The active firms’ continuation
decisions proceed sequentially in the increasing order of this rank, the oldest firm
first and the youngest firm last. Firms can use mixed strategies. These strategies’
pure realizations also occur sequentially, so a firm later in the sequence conditions
on its lower-ranked rivals’ realized (binary) continuation choices.
After active firms’ continuation decisions, those firms that have not yet had
an opportunity to enter make entry decisions in the order of their names. These
continue until one potential entrant decides to remain out of the industry. The first
potential entrant for the next period, Jt+1, has this firm’s name plus one. Note
that firms do not have the option to delay entry. Because entry decisions proceed
sequentially in the increasing order of firms’ names, firm j will have a rank Rjt+1
greater than that of any active incumbent. The entrant starting to serve the market
faces the fixed cost shock Wt and must pay a one-off rank-dependent sunk cost of
entry (ϕRjt+1
− 1)κ exp(Wt) in the next period, on top of the fixed cost κ exp(Wt).
Firms discount future payoffs with a factor β < 1.
3.2.2 Markov-Perfect Equilibrium
A Markov-perfect equilibrium is a subgame-perfect equilibrium in strategies that
are only contingent on payoff-relevant variables. When firm j decides whether to
continue or exit, Nt − Rjt (the number of active firms following it in the sequence),
Ct, R
j
t+1 (its rank in the next period’s sequence of active firms), and Wt are payoff-
relevant. Collect these terms into HjS,t ≡ (Nt − Rjt , Ct, Rjt+1,Wt). Similarly, the
payoff-relevant state to a potential entrant is HjE,t ≡ (Ct, Rjt+1,Wt), in which Rjt+1 is
the entrant’s rank in next period as well as the number of incumbents immediately
after the firm’s entry. Note that HjS,t takes its values in HS ≡ Z+× [cˆ, cˇ]×N×O for
firms active in period t and HjE,t in HE ≡ [cˆ, cˇ]×N×O for potential entrants, where
O is the support for the cost shock. Here and below, we use S and E to indicate
potential survivors and entrants.
A Markov-strategy for firm j is a pair of functions ajS : HS → [0, 1] and ajE :
HE → [0, 1]. The values of the functions represent the probabilities of being active
in the next period given that the firm is currently active (ajS) and given that the firm
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has an entry opportunity (ajE). In a symmetric Markov-perfect equilibrium, all firms
follow the same Markov-strategy. Henceforth, we restrict attention to symmetric
equilibria and drop the superscript with the firm’s name.
When firms use Markov-strategies, the payoff-relevant state variables determine
an active firm’s expected discounted profit when it decides on exit, which we de-
note with v(HS). In a symmetric Markov-perfect equilibrium with strategy profile
(aS, aE), it satisfies the Bellman equation
v(HS) = max
a∈[0,1]
aβEH′S [pi(N
′, C ′; θpi)− κ exp(W ) + v(H ′S) HS] . (3.1)
We denote the variable corresponding to Y in the next period with Y ′. In Equation
(3.1), the expectation is calculated using f(C ′,W ′|C,W ; θf ) and all firms’ strategies
conditional on the firm of interest choosing to be active. This expected discounted
profit is also a potential entrant’s post-entry payoff.
Following Abbring and Campbell (2010), we restrict attention to equilibria in
which firms employ a LIFO strategy.
Definition 6. A LIFO strategy is a strategy (aS, aE) such that aS is pure, with
aS(n− r, c, R′, w) weakly decreasing in r.
If all firms adopt a common LIFO strategy (aS, aE), then an active firm with rank
r ≥ 2 never stays if the predecessor in the sequence of active firms exits, because
aS(n − r, c, r′, w) = 0 implies that aS(n − r − 1, c, r′, w) = 0. As a consequence, if
firms adopt a common LIFO strategy, they exit in the reverse order of their entry.
Conversely, if firms use a common strategy and always exit in the reverse order of
their entry, then the common strategy is a LIFO strategy. Under a LIFO strategy,
if any r-ranked firm continues to next period, all of its competitors with lower ranks
also survive, so r′ = r.
Even with our focus on equilibria in a LIFO strategy, we still have one unin-
teresting source of equilibrium multiplicity. When multiple actions all maximize a
player’s equilibrium payoff, multiple subgame-perfect equilibria can be constructed
from these actions. To eliminate this source of multiplicity, Abbring and Campbell
require that in equilibrium, players default to inactivity by choosing to stay out or
exit whenever it gives the same payoff as entry or continuation.
Proposition 4. There exists a unique symmetric Markov-perfect equilibrium in a
LIFO strategy that defaults to inactivity. The equilibrium payoff v(n, c, r, w) is weakly
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decreasing in n; the survival rule aS and entry rule aE are such that aS(n−r, c, r, w)
is pure, constant in n− r, and weakly decreasing in r; aE(c, r, w) is pure and weakly
decreasing in r; and aS(n− r, c, r, w) ≥ aE(c, r, w).
The equilibrium survival and entry probabilities in Proposition 4 weakly decrease
with the firm’s rank in the next period. Moreover, the survival probability is constant
in the number of younger firms, and weakly larger than the entry probability of a
firm with the same prospective rank in the same demand state. The proof of this
proposition requires only minimal adaptation of the proofs of Propositions 1 and 2
in Abbring and Campbell (2010). Hence we only review the intuition behind the
proof here. First, note that the limiting conditions in Assumption 4 imply that the
number of firms that remain active in a Markov-perfect equilibrium cannot exceed
an upper bound, which we denote by nˇ. Next, we consider the exit decision of a
firm with rank nˇ. When deciding on exit, this firm rationally expects no further
entry and none of its older competitors to cease production before it does itself.
Therefore, the equilibrium value function and optimal exit and entry rules for this
firm can be constructed by solving a single agent decision problem. Next, we solve
the exit decision problems in turn for firms with ranks r = nˇ − 1, nˇ − 2, . . . , 1. A
firm with rank r forms its expectation about the actions of firms with higher ranks
using the obtained exit and entry rules of those firms. Therefore, we can construct
this firm’s equilibrium payoff function, its optimal exit and entry rules by solving a
single agent decision problem. With these solutions, we can subsequently verify that
the equilibrium payoffs and exit/entry rules satisfy the monotonicity conditions in
Proposition 4.
In LIFO equilibrium, early entrants have a first-mover advantage: They can
credibly drive out younger competitors and deter late entrants by continuation.
As a result, their payoffs are never worse than those of their younger competitors
under the same market conditions. This advantage allows them to disregard younger
competitors’ actions when making continuation or exit decisions: an incumber firm
can simply assume that no younger competitor will be active in the following period.
Let vS(c, n, w) be the n-th ranked firm’s expected payoff (excluding the fixed cost)
when all firms with ranks r ≤ n continue to the next period and all firms with ranks
r > n exit,
vS(c, n, w) ≡ EW ′,C′ [pi(n,C ′) + v(0, C ′, n,W ′) C = c,W = w] . (3.2)
This payoff function dictates firms’ entry and exit in the equilibrium.
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Proposition 5. If a LIFO strategy (aE, aS) forms a symmetric Markov-perfect equi-
librium, then for any n-th ranked firm and any (x, c, w), it satisfies,
aS(x, c, n, w) ∈ arg max
a∈[0,1]
a (vS(c, n, w)− κ exp(w)) and (3.3)
aE(c, n, w) ∈ arg max
a∈[0,1]
a (vS(c, n, w)− ϕnκ exp(w)) (3.4)
Proof. See Appendix 5.1.2.
Other symmetric Markov-perfect equilibria that default to inactivity might exist,
but in them the apparent advantage of early entrants to commit to continuation
does not always translate into longevity. In our empirical analysis, we restrict our
attention to the unique symmetric Markov-perfect equilibrium in a LIFO strategy
that defaults to inactivity.
3.3 Estimation
The primitive parameters of this model include the parameters for the exogenous
demand process, the shock variable and the surplus function θf , θpi, the coefficients
for the sunk cost of entry ϕn, and the scale of the fixed costs κ. Collect them into
the vector Θ. In this section, we discuss how to estimate these parameters.
Suppose that we have longitudinal observations (Ci,t, Ni,t) for a finite number of
periods t ∈ {t0, . . . , t0 +T} on independent markets i ∈ {1, . . . ,M}, but Wi,t is never
observed. The estimation then relies on matching the observations (Ni,t, Ci,t) with
the market transition probability Pr(N ′, C ′,W ′|N,C,W ; Θ) implied by the unique
LIFO equilibrium. Using vS and Proposition 5, we can calculate the transition
probability as
Pr(N ′ = m,C ′ = d,W ′ = y|N = n,C = c,W = w) =
Pr(vS(c,m,W ) > ϕmκ exp(W ), vS(c,m+ 1,W ) ≤ ϕm+1κ exp(W ),
C ′ = d,W ′ = y|N = n,C = c,W = w) if m > n
Pr(vS(c,m,W ) > κ exp(W ), vS(c,m+ 1,W ) ≤ ϕm+1κ exp(W ),
C ′ = d,W ′ = y|N = n,C = c,W = w) if m = n
Pr(vS(c,m,W ) > κ exp(W ), vS(c,m+ 1,W ) ≤ κ exp(W ),
C ′ = d,W ′ = y|N = n,C = c,W = w) if m < n
(3.5)
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The intuition behind this formula is straightforward: (i) If the observed next period
number of firms m exceeds the current number n, then the unobserved shock has
to be favorable enough for one potential entrant to become the m-th ranked active
firm, and sufficiently unfavorable to deter the next potential entrant; (ii) if m = n,
then the shock has to be favorable enough for the m-th ranked firm to continue, and
sufficiently unfavorable to deter the next potential entrant; (iii) if m < n, then the
shock has to be favorable enough for the m-th ranked incumbent firm to continue,
and sufficiently unfavorable for the m+ 1-th ranked incumbent to continue.
Now we present the procedure to compute vS, construct the likelihood, and
estimate Θ.
3.3.1 Computing the LIFO Equilibrium
In the LIFO equilibrium, because any active firm rationally anticipates that those
with higher ranks will remain active as long as it decides to continue, we only need
the equilibrium survival rules used by those with lower ranks to compute its payoff.
This implies that we can compute the equilibrium in the decreasing order of firms’
ranks.
We start with the firm of highest possible rank nˇ. In practice, we set nˇ to the max-
imum of number of active firms observed in the data.When computing v(x, c, nˇ, w),
this firm rationally expects any younger incumbent to exit and no firm to enter be-
fore its exit. In other words, in equilibrium this firm either receives zero payoff from
exiting, or positive payoff from continuing with all older incumbents. Thus, for any
x, the value function necessarily satisfies
v(x, c, nˇ, w) = v(0, c, nˇ, w)
= max β {0,EW ′,C′ [pi (nˇ, C ′) + v(0, C ′, nˇ,W ′) C = c,W = w]− κ exp(w)}
(3.6)
The right-hand side of (3.6) does not involve any other firm’s strategy. This
equation defines a contraction mapping with v(·, ·, nˇ, ·) as its unique fixed point.
With v(·, ·, nˇ, ·) determined, we can compute the sets of values of (C,W ) that attract
a nˇ-th ranked firm to enter and to survive. We refer to these as the entry and survival
sets,
Enˇ ≡ {(c, w)|v(0, c, nˇ, w) > ϕnˇκ exp(w)} and Snˇ ≡ {(c, w)|v(0, c, nˇ, w) > κ exp(w)}.
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The rest of the computation proceeds sequentially for r = nˇ − 1, . . . , 1. An
r-ranked incumbent’s payoff satisfies
v(x, c, r, w) = max{0, βEW ′,C′ [pi (N ′r(x, c, w), C ′)
+ v(N ′r(x, c, w)− r, C ′, r,W ′) C = c,W = w]− κ exp(w)}
(3.7)
in which N ′r(x, c, w) is the number of firms in the following period, conditional on
the r-ranked firm’s survival. It depends on the equilibrium strategy of all firms with
ranks exceeding r. Note that we have uniquely computed the entry sets Er+1, . . . ,Enˇ
and the survival sets Sr+1, . . . , Snˇ for the younger firms. The rank r firm rationally
expects that these sets govern the younger firms’ entry and survival decisions, and
that no firm will enter with rank larger than nˇ. That is,
N ′r(x, c, w) = r +
nˇ−r∑
j=1
[I {j ≤ x, (c, w) ∈ Sr+j}+ I {j > x, (c, w) ∈ Er+j}] , (3.8)
for x = 0, 1, . . . , nˇ − r. The right-hand side of (3.7) only involves other firms’
strategies that are known at this point, and it defines a contraction mapping with
a unique fixed point v˜r. Consequently, we can compute the entry and survival sets
for the r-ranked firm. By Proposition 5, they are
Er = {(c, w)|vS(c, r, w) > ϕrκ exp(w)}
Sr = {(c, w)|vS(c, r, w) > κ exp(w)},
for a firm with rank r.
In each step of this procedure, we need to calculate a two-dimensional integral
over (W ′, C ′) for the expectation EW ′,C′ . We have to repeat the exercise once more
when determining the entry and survival sets. This is computationally cumbersome.
We circumvent this problem by imposing a conditional independence assumption,
following Rust (1987).
Assumption 5 (Conditional Independence (CI)). The density of {C ′,W ′} factors
as
f(C ′,W ′|C,W ; θf ) = fC(C ′|C; θ1)fW (W ′|C ′; θ2).
Under Conditional Independence, next period’s unobserved shocks W ′ depend
on this period’s W only through the observed demand C ′, and C ′ evolves from C
independently of W . Conditional Independence implies that we can compute the
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expectation EW ′,C′ iteratively. Define the integrated value function Ev(x, c, r) ≡
EW [v(x, c, r,W ) C = c]. We obtain a functional equation that characterizes this
integrated value function by integrating both sides of (3.7) over W with respect to
the density function fW (W |C; θ2):
Ev(x, c, r)
= Pr((W, c) ∈ Sr)βEC′ [EW [pi (N ′r(x, c,W ), C ′)− κ exp(W )
+ Ev(N ′r(x, c,W )− r, C ′, r) (W, c) ∈ Sr, C = c] C = c].
(3.9)
In this equation, the expectation of v(N ′r(x, c,W )− r, C ′, r,W ′) over W ′ is replaced
by Ev(N ′r(x, c,W )− r, C ′, r). Hence, W ′ vanishes from the right-hand side.
The right-hand side of Equation (3.9) defines a contraction mapping. We for-
malize and prove the contraction property in Proposition 8 in Appendix 5.1.2. The
unique fixed point of this contraction mapping is Ev(·, ·, r). This function, with W
integrated out, has a smaller state space than v. Therefore, numerically computing
Ev is much less burdensome than computing v. Furthermore, when computing vS,
we only need to integrate this integrated value function over C ′.
Conditional Independence helps to further simplify the computation of the in-
tegrated value function. Because C ′ is independent of W once conditional on (C),
the right-hand side of (3.9) depends on W only via N ′r(x, c,W ) and κ exp(W ). This
implication has two benefits. First, the expected continuation payoff in Equation
(3.9),
EW [Ev(N ′r(x, c,W )− r, C ′, r) (W, c) ∈ Sr, C = c] ,
is a weighted average over Ev(n,C ′, r) with n = 0, . . . , nˇ− r with weights given by
Pr(N ′r(x, c,W )− r = n).
Second, note that because vS(c, n, w) is independent of w, the strategy aS, aE
are weakly decreasing in w. In other words, for any given c, a threshold rule in w
prescribes all firms’ survival and entry decisions.
Under these two results, we can rewrite the right-hand side of Equation (3.9) as
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a summation of integrals when W is a continuous random variable:
Ev(x, c, r)
= βEC′
[
r+x−1∑
i=r
∫ vS(c,i)−lnκ
ln vS(c,i+1)−lnκ
(pi(i, C ′) + Ev(i− r, C ′, r)) fW (w|C = c)dw
+
∫ ln vS(c,r+x)−lnκ
ln vS(c,r+x+1)−lnκ−lnϕr+x+1
(pi(r + x,C ′) + Ev(x,C ′, r)) fW (w|C = c)dw
+
nˇ∑
i=r+x+1
∫ ln vS(c,i)−lnκ−lnϕi
ln vS(c,i+1)−lnκ−lnϕi+1
(pi(i, C ′) + Ev(i− r, C ′, r)) fW (w|C = c)dw
− κ
∫ ln vS(c,r)−lnκ
−∞
exp(w)fW (w|C = c)dw C = c
]
.
(3.10)
For each value of i, the upper and lower-limits of the integrals are upper and lower-
thresholds of w such that for any value between them, the number of firms continuing
to next period is i.1
3.3.2 A Likelihood Function: Dynamic Probit Model
Under certain parameterizations, we can compute the integrals in (3.10) analytically
or very conveniently. For instance, let W be independent of C and follow a normal
1We set vS(c, nˇ+ 1) = 0 so that for whatever low value of w, the number of active firms does
not exceed nˇ.
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distribution W ∼ N(0, σ2W ). Then,
Ev(x, c, r)
= βEC′
[
r+x−1∑
i=r
(
Φ
(
ln vS(c, i)− lnκ
σ
)
− Φ
(
ln vS(c, i+ 1)− lnκ
σ
))
× (pi(i, C ′) + Ev(i− r, C ′, r))
+
(
Φ
(
ln vS(c, r + x)− lnκ
σ
)
− Φ
(
ln vS(c, r + x+ 1)− lnκ
σ
))
× (pi(r + x,C ′) + Ev(x,C ′, r))
+
nˇ∑
i=r+x+1
(
Φ
(
ln vS(c, i)− lnκ− lnϕi
σ
)
− Φ
(
ln vS(c, i+ 1)− lnκ− lnϕi+1
σ
))
× (pi(i, C ′) + Ev(i− r, C ′, r)) C = c
]
− κ exp(σ2/2)× Φ
(
ln vS(c, r)− lnκ− σ2
σ
))
,
(3.11)
in which Φ is the c.d.f for standard normal distribution. Since (3.11) is a special
case of (3.9), Proposition 8 in Appendix 5.1.2 ensures that we can obtain a unique
Evr by solving (3.11) and then construct vS using equation (3.2) for r = nˇ, . . . , 1.
We omit w from vS’s arguments because vS(c, r, w) is in fact independent of w under
(CI). With the normality assumption on W , we obtain an ordered probit form as a
special case of Equations (3.5):
Pr(N ′ = m|n, c; Θ)
=

Φ( ln vS(c,m)−lnϕm−lnκ
σ
)− Φ( ln vS(c,m+1)−lnϕm+1−lnκ
σ
) if m > n,
Φ( ln vS(c,m)−lnκ
σ
)− Φ( ln vS(c,m+1)−lnϕm+1−lnκ
σ
) if m = n,
Φ( ln vS(c,m)−lnκ
σ
)− Φ( ln vS(c,m+1)−lnκ
σ
) if m < n.
(3.12)
The likelihood function is:
L =
T−1∏
t=1
M∏
i=1
Pr(Ni,t+1|Ni,t, Ci,t, ζi; Θ), fC(Ci,t+1|Ci,t, ζi, θ1)
i.e., a market with Ni,t firms in t period and Ni,t+1 firms in t+ 1 period contributes
to the likelihood function “the probability of transition conditional on the current
demand”, as defined by (3.12). All of the model’s primitives can in principle depend
on the market-specific variables in ζi.
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With this likelihood function established, we employ a nested-fixed-point algo-
rithm to find the values of the structure parameters Θ that maximize this likelihood.
This algorithm iterates between an outer loop and an inner loop. It starts with
some initial parameter value Θ0. In the inner loop, the unique LIFO Markov-perfect
equilibrium is computed by finding the fixed points of the sequence of contraction
mappings. Then, the market transition probability Pr(Ni,t+1|Ni,t, Ci,t, ζi; Θ0) is com-
puted using Equation (3.5) (Equation (3.12) if assuming W ’s normality) for all t and
i, and the likelihood is evaluated. Next, the outer loop searches for a new parameter
value Θ1 to increase the likelihood value. When the parameter vector is updated, it
is passed to the inner loop to repeat the contraction mappings and regenerate the
likelihood value. The procedure stops when the likelihood value cannot be improved.
3.4 Results
To illustrate the estimation procedure of our model and compare our results to
what Bresnahan and Reiss (1993) (henceforth BR) have obtained from their two-
stage model, we have reconstructed their American dentists data set and estimated
the sunk and fixed costs for their dentists.
3.4.1 Data Description
BR collected data on the number of dentists operating in 152 small and isolated U.S.
counties from the 1982-1990 American Dental Association (ADA) directories. Their
data also contain the demographics of these markets. The counties are selected
based on the following criteria. First, the county population in 1980 was not in
excess of 10,000. Second, in these counties, no town with a population in excess
of 1,000 lies within 25 miles of the 1980 population center of each county. Third,
no town or city with a population greater than 1,000 within 125 miles of the 1980
population center has a population to driving distance ratio in excess of 600. These
criteria minimize the possible strategic interactions of dentists in adjacent markets,
and ensure that observations from multiple markets are independent.
We reconstruct BR’s dataset using the same selection criteria. After obtaining
the list of 152 counties, we go through the same ADA directories to match the
operating dentists to these markets. We analysed the resulting sample to compare
some key statistics against those found in BR. These comparisons can be found in
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Tables 1, 2, 3, and 4 in Appendix 5.3.2. Table 1 presents summary statistics of
the raw data as well as detailed break-downs of some of the data cleaning measures
and the exit and entry patterns in the data. Tables 2 and 3 replicate Tables 1a
and 1b from BR in summarizing dentist exit and entry by market between 1980
and 1988 with and without adjustments made for retirements and possible deaths.
These tables also present the marginal distributions of dentists by market for 1980.
Table 4 offers further comparisons of our sample versus that of BR by comparing
the counts and age distributions of active and retired dentists along with market
averages of dentists and town and county populations. In many ways, our sample is
very similar to that of BR. We publish an online appendix on our website to detail
the differences between our data and BR’s data.
In this illustrative exercise, we use the population data as the only demand
indicator and do not include the market-level characteristics ζ.
3.4.2 Estimation Results
We pool the year-to-year transition data on producer counts and population from
1980 to 1988 to construct a nine-year panel. This gives 1216 (152×8) observations on
market transitions. Table 3.1 presents some descriptive statistics for the data. The
size of the market measured by the number of residents ranges from around 1,000
to over 8,000. Overall, the market size distribution in 1988 is not very different
from its counterpart in 1980. However, from 1980 to 1988, many markets experience
sizeable population changes. The median of the population change is -7.2% over the
8-year period. The median of the annual population change is -0.8%. In general,
the population growth or decline tends to persist over a few years before regression,
we set fC(·|Ct−1) to equal a mixture over 51 reflected random walks in C with
uniformly distributed innovations. The demand index Ct is defined as the logarithm
of the number of county residents at time t, and it is discretized on a grid with 301
points. The grid’s upper and lower bounds bracket all realized values of Ct. The
standard deviation of the innovation is set equal to the sample standard deviation
of Ct along the temporal dimension, averaged over all markets. The annual discount
factor β is set to be 0.95.
The surplus function pi is parametrized as
pi(n, c; θpi) = αn × exp(c)× 10−3.
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Mean 10% 25% Median 75% 90%
Population in 1980 4695 1810 2819 4070 6689 8539
Population in 1988 4583 1589 2538 4051 6159 8430
% Pop. change 1980 v.s. 1988 -3.9 -17.2 -12.4 -7.2 2.0 11.1
Absolute % pop. change 80 v.s. 88 11.1 2.4 5.4 9.5 14.1 20.2
% Annual pop. change 80-88 -0.5 -3.8 -2.3 -0.8 0.9 2.9
Absolute % annual pop. change 80-88 2.4 0.3 0.8 1.8 3.1 5.0
No. of Dentists per Market 1980 1.92 0 1 2 3 4
No. of Dentists per Market 1988 1.87 0 1 1 3 4
No. of Dentists per 1K residents 1980 0.39 0.00 0.20 0.37 0.55 0.73
No. of Dentists per 1K residents 1988 0.38 0.00 0.16 0.36 0.52 0.75
Table 3.1: Summary Statistics
This specification allows us to flexibly estimate the impact of competition on firms’
markups. However, as presented in Table 3.1, in most of the markets, the number
of operating dentists never exceeds 4, which makes it difficult to accurately estimate
αn for n ≥ 5. Therefore, we set nˇ = 4 and convert any observation Ni,t > 4 to 4. We
also impose the constraint that αn is non-increasing in n and ϕn is non-decreasing
in n. Because we can only identify the parameters up to scale, we normalize κ to be
1.
We implement the estimation in Matlab using the optimization library KNITRO.
The fixed points of the contraction mappings are computed using successive approx-
imation. The estimation procedure typically takes 20-40 minutes on an off-the-shelf
computer. The estimation results are reported in Table 3.2. The standard errors
and confidence intervals are constructed using re-sampling bootstrap.
Our specification has 9 free parameters. Under the estimates, the average like-
lihood contribution of each producer count transition is 0.67.1 The counterpart in
BR’s benchmark specification (Specification (1) in BR’s Table 5) with 15 free param-
eters is 0.35. So, our model provides a better fit for the data with less parameters.
The estimated coefficients αn suggest that dentists’ variable profits per 1000
residents decreases a little more than proportionally as the market structure changes
from monopoly to duopoly, and less than proportionally as the number of dentists
1Because the likelihood contribution of each producer count transition is a probability, it has
a theoretical maximum of 1.
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Estimates Standard Error 90% Confidence Interval 95% Confidence Interval
ϕ1 265.93 236.14 [126.55,754.36] [117.07,920.15]
ϕ2 265.93 251.99 [139.51,754.36] [123.86,920.15]
ϕ3 297.62 306.22 [159.00,971.75] [145.53,1256.86]
ϕ4 297.62 334.78 [159.00,1128.41] [145.53,1268.99]
α1 1.86 0.61 [1.38,3.19] [1.30,3.61]
α2 0.88 0.23 [0.70,1.36] [0.69,1.47]
α3 0.66 0.15 [0.54,1.00] [0.52,1.08]
α4 0.43 0.09 [0.36,0.63] [0.35,0.65]
σ 1.88 0.17 [1.65,2.17] [1.64,2.28]
Table 3.2: The Estimates and the Bootstrap Confidence Intervals
further increases. This is qualitatively similar to BR’s result in their benchmark
specification, but quantitatively different: Our model predicts a sharper drop of
payoff for dentists when the market changes from monopoly to duopoly, and a milder
drop when the number of dentists further increases. Given the estimate for σ, the
median of the fixed cost κ exp(ϕ) is around 1. When the fixed cost is at this value,
a monopoly dentist needs a market with approximately 550 residents to cover the
median fixed cost, while a dentist facing another three competitor needs a market
with 2,350 residents to break-even in a single-period.
The estimates for the sunk cost of entry coefficients ϕn is the same for the first
and second entrants, as well as for the third and the fourth entrants. The difference
between the second and the third entrants’ sunk cost is not large either. This pattern
suggests that existing dentists are not likely to pose an entry barrier. However, these
coefficients are imprecisely estimated and have large standard errors. When exp(ϕ)
is at its median, even the largest market we observed is not sufficiently large for
the first operating dentist to recover the sunk cost of entry. Therefore, an entry
happens only when a very favorable cost shock is realized, which explains why entry
is a rare event in the sample: Among the 1216 market transitions, only 75 entries
are observed.
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3.5 Conclusion
In this paper, we develop an estimable dynamic oligopoly model to quantify im-
portant oligopolistic market structure determinants, such as mark-ups, fixed costs
of operation and sunk costs of entry. The LIFO assumption allows us to solve the
oligopoly game as a sequence of single-agent dynamic discrete choice problems and
estimate the primitive parameters using a quick and reliable algorithm.
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4.1 Introduction
In this paper, I develop and estimate a tractable dynamic oligopoly model for the re-
tail grocery industry. The analysis quantifies the determinants of chain stores’ entry
and exit decisions and evaluates how these decisions influence incumbent stores’ prof-
itability and their survival. In recent decades, technologies like barcode scanning,
computerized inventory management, and modern logistic systems have continued
chain grocery stores’ century-long expansion, at the expense of old-fashioned inde-
pendent local grocery stores. Understanding the determinants and consequences of
chain stores’ entry and exit in this creative destruction process is central to com-
petition policy. For instance, policy makers might want to create favorable market
conditions to encourage chain stores’ entry. A policy experiment with the estimated
model shows that reducing the entry cost by 40% almost doubles chain store entry
in the Dutch cities sampled in this paper. Regulators might also want to support
local stores’ participation in this industry. In the Netherlands, many local govern-
ments offer subsidy programs to small supermarkets.1 The estimated model suggests
that a subsidy package valued 180 million Euro over the next ten years is required
to maintain on average one operating local store per postcode area in the sampled
cities in 2020.
In empirical industrial organization, there is a large literature studying entry
into oligopoly markets. Despite the problem’s inherently dynamic nature, a major-
ity of the empirical studies assume that firms’ one-shot choices settle the industry
into its long-run steady state. This line of research is pioneered by Bresnahan and
Reiss (1990) and Berry (1992), enriched by Mazzeo (2002) and Seim (2006)), and
further extended and applied to retail industries by, among others, Zhu, Singh, and
Manuszak (2009), Vitorino (Forthcoming), and Datta and Sudhir (Forthcoming).
Good departure points as they are, these models cannot incorporate firms’ dynamic
considerations into their entry and exit decisions. For instance, entering firms in
these static analyses do not have the option to cease operation and avoid negative
1For an overview of these programs, see the document “Subsidiemogelijkheden
kleine tot middelgrote buurtsupermarkten” (In English, Subsidy opportunities for
small and medium local supermarkets) published by the Dutch administrative author-
ity National Board for the Retail Trade (Hoofdbedrijfschap Detailhandel, HBD) at
http://www.hbd.nl/websites/hbd2009/files/Supermarkten/Subsidiemogelijkheden%
20kleine%20tot%20middelgrote%20buurtsupermarkten.pdf.
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profit in future. When studying a dynamic industry with uncertainty, ignoring dy-
namics often leads to biased estimates of important market determinants, as demon-
strated by Abbring and Campbell (2010). By adding ongoing demand uncertainty
and sunk costs in its dynamic analysis, this paper mitigates these problems.
The simplicity and tractability of the paper’s model differentiate it from a small
but growing literature that employs dynamic oligopoly models in the spirit of Er-
icson and Pakes (1995) to characterize market structure changes (e.g., Xu 2008,
Collard-Wexler 2010, Gowrisankaran, Lucarelli, Schmidt-Dengler, and Town 2010,
Beresteanu, Misra, and Ellickson 2010, and Ryan 2012). Specifically, I keep the es-
timable game-theoretical model simple and deliver clear-cut results on computation
and multiplicity of its Markov-perfect equilibria: (1) A Markov-perfect equilibrium
satisfying some natural refinements always exists, and all such equilibria can be
quickly computed by finding the fixed points of a sequence of low-dimensional con-
traction mappings; (2) The driving force for any equilibrium multiplicity is identified.
I then derive a fairly intuitive and computable condition for the estimated Markov-
perfect equilibrium to be unique. Since Ericson and Pakes’s seminal work, it is well
known that the lack of results on Markov-perfect equilibrium computation and multi-
plicity poses serious challenges on this class of dynamic oligopoly models’ estimation.
Enormous efforts have been devoted to tackling these issues, with considerable suc-
cess. Aguirregabiria and Mira (2007), Pakes, Ostrovsky, and Berry (2007), Bajari,
Benkard, and Levin (2007), Pesendorfer and Schmidt-Dengler (2008), Weintraub,
Benkard, and Roy (2008), and Arcidiacono, Bayer, Blevins, and Ellickson (2012) all
provide various feasible computation or estimation methods. However, these papers
and their applications are largely silent on the issue of multiple equilibria. Besanko,
Doraszelski, Kryukov, and Satterthwaite (2010) convincingly demonstrate the sever-
ity of the multiplicity problem in the class of models considered by those authors. In
general, even after reasonable refinement, the number of equilibria remains unclear,
rendering the computation of all Markov-perfect equilibrium nearly impossible. This
poses a serious threat to the reliability of counterfactual policy experiments, because
results from such experiments are generated only by the computed equilibrium. By
contrast, the simplicity of my model allows me to verify the uniqueness of the es-
timated equilibrium. Additionally, the contraction-based algorithm allows me to
quickly examine the effects of a large variety of policy changes by computing the
equilibria for many sets of parameter values.
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My modeling and estimation strategy builds on several previous papers. Firstly,
the proposed model is rooted in Abbring, Campbell, and Yang (2012a). However, I
extend their framework in two important dimensions. First, their framework is sta-
tistically degenerate: for any set of parameter values, their model’s predicted market
outcome is sometimes deterministically related to the observable market conditions.
Therefore, it cannot be directly applied to analyzing real market data. Following
Rust (1987), I introduce various sources of unobservable transitory shocks into re-
tailers’ decision problems to rationalize the real data. The contraction-mapping
property of the equilibrium computation scheme and the transitory shock struc-
ture motivate a direct application of the Nested-Fixed-Point Algorithm developed
by Rust to estimate the model. Second, I adapt Abbring, Campbell, and Yang’s
entry phase by allowing potential entry of low-cost retailers. This generalization is
a crucial step towards accommodating creative destruction in the model.
In my model, retailers of two formats, chain stores and local stores, enter, com-
pete, and exit in infinite-horizon oligopoly markets with stochastic demand. Entry
requires paying a format-specific stochastic sunk cost. After entry, a chain store
either becomes a high profitability retailer, or settles for the same low profitability
as its local rivals. Each active retailer receives a profit every period, determined by
market competition, its profitability type, realized demand, and a shock on profit
which can make continuing operation unprofitable. In the model’s Markov-perfect
equilibrium, a retailer enters a market if the expected discounted profit from opera-
tion covers the sunk cost of entry, and exits if continuation gives negative expected
discounted profit. By exploring the difference in retailers’ equilibrium entry and exit
choices under varying market conditions, I identify the ratio of sunk costs to store
profit. This identification strategy is in the spirit of Bresnahan and Reiss (1990,
1993) and Berry (1992).
The model’s simplicity allows me to make a first attempt at extending the esti-
mation of dynamic oligopoly models in one dimension: recovering persistent unob-
servable heterogeneity. In the retail grocery industry, it is common to observe that a
chain store exits while a nearby local store remains active. In light of this, I assume
that whether a chain retailer has a superior profitability type than its local rivals is
stochastically determined upon entry. This profitability type stays unchanged over
time, but remains unobserved to the econometrician. The stores’ optimal entry and
exit choices are informative on the joint type distribution of all the incumbent chain
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stores, so I infer this joint distribution with Bayes’ rule following every observed
entry and exit choice. This approach turns out to be very tractable.
I apply the model to a panel dataset of grocery stores’ entry and exit in small
Dutch municipalities from 2002 to 2010. Comparing to the rare store-level per-
formance data1, the entry and exit data are in general easier to access in many
countries. Nevertheless, there are three reasons to champion the Dutch data. First,
a clear pattern of creative destruction is visible. During the 9-year period, the num-
ber of chain stores increased almost 25% in the sampled cities, while around half
of the local stores that were active in 2002 exited before 2010. Second, stores often
cluster in residential areas because Dutch consumers highly value proximity when
planning grocery shopping trips.2 This feature suggests that I can use residential
postcode to partition the country into isolated markets and obtain a large cross sec-
tion of markets for estimation. Finally, after 2002, most Dutch supermarket chains
had established their logistic networks. They are also active in franchising during
the sample period: A large number of the supermarket outlets were set up and run
by individual entrepreneurs. These features allow me to treat continuation and entry
decisions for individual chain stores independently from other outlets in the same
chain.3
The Markov-perfect equilibrium after intuitive refinements is verified to be unique
given the estimated structural parameters. In this equilibrium, the chain stores,
upon successfully establishing their advantageous profitability position, earn a flow
profit 5.5 times that of their local rivals. When a chain store enters, it decreases
an incumbent local store’s expected discounted profit by 26%-62%. However, chain
stores’ entry is considerably delayed by a very high average sunk cost. A policy
experiment shows that cutting the average sunk cost of entry by 40% will almost
1Despite the scarcity of this type of data, some scholars have used them to study the grocery
retail industry. For example, Ellickson and Grieco (Forthcoming).
2See Van Lin and Gijsbrechts (2011).
3Jia (2008) and Holmes (2011) study the network effect in chain stores’ expansions in the US. In
their models, chain store headquarters incorporates the economies of scale from network expansion
in their outlet entry decisions. Therefore, market entry decisions are correlated with each other.
Using US data, both authors confirm network effect as a driving force behind the market leaders’
vast expansion. Incorporating such network effects in the model will result in complications that
are beyond the scope of this paper. Fortunately, the nearly complete logistic networks and the
franchising activities of the Dutch chain stores reduced the concern of not modelling the network
effect. This simplification allows me to set up a model featuring both dynamics and oligopoly
competition, from which Jia and Holmes respectively abstracted.
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double the number of chain store entrants in the next 10 years. If the average sunk
cost can be reduced by 90%, the number of incumbent chain stores in 2020 will
double, and very few local stores will remain. To provide budgetary advice for the
Dutch subsidy programs, I also compute the required costs for various policy targets.
For instance, ensuring an average of one active local store per postcode area in 2020
requires in total 180 million Euro subsidy from 2010 to 2020. Almost 400 million
Euro is needed to contain the percentage of postcode areas that only have chain
stores to below 40%.
The remainder of this paper proceeds as follows. The next section provides
background information on the Dutch retail grocery industry to guide the model-
ing choices. It also describes the sources and construction of my dataset. Section
4.3 presents the model’s primitives. Section 4.4 establishes the results on equilib-
rium existence and uniqueness. The constructive proof of equilibrium existence also
provides a procedure to compute the equilibrium values and market transition prob-
abilities. Section 4.5 describes the likelihood construction and estimation procedure.
The estimation results and the policy analysis are reported in Section 4.6. Further
discussion and a conclusion appear in Section 4.7. Computational details and proofs
are collected in the appendices.
4.2 Grocery Stores in Small Dutch Municipalities
4.2.1 The Dutch Grocery Stores: A Snapshot
The Netherlands is not famous for its dining culture. Nevertheless, according to
Statistics Netherlands (Centraal Bureau voor de Statistiek, CBS), Dutch people
spent almost 40 billion euro on food, beverages and tobacco in 2010. This is around
15% of total domestic consumption. Grocery supermarkets enjoyed 86% of the
market share from food and 62% from beverage and tobacco, boasting a turnover of
25 billion Euro in 2010. Even after adjusting for inflation, the supermarkets’ total
turnover increased over the past decade.
The major Dutch supermarket chains include four national ones (Albert Heijn
(AH), C1000, Super de Boer, and Jumbo), two international hard discounters1 (Aldi
and Lidl, both German supermarket chains), and a dozen of smaller regional chains.
1The hard discounters are small to medium supermarkets that use aggressive pricing strategy,
have limited assortment, and predominately focus on private labels.
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2007 2008 2009 2010
Albert Heijn 29.5% 31.2% 32.8% 33.6%
C1000 14.3% 13.1% 11.7% 11.5%
Super de Boer 7.3% 6.7% 6.5% 5.5%
Jumbo 4.4% 4.7% 4.9% 5.5%
Superunie (total) 30.0% 30.7% 29.6% 29.6%
Aldi 8.9% 8.4% 8.3% 7.9%
Lidl 4.0% 4.7% 5.4% 5.6%
Other Chains 1.6% 0.5% 0.8% 0.8%
Total 100% 100% 100% 100%
Table 4.1: Market Shares (sales) of the Dutch Supermarket Chains.
Source: Original from AC Nielsen report, cited by “Dossier Supermarkten (feiten en cijfers)” (In
English, Supermarket Profiles (facts and figures)) composed by HBD.
Table 4.1 presents their market shares in recent years. The largest chain AH has a
market share of one third, which is still growing. The other three national chains
and the two hard discounters roughly take another one third. The regional chain
stores under the Superunie group altogether take the rest.1
All the supermarket chains in Table 4.1 have been active since 2002, the beginning
of the data period. No other large chain entered the Dutch market since then. During
this period, Dutch chain stores’ expansion had been much more modest than that of
their US counterparts studied by Jia and Holmes. For instance, from 1962 to 2005
in the US, the number of Wal-Mart’s general merchandise outlets increases from
none to 3,176, and the number of the general distribution centers from none to 43
(Table 2 in Holmes 2011). During 2002-2010, the most aggressive expander Albert
Heijn opened 154 outlets, which account for less than 20% of the currently active
stores. Furthermore, no new distribution center was built by Albert Heijn during
this period, suggesting that the logistic network had been completed in 2002. The
1Superunie is a purchasing organization. It negotiates and buys products in the wholesale
market on behalf of the regional chain stores. It also handles the lion’s share of logistics for the
members, delivering products from its own warehouses using its own container-bearing trucks. Its
presence integrates the contracted regional chains in purchasing and logistics to a very large extent,
creating economies of scale and enabling them to compete with the national and international
chains. For this reason, I do not categorize the small regional chains affiliated to Superunie as local
stores in my estimation.
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second largest chain (C1000) even experienced contraction during this period.
Several mergers and acquisitions of supermarket chains occured during the ob-
servation period. In 2006, the holding company of supermarket chains Konmar and
Edah, Laurus, sold all its stores to third parties, including AH and C1000. In 2009,
the parent company of supermarket Jumbo bought another chain, Super de Boer,
from its French holding company Groupe Casino. During these merger and acqui-
sitions, many stores were taken over, but very few were closed. In the second case,
Super de Boer and Jumbo still operated as two distinct chains after the acquisition.1
Despite the presence of the hard discounters, vertical differentiation among the
supermarket chains remains limited. Most of the Dutch supermarket chains have
only one store format2 and adopt a nation-wide uniform pricing policy. All of the
national chains and most of the regional chains provide a full spectrum of products
to capture the maximum scope of potential consumers. Even the quality-oriented
AH provides, and aggressively advertises, its heavily discounted private label Eu-
roShopper. As pointed out by Van Lin and Gijsbrechts (2011), distance to store
is the first concern for Dutch grocery shoppers. This is arguably the most promi-
nent characteristic that horizontally differentiates the supermarkets. To stay close
to their potential customers, grocery stores usually locate in residential areas. The
Dutch zoning regulation (bestemmingsplan) imposes strict restriction on using des-
ignated dwelling properties for business purposes, which limits the locations suitable
for entry. Municipalities draft these plans in consultation with local residents, and
they revise them only infrequently.3
As discussed earlier, many Dutch supermarket chains actively franchise their
1In 2011, Super de Boer stores started converting into Jumbo stores. The data used in this
paper ends in 2010.
2AH is one exception. Besides the ordinary outlets, it has around 30 hypermarkets, “AH
XL”, and around 50 convenience stores, “AH To Go”. The AH XL stores are larger in size than
ordinary AH. They also have more departments in multimedia products, kitchen products, etc..
Nevertheless, its primary business activity remains retail grocery. AH To Go stores are mostly
located in the train stations and airports. In the empirical analysis, I treat AH XL as ordinary
AH stores, and exclude AH To Go from the sample.
3Establishing or changing a zoning plan often requires approval from residents, municipal coun-
cil, and existing entrepreneurs. This can be a long and painful process which takes months.
A description on the procedure of revising a zoning plan is published (in Dutch) by the Dutch
Chamber of Commerce at http://www.kvk.nl/ondernemen/huisvesting/bestemmingsplannen/
wijziging-bestemmingsplan-door-de-gemeente/
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brands. For instance, Albert Heijn has around 200 franchisees among its 800 stores.1
Almost 90% of the 400 outlets in the second largest chain C1000 are independent
franchisees.2
4.2.2 The Data
The longitudinal dataset used in the model’s estimation is constructed from two
major sources. The annual establishment-level data of store entries and exits is
extracted from the online version of the REview and Analysis of Companies in Hol-
land (REACH) database. Small municipalities’ isolated postcode areas are selected
to form the cross-sections of independent markets for retail grocery. To measure the
demand on these markets, annual populations on the postcode level are retrieved
from the CBS database StatLine.
4.2.2.1 The REACH Data
The online version of the REACH database contains the establishment-level data
for all Dutch business that have ever been active after January 1, 2002. It is cre-
ated and maintained by the Dutch consultancy Bureau van Dijk (BvD), under the
delegation and authorization of the Dutch Chamber of Commerce (Kamer van Koo-
phandel, KvK). The business profiles come from the Dutch Trade Register (Het
Handelsregister, DTR) archive provided by KvK. In the Netherlands, registration in
DTR is compulsory for “every company and almost every legal entity” (KvK web-
site).3 The registration also requires truthful provision of, among other things, the
business’ name, main activities, location, date of incorporation, ownership data, and
form of legal organization. These pieces of information are all recorded by REACH.
Additionally, businesses ceasing operation must deregister from the DTR. REACH
includes the deregistration date.4
1In Dutch at http://www.ah.nl/artikel?trg=albertheijn/article.feiten.
2In Dutch at http://www.denationalefranchisegids.nl/firstfranchise/KG_c1000.htm.
3For the details on the scope of the registration, see http://www.kvk.nl/english/
traderegister/020_About_the_trade_register/registrationinthetraderegister/
Whomustregister.asp. It is safe to assume that all the relevant stores are included in this
database.
4REACH does provide concise financial data for medium companies with annual turnover
between 1.5 and 50 million euro in several recent years. For the majority of the stores studied in
this paper, the financial data are either not available for the full sample period, or of poor quality.
77
4. CREATIVE DESTRUCTION AMONG GROCERY STORES
I focus on the period between January 1, 2002 and December 31, 2010 to con-
struct an 9-year annual panel. If an establishment (1) has been active in this period,
(2) has a four-digit SBI1 code 4711 (supermarket and such with a general assort-
ment of food and drink) listed among its main activities,2 and (3) does not have
a name either strongly suggesting that other business activity dominates grocery
retail, or indicating that the store is specialized in a narrow category of groceries,3 I
classify it as a grocery store and include it in the sample. For each store, I treat its
recorded “year of incorporation” as the entry time, and the year of deregistration as
the exit time.4 The store’s format is primarily recovered from the ownership data;
if it is labeled as a “branch” in REACH, then it is categorized as a chain store
outlet. This criterion may overlook the franchisees, which are very often recorded
as single location firms. Therefore, I supplement this criterion by (1) matching the
store names with a list of major brands of supermarket chains, and the names of
known franchisees; (2) matching the website of the store with a list of chain stores’
websites; (3) categorizing stores with 40 or more employees as chain stores. If an
establishment is not labeled as a chain store after applying all the above criterions,
it is deemed a local store.
1SBI (De Standaard Bedrijfsindeling) is the Dutch standard industry classification code.
For its details, please refer to the link (in Dutch) http://www.cbs.nl/nl-NL/menu/methoden/
classificaties/overzicht/sbi/default.htm. Although REACH also provides BIC and SIC
codes in the business profiles, the original registration at KvK only contains the SBI code.
2Most of the Dutch supermarkets specialize in food-items and household non-durable supplies,
flirting little with other retail sectors. According to HBD, supermarket chains only have a 29%
share in the drugstore products market, 8% in non prescription medicine, and 1% in clothing.
Therefore, the presence of other retailers is not likely to influence grocery stores’ entry and exit
decisions. For this reason, I do not consider the competition between grocery stores and other
retailers.
3To this end, I eliminate the stores whose names contain, “wijnen” (wine), “kaas” (cheese),
“noten” (nuts), “eetcafe” (small restaurant), etc., and a range of terms suggesting that a store is
specialized in exotic foreign products (immigrant stores). A complete list of the terms used for the
elimination can be found in the documentation for the data processing, which is published on the
author’s website.
4In case of store ownership change due to the aforementioned mergers, I treat the records of
outlet takeovers the same as store continuation if the store name remains after the takeover, and
as a sequence of exit followed by entry if the store name changes.
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4.2.2.2 Market Definition and the StatLine Data
To create a sample of markets with well-defined demand, shoppers in one sampled
market should not buy groceries from stores in another sampled market. To ensure
this, I adopt a similar strategy as in Bresnahan and Reiss (1991), and define markets
as the major residential postcode areas in the small Dutch municipalities.
The demographic data are obtained from the publicly available dataset of Stat-
Line. First, from the 2009 list of Dutch municipalities, I eliminate 22 metropolitan
areas. These areas often have multiple densely populated postcode areas adjacent
to each other. Shoppers are likely to traverse through the areas to buy groceries. In
addition, many of these areas are either business districts, or packed with tourists
throughout the year. For them, the number of residents is not a proper measure of
local demand. This elimination leaves me with 375 small municipalities. I further
drop the tourist town Noordwijkerhout and the beach resort Burgh-Haamstede from
the sample. The remaining municipalities are often composed of isolated villages,
each having a distinct postcode. Next, I choose the postcode areas with a number
of inhabitants between 4,000 and 12,000 in 2009 in these municipalities as isolated
markets for retail grocery. I obtain 877 such markets. The numbers of inhabitants
in these markets from 2002 to 2010 are extracted as the indicator for market de-
mand. Stores in REACH are subsequently matched to these markets based on their
location information. In total, 2,588 stores have been active during 2002 to 2010 in
these markets. Among them, 1,559 are chain store outlets and 1,029 are local stores.
4.2.2.3 Summary Statistics
Table 4.2 presents some summary statistics for the selected markets. From 2002
to 2010, the number of residents grew in roughly half of the markets, and declined
in the other half. Overall, the magnitude of population growth outmatched the
magnitude of decline, and hence the markets’ population distribution shifted to the
right. The annual absolute population percentage change has a median of 0.7%.
The population change more often accumulated than cancelled out over the 9-year
period. As a result, the absolute population percentage change from 2002 to 2009
has a median of 3.5%.
The income statistics are only available at the municipality level. Fortunately
for the analysis, the Netherlands has a very equal income distribution, even among
79
4. CREATIVE DESTRUCTION AMONG GROCERY STORES
Mean 10% 25% Median 75% 90%
Population in 2002 7103 4463 5251 6760 8719 10214
Population in 2010 7213 4585 5386 6885 8849 10310
% of Pop. change 02 v.s. 10 2.7 -5.8 -3.4 0.0 3.7 9.6
Absolute % pop. change 02 v.s. 10 6.5 0.6 1.5 3.5 6.1 10.4
% of Annual pop. change 02-10 0.3 -1.2 -0.7 -0.1 0.7 1.7
Abs.% annual pop. change 02-10 1.1 0.1 0.3 0.7 1.2 2.1
Disposable income per capita 08 (k e) 14.73 13.30 13.88 14.50 15.30 16.40
% of Population w/ income 2008 71 69 70 72 73 74
Disp. inco. for pop. w/ inco. 08 (k e) 20.33 18.28 19.10 19.90 21.10 22.62
No. of chain entrants, 2002-2010 0.57 0 0 0 1 2
No. of chain exited, 2002-2010 0.23 0 0 0 0 1
No. of local entrants, 2002-2010 0.55 0 0 0 1 2
No. of local exited, 2002-2010 0.59 0 0 0 1 2
Table 4.2: Summary Statistics
The mean values are arithmatic average over all the markets.
The income data is from StatLine, and is at the municipality level. Income includes labor and
capital income, as well as social benefits.
the small municipalities. For this reason, I am content with the postcode-level
population data as a proxy for local demand.
During the sample period, chain store entry happened in less than half of the
markets, and the same can be said for chain store exit, local store entry, and exit.
On average, store entry and exit happened less than once per market during the
9-year period. This is perhaps not surprising given that these markets were mostly
developed residential districts in a developed country. Nevertheless, the chain stores’
advance and the local stores’ consequent exits still changed the market composition
of chain and local stores considerably, as summarized in Table 4.3. The number of
markets populated only by chain stores rose from 340 in 2002 to 406 in 2010. In 2002,
there were 234 markets without a single chain store, 62 of them with monopoly local
store, and 26 of them with duopoly local stores. In 2010, the numbers had dropped
to 154, 50, and 11 respectively. The numbers of markets with 2, 3, and 4 or more
chain stores all increased over this period.
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Market Composition in 2002
No. chains\locals 0 1 2 3 4+ Subtotal
0 139 62 26 5 2 234
1 176 108 37 13 6 340
2 99 51 19 5 6 180
3 46 21 9 6 1 83
4+ 19 16 3 0 2 40
Subtotal 479 258 94 29 17 877
Market Composition in 2010
No. chains\locals 0 1 2 3 4+ Subtotal
0 86 50 11 5 2 154
1 197 94 27 10 2 330
2 121 59 22 8 4 214
3 65 44 9 2 5 125
4+ 23 20 4 5 2 54
Subtotal 492 267 73 30 15 877
Table 4.3: Market Compositions
The total number of the active chain stores in the sample rose from 1105 in
2002 to 1354 in 2010, while the total number of the active local stores declined from
556 to 551. Behind the negligible contraction of the local stores is a high annual
turnover: As shown in Figure 4.1, around 50-70 local stores exited each year, which
was roughly 10% of all the active local stores. This high turnover rate suggests that
individual local stores are vulnerable to changes in market conditions.
4.3 The Model
With the panel data in hand, I introduce an oligopoly model of stores’ entry and exit
to rationalize observed market dynamics in terms of structural primitives, particu-
larly, sunk costs of entry, the profitability advantage of chain stores, and uncertainty.
In the remainder of the paper, I denote a n−vector by x = (x1, x2, . . . , xn). A
capital letter denotes a random variable or vector, the corresponding lower case
letter is reserved for its realization. The random variable corresponding to Y in the
next period is Y ′. The expectation taken over the random variable X is denoted
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Figure 4.1: Numbers of Incumbents, Entrants, and Exited Stores in Each Year:
2002-2010
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with EX . The conditional density function for y is written as f(y|X = x) when
random variable X equals x, while f(y; θ) means that θ is function f ’s parameter.
4.3.1 Primitives
The same set of primitive assumptions applies to all the markets. Time is discrete
and the horizon is infinite, t ∈ Z? ≡ {0, 1, . . .}. Retailers are observed to differ in
their formats: local store (L) or chain store (C). A countable number of chain store
retailers and a countable number of local retailers potentially serve each market. At
a given time t, some of the retailers are active, and the rest are inactive. Active
retailers either have low (L) or high (H) profitability types. These types are not
observed by econometrician, though they are common knowledge to the retailers
once realized. A 2 × 1 vector Nt, the variable for market structure, records the
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Figure 4.2: The Sequence of Events and Actions within a Period
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numbers of active type-L and type-H stores. Strategic entry and exit determine the
market structure’s evolution.
Here and throughout the paper, I use ιH ≡ (0, 1) and ιL ≡ (1, 0) to denote a
market structure with a type-H firm and a type-L firm respectively. I denote an
empty market with ι0 ≡ (0, 0).
Figure 4.2 illustrates the sequencing of these variables’ realizations and retailers’
actions within period t. The stochastic number of consumers in period t is denoted by
Ct ∈ [cˆ, cˇ], with cˇ <∞. The market-level cost shock on profit in period t is denoted
by WM,t. Given the inherited values of Nt, Ct and WM,t, all active retailers begin
the period by serving the market. The profits from this stage are piH(Nt, Ct; θH) −
β−1ϕM exp(WM,t) for a type-H retailer and piL(Nt, Ct; θL) − β−1ϕM exp(WM,t) for
a type-L retailer. The discount factor β < 1 is common to all retailers. The
parameters θH and θL measure how the state variables affect the profits. A retailer’s
profit decreases with the number and profitability types of its competitors, and
it improves with market demand. Also, the technological advantage of a type-H
retailer over a type-L gives it greater profit. Formally, we have
Assumption 6 (Monotone Producer Profit). For any profitability type k ∈ {L,H},
number of consumers c ∈ [cˆ, cˇ], and market structure n ∈ Z2? such that n at least
includes one type-k store
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1. pik(n, c; θk) ≤ pˇi <∞;
2. pik(n + ιH, c; θk) < pik (n + ιL, c; θk);
3. there exists an n ∈ N such that pik(n, c; θk) < 0 if the number of stores in n is
larger than n; and
4. piL(n, c; θL) ≤ piH(n, c; θH) for any n that includes at least one type-L and one
type-H retailer.
After production, a shock on chain stores’ sunk cost of entry WC,t is realized. One
chain store retailer that has never attempted to enter the market makes an entry
decision after observing this shock. After this decision, a shock to local stores’ sunk
cost of entry WL,t is realized. One local store that has never attempted to serve
the market observes this shock, and subsequently decides on entry. Upon entry,
the chain store retailer pays a sunk cost of ϕC exp(WC,t) ≥ 0. The local store pays
ϕL exp(WL,t) ≥ 0 for entry. The restriction on the number of potential entrants each
period fits the data: In the Dutch local markets considered in the estimation, entry
by more than one chain stores or local stores in the same year is very rarely observed
(less than 20 cases in the 877 markets over 9 years1).
All local stores have profitability type L after entry. chain stores do not learn
their types until after entry. A chain store has probability ω to become a type-H
retailer, and with the complimentary probability it becomes a type-L retailer. Each
store’s profitability type is not only learned by its manager, but also observed by all
retailers. I assume that the local store entrant following this chain store observes
this type.
A retailer with an entry opportunity cannot delay its choice2, so the payoff to
staying out of the industry is normalized to be zero. After the entry phase, the
profitability shock in period t + 1, WM,t+1, is revealed to all active retailers. Then,
all of them— including those that just entered the market— decide simultaneously
1In the estimation, I only consider the likelihood contribution from each year’s first entry in
each local market. The subsequent entries in the same year and same market does not contribute
to the likelihood.
2Given the franchise feature and the large number of chain brands, lots of people can be
potential owners of chain stores. In this industry, opportunities to open a store come and go
quickly. Hence, for a potential store owner, delaying entry to a later year often is not practical.
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between survival and exit. Exit is irreversible1 but otherwise costless. It allows
firms to avoid future periods’ negative profits. All retailers’ entry and exit decisions
maximize their expected discounted profits.
In the period’s final stage, the number of consumers Ct evolves exogenously
following a first-order Markov process. This concludes the updating of all the ex-
ogenous random components in this market. With the updated values of Nt+1, Ct+1
and WM,t+1, the market moves on to next period.
I follow Rust (1987) and assume that the unobservable shocks WC,t,WL,t, and
WM,t are conditionally independent in the following way.
Assumption 7 (Markov and Conditional Independence). For any t ∈ {1, . . .},
{Ct,WM,t,WC,t,WL,t} follows a first-order Markov process. The transition density
of the process factors as
f(Ct+1,WM,t+1,WC,t+1,WL,t+1|Ct,WC,t,WL,t,WM,t) =
fC(Ct+1|Ct)fWM (WM,t|Ct)fWC(WC,t+1|Ct+1)fWL(WL,t+1|Ct+1),
in which fC is the conditional density for the Markov variable Ct, fWM is the condi-
tional density for the profitability shock WM,t, fWC and fWL are the densities of the
shocks on sunk costs.
4.3.2 Markov-Perfect Equilibrium
I focus on Markov-perfect equilibrium of the model. This is a subgame-perfect equi-
librium in strategies that are only contingent on payoff-relevant variables. Assump-
tion 7 ensures that conditional on Ct, the realized shocks do not help in predicting
their future realizations. For a chain store retailer contemplating entry in period t,
the payoff-relevant variables are Ct,WC,t, and the market structure MC,t just before
this store’s possible entry. For a local entrant, the payoff-relevant variables include
Ct,WL,t and ML,t. Next, denote the market structure after the period’s final entry
with ME,t. For an active retailer contemplating survival, the payoff-relevant vari-
ables are this market structure, the current number of consumers Ct, the profitability
shock WM,t+1, and this retailer’s profitability type.
1Although a chain store outlet’s closure does not mean the exit of the chain from the retail
grocery market, it is rarely observed that a chain store opens another outlet in a market from
which it has previously withdrawn.
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Suppose that WC,t,WL,t and WM,t all have infinite support. A Markov strategy
is a couple (aE, aS) of functions
aE : Z2? × [cˆ, cˇ]× R× {L,C} −→ [0, 1]
aS : Z2? × [cˆ, cˇ]× R× {L,H} −→ [0, 1].
This allows for mixed strategies. For each potential entrant with format k ∈
{L,C}, this strategy’s entry rule aE assigns a probability of becoming active to
any (Mk,t, Ct,Wk,t, k). Similarly, its survival rule a
S assigns a probability of re-
maining active in the next period to each possible value of the payoff-relevant state
(ME,t, Ct,WM,t, k) for all active retailers, where k ∈ {L,H}. Since calendar time is
not payoff-relevant in Markov-perfect equilibrium, I hereafter drop the t subscript
from all variables. Throughout the paper, I focus on symmetric equilibria: Firms
facing the same values of state variables have the same equilibrium probability of
survival or entry.
To characterize equilibria, it is useful to define two value functions, each corre-
sponding to a particular node of the game tree within each period. The post-entry
value vE(mE, c, k) equals the expected discounted profits of a retailer that has prof-
itability type k, faces market structure mE and number of consumers c just after
all entry decisions have been realized, and just before the profitability shock WM is
revealed. For a potential entrant, this value function gives the expected discounted
profits from entry, and hence it determines optimal entry choices. The realized
shocks on sunk costs wC, wL do not enter this value, because they are “sunk” upon
entry, and do not help predicting future shocks (Assumption 7). The post-survival
value vS(mS, c, k) equals the expected discounted profits of a type-k retailer,gross of
next period’s fixed costs, facing market structure mS and number of consumers c, just
after all survival decisions have been realized. This value net of the (discounted) prof-
itability shock, vS(mS, c, k)− ϕM exp(wM), equals the payoff to a surviving retailer
following the simultaneous continuation decisions, so it is central to the analysis of
exit.
The value functions vE and vS satisfy
vE(mE, c, k) = EMS ,WM [a
S(mE, c,W
′
M , k)(v
S(MS, c, k)
− ϕM exp(W ′M)) ME = mE, C = c],
(4.1)
and
vS(mS, c, k) = βEME ,C
[
pik(mS, C
′) + vE(M′E, C
′, k) MS = mS, C = c
]
. (4.2)
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For (aE, aS) to form a symmetric Markov-perfect equilibrium, it is necessary
and sufficient that no firm can gain from a one-shot deviation from (aE, aS) (e.g.
Fudenberg and Tirole, 1991, Theorem 4.2):
aE(mC, c, wC,C)∈arg max
a∈[0,1]
a(ωEME [v
E (ME, c,H) |ML = mC + ιH]
+(1− ω)EME [vE (ME, c,L) |ML = mC + ιL]− ϕC exp(wC)) (4.3)
aE(mL, c, wL,L)∈arg max
a∈[0,1]
a
(
vE (mL + ιL, c,L)− ϕL exp(wL)
)
, (4.4)
aS(mE, c, wM , k)∈arg max
a∈[0,1]
a
(
EMS
[
vS(MS, c, k) ME = mE
]− ϕM exp(wM))(4.5)
The conditional expectations in (4.1), (4.2), (4.3), and (4.5) are computed given that
other retailers follow (aE, aS), and the retailer of interest enters or remains active.
Note that a chain store entrant’s payoff depends on the post-entry values for both
types. Together, conditions (4.1)–(4.5) are necessary and sufficient for a strategy
(aE, aS) to form a symmetric Markov-perfect equilibrium with payoffs vE and vS.
4.4 Equilibrium Analysis
In Section 4.4.1, I begin the equilibrium analysis with markets that can accommo-
date at most two retailers simultaneously, regardless of their types. The restriction
on the number of retailers can be rationalized by a formidable entry cost for a third
entrant. Note that under this restriction, the number of simultaneously active re-
tailers never exceeds two in equilibrium, if the market is initially empty. This is the
simplest example where strategic interactions between retailers are retained. Us-
ing this example, I introduce several equilibrium refinements and illustrate how to
compute the equilibrium value functions, the choice probability of retailers, and the
market structure transition probabilities under the refined equilibria. I formally de-
fine the equilibrium refinements in Section 4.4.2. Finally, I generalize the technique
and procedure used in the duopoly example, and establish the general results on
equilibrium existence, uniqueness, and computation in Section 4.4.3.
4.4.1 A Duopoly Example
If at most two retailers can serve a market at the same time, the equilibrium com-
putation consists of five steps. In each of the steps, the post-entry value function
restricted to part of the state space is determined by the unique fixed point of
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Figure 4.3: Reduced-form Representation of the Duopoly Continuation Game
Survive Exit
Survive
vS(2ιH, c,H)− ϕM exp(wM)
vS(2ιH, c,H)− ϕM exp(wM)
vS(ιH, c,H)− ϕM exp(wM)
0
Exit
0
vS(ιH, c,H)− ϕM exp(wM)
0
0
Note: In each cell, the upper-left expression gives the row player’s payoff. Please see the text for
further details.
a contraction mapping. Then, the post-survival values, the strategy, the choice
probabilities, and the transition probabilities are constructed. The results from the
completed steps are used as inputs in the following steps. I sketch the procedure
here, and collect the omitted details in Appendix 5.2.2.1.
Step 1: Duopoly Market with Two Type-H Retailers The equilibrium com-
putation begins with market structure of two active type-H retailers. In a Markov-
perfect equilibrium, the survival rule aS(2ιH, c, wM ,H) satisfies (4.5): It is a Nash
equilibrium of the static simultaneous-move game with payoffs given by the ex-
pected value of continuation given c and wM . Figure 4.3 gives the reduced-form
representation of this static game with the two possible pure strategies “Survive”
and “Exit”. The upper-left expression in each cell is the row player’s payoff. Both
retailers receive the duopoly post-survival payoff vS(2ιH, c,H) − ϕM exp(wM) from
joint continuation. Since no retailer will further enter this saturated market in the
next period, the duopoly post-survival payoff satisfies a special case of Equation
(4.2):
vS(2ιH, c,H) = βEC
[
piH(2ιH, C
′) + vE(2ιH, C ′,H) C = c
]
.
If a retailer survives alone, it earns the monopoly post-survival value vS(ιH, c,H)−
ϕM exp(wM).
Now, suppose that vS(2ιH, c,H) > ϕM exp(wM). If the monopoly post-survival
value vS(ιH, c,H) > ϕM exp(wM), “Survive” is a dominant strategy in this static
game. If vS(ιH, c,H) ≤ ϕM exp(wM), any symmetric equilibrium strategy other than
“Survive” is not renegotiation-proof: Such strategy either involves mixing, or is pure
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“Exit”. In either case, retailers’ expected payoff from such a strategy always equals
zero. So, if retailers can renegotiate, they will both rationally choose joint continu-
ation to get positive payoff. Therefore, if we require the Markov-perfect equilibrium
to be renegotiation-proof, both retailers will choose “Survive” with probability one
if vS(2ιH, c,H) > ϕM exp(wM). If instead v
S(2ιH, c,H) ≤ ϕM exp(wM), then any
symmetric equilibrium strategy, mixing or pure “Exit”, gives retailers zero expected
payoff. Since vE(2ιH, c,H) is computed based on the symmetric equilibrium payoff
to this static game, these facts together yield the following special case of Equation
(4.1):
vE(2ιH, c,H) = EWM
[
max{0, vS(2ιH, c,H)− exp(W ′M)} C = c
]
= EWM [max{0, βEC
[
piH(2ιH, C
′) + vE(2ιH, C ′,H) C = c
]
− ϕM exp(W ′M)} C = c].
(4.6)
The expectation in Equation (4.6) is taken over the exogenous variables C ′ and W ′M
only, and does not depend on any survival rule. This ensures that the equation’s
right-hand side defines a contraction mapping, with its unique fixed point pinning
down vE(2ιH, ·,H). Then, it is straightforward to compute vS(2ιH, ·,H). The rea-
soning leading to Equation (4.6) highlights the key technical insight that makes the
equilibrium computation simple. The equilibrium duopoly payoffs can be computed
without knowledge of the retailers’ payoffs in other market structures, because re-
tailers receive positive expected payoff in a symmetric equilibrium only when joint
continuation is individually profitable.
For some distributions of WM , the expectation over WM in Equation (4.6) has a
closed-form expression. In Appendix 5.2.2.1, I work out an example under normally
distributed WM . By using closed-form expression to compute v
E(2ιH, ·,H), one can
avoid the numerical integration over WM . This is one of the major consequence and
benefit from Assumption 7.
Step 2: Type-L Duopolist Facing a Type-H Rival. Next, consider a type-L
retailer who faces a type-H competitor. Because a type-H retailer earns higher flow
profit than a type-L retailer does in each period, I require the equilibrium to be
natural in its survival rules: a type-H retailer never exits when a type-L competitor
survives. In a natural Markov-perfect equilibrium, the type-L retailer’s survival
implies the survival of the type-H rival. Moreover, no retailer will further enter
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this market following its survival, given the formidable sunk cost of entry for a third
store. Therefore, this retailer’s post-survival value does not depend on any unknown
strategy of rival stores. Consequently, Equation (4.1) defines a contraction mapping
with its unique fixed point determining vE(ιL + ιH, ·,L). Then, the post-survival
value vS(ιL + ιH, ·,L) naturally follows.
The equilibrium refinements discussed above narrow the equilibrium set to the
renegotiation-proof natural Markov-perfect equilibria (RNMPE). With the computed
RNMPE value functions, I can further compute the equilibrium entry rules to a
market occupied by a type-H monopolist for a chain store and a local store, and the
survival rule for a type-L retailer facing a type-H rival.
By imposing distributional assumptions on WC,WL, I can compute the choice
probabilities for a chain store and a local store to enter when the market is monopo-
lized by a type-H retailer, PE(ιC|ιH, ·) and PE(ιL|ιH, ·), by integrating out the sunk
cost shocks. With these probabilities in hand, I further compute PE(mE|ιH, ·), the
transition probability of entry for the post-entry market structure to become mE,
when the pre-entry market structure is ιH.
Similarly, the transition probability of survival, PS(ιL + ιH|ιL + ιH, ·), follows
from the post-survival value vS(ιL + ιH, ·,L) and some distributional assumption on
WM .
Step 3: Type-H Monopolist & Type-H Duopolist Facing One Type-L
Rival. A type-H monopolist’s post-survival value function, vS(ιH, ·,H), depends
on whether entry would occur next period. The relevant entry rules have been
calculated in Step 2. The post-survival payoff for a type-H duopolist who face a type-
L rival, vS (ιL + ιH, ·,H), depends on whether the type-L store exits. The relevant
survival rule has been calculated in Step 2 as well. Thus, Equation (4.1) again defines
a contraction mapping with its unique fixed point simultaneously determining the
post-entry value functions vE(ιH, ·,H) and vE (ιL + ιH, ·,H). The associated post-
survival payoffs, the transition probabilities PS(ιH|ιL + ιH, ·) and PS(ι0|ιL + ιH, ·)
follow.
Step 4: Duopoly Market with Two Type-L Retailers. The survival prob-
lem on a duopoly market with two type-L retailers is a carbon copy of the static
game presented in Figure 4.3. If simultaneous survival is individually profitable,
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then the renegotiation-proofness requires both retailers to choose survival in a sym-
metric equilibrium. Otherwise, the strategy in the static game assigns non-negative
probability to “Exit”, and results in zero expected payoff. Therefore, similarly to
Equation (4.6), the necessary condition for vE(2ιL, ·,L) defines a contraction map-
ping, with its fixed point determining vE(2ιL, ·,L). Consequently, vS(2ιL, ·,L) fol-
lows. Then, the associated choice probabilities PE(ιC|ιL, ·) and PE(ιL|ιL, ·), and
the transition probabilities of entry for market structures succeeding this monopoly
market PE(ιL + ιH|ιL, ·), PE(2ιL|ιL, ·), and PE(ιL|ιL, ·) are computed analogously to
their counterparts in Step 2.
Step 5: The Rest. First, I compute a type-L monopolist’s value functions. The
survival decision of this retailer depends on whether entry happens next period. The
likelihood of entry is given by PE(ιC|ιL, ·) and PE(ιL|ιL, ·), the choice probabilities
that have been calculated in Step 4. Therefore, a special case of Equation (4.1)
defines a contraction mapping, with its unique fixed point determining the post-
entry value vE(ιL, ·,L).
Next, I compute the entry rule to an empty market by a chain store. This
entry rule depends on whether the local store following this chain store in the entry
sequence enters. Such entry choice is characterized by the entry rules for a local store
to a monopoly market, which have been determined in Steps 2 and 4. With this
entry rule in hand, I obtain the associated choice probabilities of entry by integrating
out WC.
Furthermore, I determine the entry rules to an empty market by a local store
and the survival rule of a monopolist type-L retailer as the optimal choice rules in
single-agent decision problems. The associated choice and transition probabilities
have closed-form expressions under the normality assumption.
Finally, all that remain undetermined is the survival rule for duopoly retailers
of identical type and the associated choice and transition probabilities. Reconsider
the static game presented in Figure 4.3: in a RNMPE, if the post-survival value for
a duopolist exceeds ϕM exp(wM), then both retailers continue for sure. Otherwise,
checking the post-survival value for a monopolist is essential.
If the monopoly post-survival value also exceeds ϕM exp(wM), the reduced-form
continuation game has no pure strategy equilibrium. Instead, it admits a unique
mixed-strategy equilibrium, in which each retailer chooses a survival probability to
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leave its rival indifferent between exiting and surviving. The equilibrium thus has
the following survival rules for k ∈ {H,L}.
aS(2ιk, c, wM , k) =

1 if vS(2ιk, c, k) > ϕM exp(wM),
vS(ιk,c,k)−ϕM exp(wM )
vS(ιk,c,k)−vS(2ιk,c,k) if v
S(2ιk, c, k) ≤ ϕM exp(wM),
and vS(ιk, c, k) > ϕM exp(wM)
0 otherwise.
If the monopoly post-survival value is low than ϕM exp(wM), pure exit is the
only equilibrium strategy of the static game–no unilateral deviation not improve the
payoff, and no mixing is possible. In this case, the survival rule in the RNMPE is
aS(2ιk, c, wM , k) =
{
1 if vS(2ιk, c, k) > ϕM exp(wM),
0 otherwise.
In this duopoly example, the RNMPE is always unique. For the unique equi-
librium, I can compute the transition probabilities for a duopoly market with two
type-k retailers by integrating out WM . With this part of the survival rule and
transition probabilities determined, the equilibrium construction is concluded.
4.4.2 Equilibrium Refinements
The RNMPE are a subset of Markov-perfect equilibria which possesses theoretically
and empirically plausible implications. First, in a natural Markov-perfect equilib-
rium, a type-H retailer never exits when a type-L competitor survives. The exit
pattern in the data supports such an equilibrium: The majority of the exited stores
are local stores, which are type-L retailers by assumption. Formally, we have
Definition 7. A natural Markov-perfect equilibrium is a symmetric Markov-perfect
equilibrium in a strategy (aE, aS) such that for all c, wM and all m that includes at
least one type-H and one type-L retailer, aS(m, c, wM ,L) > 0 implies that
aS(m, c, wM ,H) = 1.
Cabral (1993) restricts attention to similar natural equilibria in a model with deter-
ministic productivity progression.
Second, renegotiation-proofness requires all active retailers of the same type to
continue for sure, if the joint continuation is profitable for every one of them. This
92
4.4 Equilibrium Analysis
requirement only has a bite when joint incumbency yields positive expected payoff,
while any other market structure, including those with less retailers of this type,
yields negative expected payoff.1 In this case, I only consider the natural Markov-
perfect equilibrium in which all retailers of this type choose to continue, hence
these retailers cannot further gain by a joint change of actions. Since these retailers
repeatedly interact, it seems reasonable to assume that they are able to “renegotiate”
onto this more profitable option. Formally, we have
Definition 8. A natural Markov-perfect equilibrium is renegotiation-proof if, for
any (m, c, wM), no one-shot agreement satisfying the following properties can be
negotiated:
• all retailers in the agreement change their survival actions once;
• the agreement is self-enforcing, so no retailer in the agreement has incentive
to unilaterally change the agreed action;
• if one type-k firm is in the agreement, all type-k firms are, k ∈ {L,H}; and
• the payoffs to all retailers in the agreement are strictly improved.
Finally, I need to make a technical remark on a retailer’s equilibrium actions on
“indifference” points. When no other active stores have the same state variables as
this retailer, and different actions give this retailer the same payoff, one can generate
multiple equilibria by varying this retailer’s action. For instance, when the payoff
to entry net of sunk cost exactly equals zero, both entry and staying out give an
entrant the same payoff, and both are consistent with payoff maximization. Simi-
larly, when the payoff to survival as the only retailer of a certain type subtracting
profitability shock exactly equals zero, both exit and continuation give this retailer
the same payoff, and both are consistent with payoff-maximization. I require that
retailers choose inactivity in these situations to eliminate this unimportant equilib-
rium multiplicity. In my empirical implementation, the shocks on costs and profit
are continuous random variables. Therefore, such equilibrium multiplicity occurs
with measure zero and reduces to a technicality. Formally, we have
1This seemingly odd situation only arises when k = L. If (1) two type-L retailers can deter
future entry of any chain store by joint continuation, while one type-L retailer’s continuation
cannot, and (2) the gain from not having a chain store in future may dominate the harm from a
decrease in present flow profit, solo continuation is less profitable than joint continuation.For an
example, please refer to Abbring, Campbell, and Yang (2012a).
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Definition 9. A Markov strategy (aE, aS) with corresponding value functions vE, vS
defaults to inactivity if
• for all m, aE(m, c, wC,C) = 0 whenever
EME [ωv
E (ME, c,H) + (1− ω)vE (ME, c,L) MC = m] = ϕC exp(wC);
• for all m, aE(m, c, wL,L) = 0 whenever EME
[
vE (ME, c,L) ML = m
]
=
ϕL exp(wL);
• aS(m, c, wM , k) = 0 whenever vS(m, c, k) = ϕM exp(wM) and mk = 1.
for all k ∈ {L,H} and all c, wC, wL, wM .
Throughout the paper, I restrict attention to equilibria with strategies that de-
fault to inactivity.
4.4.3 Equilibrium Existence, Uniqueness and Computation
The five-step approach discussed in Section 4.4.1 can be naturally extended to a gen-
eral procedure that solves for a RNMPE by computed the fixed points of a sequence
of contraction mappings. This procedure partitions the state space and traverses
through the parts in steps. In each step, the post-entry value function restricted to
the part of the state space is determined by the fixed point of a contraction map-
ping. I emphasize that the procedure calculates candidate value functions, choice
probabilities and transition probabilities by denoting these with νE, νS, PE, PE,
and PS instead of vE, vS, PE, PE and PS.
Item 3 in Assumption 6 and non-negative sunk costs of entry imply that there
exists a upper bound for the number of simultaneously active retailers in an initially
empty market. Denote this bound by nˇ. Consequently, no retailer will rationally en-
ter the market nˇιH, and at most
(nˇ+2)(nˇ+1)
2
−1 different non-empty markets structures
can arise when market evolves. The state space is then partitioned into (nˇ+2)(nˇ+1)
2
−1
parts, with each step of the procedure computing the payoff function restricted to
one of these parts. The computation procedure starts by considering the saturated
market nˇιH. Procedure 4 presents this as a flow chart.
In this procedure, h indexes the number of type-H retailers, and l indexes the
number of type-L retailers. In the course of the computation, h decreases from
nˇ to 0. For each level of h, l decreases from nˇ − h to 0. For any pair of (h, l)
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START
h ← nˇ, l ← 0, νE(·) ← 0, νS(·) ← 0,
PS(m|m, ·) ← 1,PE(m|m, ·) ← 1, Other PS,PE ← 0
mh,l ← lιL+hιH
l = 0?
kh,l ← L
Hh,lS ←
{
(mh,l, c,L)|c ∈ [cˆ, cˇ]}
For all Hh,lS ∈ Hh,lS ,
Compute νE(Hh,lS ) as the fixed point of (TLf)(H
h,l
S );
Construct νS(Hh,lS ) using obtained ν
E(Hh,lS )
Compute PE(ιC|mh,l, c),PE(ιL|mh,l, c)
and PE(·|mh,l, c) for all c ∈ [cˆ, cˇ]
l = 1? l ← l − 1
For all HS = (m, c, k) ∈
Hh,1S
⋃
. . .
⋃
Hh,nˇ−hS ,
compute PS(·|m, c).
h = 0?STOP
kh,l ← H
Mmh,l ←
{
mh,l + qιL|0 ≤ q ≤ nˇ− h
}
Hh,lS ← {(m, c,H)|m ∈Mmh,l , c ∈ [cˆ, cˇ]}
For all Hh,lS ∈ Hh,lS ,
Compute νE(Hh,lS ) as the fixed point of (THf)(H
h,l
S );
Construct νS(Hh,lS ) using obtained ν
E(Hh,lS )
h = 1?
h ← h − 1
l ← nˇ − h
For all HS = (m, c, k) ∈
H1,0S
⋃
. . .
⋃
Hnˇ,0S ,
compute PS(·|m, c).
Computation Details for
PE,PE,PS, νS and νE
Are Provided in Appendix 5.2.2.2.
NoYes
No
Yes
Yes
No
NoYes
Procedure 4: Calculation of a Candidate Equilibrium
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such that l > 0, the post-entry value of type-L retailers facing h type-H rivals,
νE(lιL + hιH, ·,L), is computed as the fixed point of a functional operator TL. This
operator is defined by the appropriate generalization of Equation (5.16). The type-
L retailer rationally expects all of its rivals to remain whenever it receives positive
payoff, so this retailer’s value only depend on future states in which all currently
active retailers survive. Since any subsequent entry leads to a market structure with
higher h or higher l, and the algorithm proceeds in descending order of (h, l), the
payoff-relevant entry transition probabilities and the post-entry value functions have
been computed before this step.
When l reaches 1, the choice probabilities of survival for 1, 2, . . . , nˇ − h type-L
retailers facing h type-L retailers are computed. With these probabilities in place,
the next step is to simultaneously compute the payoff for a type-H retailer in a mar-
ket with h− 1 type-H and 0, 1, . . . , nˇ− h type-L rivals. This payoff is computed as
the fixed point of a functional operator TH. Evaluating this operator requires choice
probabilities of survival from the type-L competitors, the relevant entry transition
probabilities, and the corresponding post-entry value functions. Again, the descend-
ing order of (h, l) guarantees that these values have been computed before this step.
Therefore, TH and TL are always contraction mappings with unique fixed points ν
E.
Upon verifying that νE is indeed the post-entry value function for a RNMPE, this
procedure serves as a constructive proof for the equilibrium existence.
Proposition 6 (Equilibrium Existence). Procedure 4 always computes a renegotiation-
proof natural Markov-perfect equilibrium. The equilibrium value functions vS =
νS, vE = νE, the choice probabilities PE = PE and the transition probabilities
PE = PE and PS = PS.
Proof. See Appendix 5.1.3.
In Procedure 4, when equilibrium survival rule on (m, c, wM , k) involves mixed
actions, the mixing probability p is determined by the following polynomial equa-
tion.1
mk−1∑
i=0
(1−p)mk−1−ipi
(
mk − 1
i
)
(νS(m−(mk−1− i)ιk, c, k)−ϕM exp(wM) = 0. (4.7)
1In practice, I do not need to solve this polynomial equation to compute the model. Compu-
tational details are included in Procedure 4 in Appendix 5.2.2.2
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where m = m if k = L, and m = mkιk if k = H. The degree of the polynomial
equals the number of mixing stores minus one. When the number of mixing stores
exceeds two, multiple roots of the polynomial may exist between [0, 1), resulting
multiple choice probabilities. Given each distinct set of choice probabilities, the
contraction mappings TH and TL produce a unique equilibrium post-entry value
function. Thus, the uniqueness of the equilibrium entirely rests on the uniqueness
of the mixing probability.
If both C and WM are discrete variables (or discretized for computational pur-
poses), the state space for any retailer facing continuation decision has a finite
number of points. This implies that one can only create a finite number of distinct
sets of choice probabilities, and hence a finite number of RNMPE by combining dif-
ferent mixing probabilities. By recording all the admissible mixing probabilities and
repeating the algorithm for every possible set of these probabilities, I can compute
the payoffs and choice probabilities for all such RNMPE.
Nevertheless, equilibrium uniqueness is still an empirically desirable feature. It is
also central to ensure the reliability of policy experiments. The following proposition
and its corollary further address the uniqueness issue.
Proposition 7 (Equilibrium Uniqueness). The renegotiation-proof natural Markov-
perfect equilibrium of the model is unique if for any (m, c, wM , k) such that v
S(m, c, k) ≤
0, the polynomial equation (4.7) admits no more than one root in [0, 1).
Proof. See Appendix 5.1.3.
A sufficient condition for the polynomial (4.7) to have a unique root is that
vS(m, c, k) is non-increasing in the number of type-k stores in m.
Corollary 2. If the value functions of a natural Markov-perfect equilibrium satisfy
vS(m, c, k) ≥ vS(m + ιk, c, k) and vE(m, c, k) ≥ vE(m + ιk, c, k) for all (m, c, k), it
is the unique renegotiation-proof natural Markov-perfect equilibrium.
The natural Markov-perfect equilibrium whose value functions satisfies the mono-
tone conditions in Corollary 2 is named payoff-monotone natural Markov-perfect
equilibrium. Three important remarks supplement this corollary. First, a payoff-
monotone natural Markov-perfect equilibrium is always renegotiation-proof. If the
equilibrium post-survival payoff is monotone, and joint continuation for retailers
of a same type is profitable, then survival is the dominant strategy. If all such
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retailers survive, no coalition can be formed to further improve their payoffs. There-
fore, payoff-monotonicity ensures that retailers always adopt the renegotiation-proof
strategy. Second, because all the post-survival value functions relevant to any par-
ticular mixing probability have been determined before the probability is computed,
the payoff-monotonicity is more easily testable than directly examining the number
of admissible roots of the polynomial. Finally, the monotonicity should be checked
in the same ordering as the equilibrium computation. If the monotonicity is only
violated in the later steps, multiple equilibria, if any, still agree on the values, choice
probabilities and transition probabilities computed in the earlier steps where mono-
tonicity held.
4.5 Estimation
Throughout Section 4.4, the choice probabilities, the transition probabilities and the
equilibrium value functions are independent of the shocks to profit and sunk costs.
Nevertheless, they still depend on retailers’ profitability types and the market struc-
ture. The data, on the other hand, only contain information on the store formats,
which are noisy indicators of the active retailers’ profitability types. Therefore, to
construct a likelihood function using the choice and transition probabilities, I need
to assess the underlying market structure through the joint distribution of active
chain stores’ types. Because all active retailers’ profitability types are public infor-
mation for the players of the game, retailers’ equilibrium decisions are informative
on the underlying market structure. Hence, I infer the joint distribution for all active
retailers’ types from their observed equilibrium actions. From there, the likelihood
function is constructed by integrating over this joint distribution. In Section 4.5.1,
I use a duopoly example to illustrate the construction of the likelihood function. In
Section 4.5.2, I generalize this construction and introduce the Nested-Fixed-Point
algorithm to estimate the model.
4.5.1 A Duopoly Example
Consider a market with two active chain stores, AH and C1000. Their joint type
distribution has four points in the support. Suppose that the initial (post-entry)
probabilities in period 1 for these four points are given. Denote them by pE,HH1 ,
pE,HL1 ,p
E,LH
1 , and p
E,LL
1 respectively (the types in the superscript are alphabetically
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ordered by the stores’ names). Denote the post-entry probability conditioning on
the observed exits and survivals by p˜E,k1k21 , for k1, k2 ∈ {L,H}. If, for instance, both
stores are observed to continue in period 1 under the demand c1, This observation
is informative on the underlying market structure. According to Bayes’ rule, the
conditional post-entry probability that AH is type-k1 and C1000 is type-k2 is updated
to
p˜E,k1k21 =
pE,k1k21 PS(ιk1 + ιk2|ιk1 + ιk2 , c1)∑
i∈{L,H}
∑
j∈{L,H} p
E,ij
1 PS(ιi + ιj|ιi + ιj, c1)
,
in which PS(ιi + ιj|ιi + ιj, c1) is the equilibrium transition probability for market
structure ιi + ιj to remain unchanged under demand c1. The numerator is the the
probability that AH has type-k1, C1000 has type-k2, and both of them survive under
c1. The denominator is the sum of probabilities that both AH and C1000 survival
taking all possible type combinations among them, and under c1. When no store
exits, the post-survival probabilities are not updated and they equal the conditional
post-entry probabilities.
If C1000 exits from the market, while AH remains, then the conditional post-
entry probability that AH is type-k1 and C1000 is type-k2 is
p˜E,k1k21 =
pE,k1k21 PS(ιk1|ιk1 + ιk2 , c1)/
(
nk2
1
)∑
i∈{L,H}
∑
j∈{L,H} p
E,ij
1 PS(ιi|ιi + ιj, c1)/
(
nj
1
) ,
The numerator is the the probability that AH has type-k1, C1000 has type-k2,
and only the type-k2 store exits under c1. Here, nj is the number of type-j stores
in the pre-survival market. If j = k1, i.e., C1000 and AH have the same type,
because PS(ιk1|ιk1 + ιj, c1) summarizes the transition probabilities for both C1000’s
exit coupled with AH’s survival and C1000’s survival coupled with AH’s exit, it
needs to be divided by
(
nj
1
)
= 2 to represent the observed market transition.
After C1000’s exit, the post-survival type distribution in period 1 is determined
by AH’s type. The probabilities for AH to be type L and type H are pS,L2 and p
S,H
2
respectively. For k1 ∈ {L,H}, they are constructed by summing p˜E,k1k21 over C1000’s
two possible types, pS,k11 =
∑
j∈{L,H} p˜
E,k1j
1 .
Now suppose that after C1000’s exit in period 1, another chain store Dirk enters
in period 2 in demand state c2. This equilibrium action is informative on the type of
AH, the only incumbent in the pre-entry market. Hence, the post-survival (or pre-
entry) probability for AH to be type-k1, k1 ∈ {L,H}, conditioning on the observed
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entry, is
p˜S,k11
pS,k11 P
E(ιC|ιk1 , c2)∑
i∈{L,H} p
S,i
1 P
E(ιC|ιi, c2)
.
Then, the post-entry probability for AH to be type-k1 and Dirk to be type-k2,
k1, k2 ∈ {L,H} is constructed from p˜S,k11 by incorporating Dirk’s initial type,
pE,k1k22 =
{
ωp˜S,k11 if k2 = H,
(1− ω)p˜S,k11 if k2 = L.
Because the distribution of chain store types is updated in each period, the
observations’ likelihood contributions are also computed iteratively over time. In the
first period of this duopoly example, if both retailers continue to the next period,
collect the conditional post-entry probabilities, p˜E,k1k21 , for the four possible type
combinations in the type distribution vector p˜E1 . The underlying post-entry market
structure assumes three values. Denote its distribution function by P(N|p˜E1 , 0),
where 0 is the number of active local stores. Then,
P(N|p˜E1 , 0) =

pE,HH1 if N = 2ιH,
pE,HL1 + p
E,LH
1 if N = ιH + ιL,
pE,LL1 if N = 2ιL,
0 otherwise.
The observed survival’s likelihood contribution is determined by summing the
appropriate transition probabilities over the distribution of underlying market struc-
tures,
PS(2ιL|2ιL, c1)P(2ιL|p˜E1 , 0)+PS(ιL+ιH|ιL+ιH, c1)P(ιL+ιH|p˜E1 , 0)+PS(2ιH|2ιH, c1)P(2ιH|p˜E1 , 0).
If AH continues but C1000 exits, then natural equilibrium requires that AH does
not have inferior profitability type than C1000. Hence, the market structure ιL + ιH
can only be attributed to a type-H AH and a type-L C1000. Such an observation
contributes to the likelihood by
PS(ιL|2ιL, c1)P(2ιL|p˜E1 , 0, C1000) + PS(ιH|2ιH, c1)P(2ιH|p˜E1 , 0, C1000)
+ PS(ιH|ιL + ιH, c1)P(ιL + ιH|p˜E1 , 0, C1000).
where P(·|p˜E1 , 0, C1000) denotes the market structure distribution conditional on
C1000’s type being no superior to the type of the surviving rival AH. In this example,
100
4.5 Estimation
P(2ιk|p˜E1 , 0, C1000) = P(2ιk|p˜E1 , 0) for k ∈ {L,H}, whereas P(ιL+ιH|p˜E1 , 0, C1000) =
p˜E,HL1 .
In period 2 of the duopoly example, chain store Dirk’s entry contributes to the
likelihood function by
PE(ιC|ιL, c2)P(ιL|p˜S1 , 0) + PE(ιC|ιH, c2)P(ιH|p˜S1 , 0).
This is the sum of probabilities of entry under each possible pre-entry market struc-
ture. If instead a local store becomes active or no retailer enters in this period,
the likelihood contribution is computed in a similar fashion by using the appro-
priate choice probabilities. Extending the market structure distribution function
P(N|p˜, k) to the cases where k > 0 is straightforward.
Next, the likelihood construction moves on until the end of the sample. After
each entry (or no entry) and exit (or no exit), I update the type distribution vector
using Bayes’ rule, and compute the likelihood contribution for each observed action.
4.5.2 The Nested-Fixed-Point Algorithm
The parameter vector θ1 governing C’s evolution can be directly recovered from a
partial likelihood of population dynamics. After θ1 has been estimated, with the
choice and transition probabilities computed by Procedure 4, the construction of
the partial likelihood for the other parameters in Θ proceeds iteratively from the
first period (t = t0) of the data to the last period (t = t0 + T ). In any market
i ∈ {1, . . . , I}, this procedure starts with initializing pS0 , the type distribution vec-
tor for the post-survival market at the end of the pre-sample period. Then, using
the observations on entries and exits, I update the type vector and compute the
likelihood contributions, as illustrated in Section 4.5.1. The general procedure is
depicted in following flow chart for Procedure 5.
In this procedure, pEi,t denotes the type distribution vector at time t in market i,
with the retailer x’s type fixed at k. The distribution function for underlying market
structure P is computed by considering all active retailers’ type distributions. The
formula for P is in Appendix 5.2.2.2.
To search for the optimal value of Θ, I use the Nested-Fixed-Point Algorithm
(NFXP) proposed by Rust (1987). This algorithm iterates between an outer loop
and an inner loop. It starts with initialize values for Θ. The upper bound nˇ is
recovered from the historical maximum number of simultaneously active retailers.
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PS, PE
Initialize t = t0,p
S
i,t0−1 and log likelihood `i = 0.
nL ← the number of active local stores
Chain
Enters?
Update pSi,t−1 to p˜
S
i,t−1.
`i ← `i +
log
∑
n∈M P
E(ιC|n, ci,t)P(n|p˜Si,t−1, nL).
Construct pEi,t from p˜
S
i,t−1.
Update pSi,t−1 to p˜
S
i,t−1.
`i ← `i + log
∑
n∈M(1 −
PE(ιC|n, ci,t))P(n|pSi,t−1, nL).
Construct pEi,t from p˜
S
i,t−1.
Local
Enters?
Update p˜Si,t−1 once again.
`i ← `i +
log
∑
n∈M P
E(ιL|n, ci,t)P(n|pSi,t−1, nL).
nL ← nL + 1
Update p˜Si,t−1 one again.
`i ← `i + log
∑
n∈M(1 −
PE(ιL|n, ci,t))P(n|pSi,t−1, nL).
The exit phase
1. Update pEi,t to p˜
E
i,t.
2. Add the likelihood contribution from survivals.
(a) If no retailer exits: `i ← `i + log
∑
n∈M PS(n|n, ci,t, aS)P(n|p˜Ei,t, nL);
(b) If only neL > 0 local stores exit:
`i ← `i + log
∑
n∈M PS(n− neLιL|n, ci,t)P(n|p˜Ei,t, nL);
(c) If neL ≥ 0 local stores and neC > 0 chain stores, x1, . . . , xneC , exit:
`i ← `i+log
∑
n∈M
neC∑
h=0
PS(n−(neL+h)ιL−(neC−h)ιH|n, ci,t)P(n|p˜Ei,t, nL, x1, . . . , xneC).
3. Construct pSi,t from p˜
E
i,t
t = t0 +T ? t ← t + 1
STOP
YesNo
YesNo
Yes
No
Procedure 5: Likelihood Construction for Market i
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In the inner loop, it uses Procedure 4 to compute a RNMPE by finding the fixed
points of a sequence of contraction mappings, and return the choice probabilities
PE and the transition probabilities PE,PS. Then, it uses Procedure 5 to evaluate
the log likelihood contribution `i for every market i ∈ {1, . . . , I}, and subsequently
sums them up to form the partial likelihood for the structural parameters. In the
outer loop, it searches for new parameter values of Θ to increase the likelihood value.
When the parameter values are updated, they are passed to the inner loop to solve
the model again and regenerate the likelihood value. The algorithm stops when no
further improvement of the likelihood can be found. The flow chart for Algorithm
3 presents the details.
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Algorithm 3 (Nested-Fixed-Point Algorithm).
START
Recover θ1, nˇ from the data
Initialize ir ← 0, i ← 1, `ir ← 0 and Θir
Use Procedure 4 to compute a RNMPE under Θir
Return the choice/transition probabilities PS, PE,PE.
Use Procedure 5 to evaluate the partial likelihood `i
`ir ← `ir + `i
i = I?i ← i + 1
Find Θ˜ that improves `ir
Convergence?
ir ← ir + 1
i ← 1
Θir ← Θ˜
`ir ← 0
STOP
No
Yes
No
Yes
4.6 Empirical Implementation and Results
This section discusses in order the details of the empirical implementation, the esti-
mation results, and the policy experiments.
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4.6.1 Empirical Implementation
The market demand ci,t is defined as the number of inhabitants at time t in postcode
area i. Since all the postcode areas in the sample have a population between 4,000
and 12,000 in 2009, the demand indicator C is discretized on a 201-point grid with
bounds [3500, 12500]. Each sampled value is located on its nearest grid point. The
conditional distribution fC(C
′|C; θ1) is assumed to be a mixture over 51 reflected
random walks in C with uniformly distributed innovations. This mixture approxi-
mates a normally distributed innovation. The parameter θ1 includes the mean and
the standard deviation of the innovation targeted by the approximation. The mean
is set to be 0, and the standard deviation equals 161.38, which is the sample standard
deviation of Ci,t.
The upper bound on the number of simultaneously active stores nˇ is set to 11,
the maximum number observed in the sample. Feasible alternatives nˇ = 12 and
nˇ = 13 alter the estimation results negligibly. In total, 77 possible market struc-
tures can arise in market dynamics. Because not every possible market structure is
well represented in the sample, nonparametric identification of the profit function
pik(n, c; θk) is nearly impossible. Therefore, I adopt a parametric approach to specify
the profit function as
pik(n, c; θk) =
θk(c/500)
θHnH + θLnL + 1
, k ∈ {L,H}. (4.8)
An intuitive interpretation for this parametrization is that the profit from every 500
inhabitants is divided into θHnH + θLnL + 1 shares, and a type-k retailer attracts
θk shares of them. In this expression, the parameter θk measures the profitability
of a type-k retailer. A type-H retailer earns a profit θH/θL times that of a type-L
retailer in the same market. Hence, this ratio captures the profitability advantage
of a type-H relative to a type-L rival. Assumption 6 requires this ratio to be larger
than 1.1 In the estimation, I normalize θL to 1. Under this normalization, the per
period profit from every 500 inhabitants is θH/(θH + 1) for a type-H monopolist,
and 1/2 for a type-L monopolist.
I assume that the transitory shocks are normally distributed with mean 0 and
variances σ2M , σ
2
C, and σ
2
L. For lack of historical observations, I assume that all
the existing chain stores at the beginning of the sample period have an identical
1When this ratio is larger than 1, pik(n, c; θk)− ε for any ε > 0 honors all the requirements in
Assumption 6. In practice, I discard the ε term.
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probability ω0 to be a type-H retailer. I estimate ω0 simultaneously with other
parameters. The annual discount rate is set to 5%.
With the above parametrizations, the variables to be estimated are down to the
probability that a chain store is a type-H retailer at the beginning of the data (ω0),
the probability for a chain store to become a type-H retailer after entry (ω), the
profitability parameter for type-H retailers (θH), the profitability shock parameters
ϕM , σM , and the sunk cost parameters ϕC, ϕL, σC, σL. In practice, the parameter σL
is not well identified. So, I fix it at 1.1
The NFXP estimation is coded in Matlab. The likelihood maximization invokes
function ktrlink,which calls the KNITRO optimization libraries. With 201 grid
points for the demand process, 201 grid points for the mixing probability, and nˇ =
11, each likelihood evaluation typically takes less than 10 seconds on an off-the-
shelf computer, and the entire estimation takes about 1-2 hours. The code and the
companion documentations are downloadable from the author’s website.
4.6.2 The Results
4.6.2.1 The Estimates
The estimates are reported in the first column of Table 4.4. The standard errors and
confidence intervals are constructed from 100-replication bootstrap. The bootstrap
inference suggests that the estimates are reasonably accurate.
In 2002, the beginning of the data, around 63 % of the active chain stores are
type-H retailers. This is an outcome after market selection: 56% of the chain stores
establish themselves as type-H retailers in the market after entry. The estimate of
θH is 5.5, confirming the advantageous position of the type-H retailers relative to the
type-L competitors. This estimate helps to anchor the normalized equilibrium values
to Euros. By matching the equilibrium implied chain store profit in 2009 to the
information published by the administrative authority HBD, I conclude that 1 unit
of the cost/profit/payoff determined by the estimation is roughly worth e20,000.2
1In practice, separately identifying σL and ϕL turns out to be hard, because of limited variation
in type-L stores’ values. I also set σL to 0.5 and 2 to check the robustness. The other estimates
change little.
2In 2009, the estimated equilibrium implies a flow profit of 2.7 for a chain store, averaged
over all the markets and the profitability shock. HBD reports that the net accounting profit for a
supermarket chain outlet is around e102,920 in the same year. (The per-store sales is e5,146,000,
and the net profit is 2%. See page 15 & 16 in “Dossier Supermarkten (feiten en cijfers)”.) I reckon
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Estimates Standard Error 90% Confidence Interval 95% Confidence Interval
ω0 67.92% 1.79% [64.34%,70.51%] [64.25%,71.21%]
ω 56.15% 4.14% [48.08%,62.40%] [47.23%,64.08%]
θH 5.48 0.25 [5.14,5.92] [5.07,6.12]
ϕC 197.63 21.17 [166.88,239.54] [161.31,245.84]
ϕL 30.85 2.63 [27.18,34.64] [26.68,37.42]
ϕM 1.62 0.18 [1.38,1.95] [1.36,2.01]
σC 0.67 0.08 [0.55,0.79] [0.53,0.82]
σM 1.27 0.08 [1.13,1.38] [1.10,1.43]
Table 4.4: The Estimates and the Bootstrap Confidence Intervals
Suppose that the market has one active type-L local store and one active type-H
chain store. From serving every 500 inhabitants, the local store receives an annual
net-of-shock profit of e2,700, and the chain store receives e14,700.
Conditional on entry, the average post-entry value expected by a chain store
potential entrant is estimated to be around 1.8 million Euro, suggesting that the
average sunk costs actually incurred are below this value. Unconditionally, the
estimates of sunk cost parameters translate into setup costs of 5.5 million Euro
for a chain store and 1 million Euro for a local store, averaged over the transitory
shocks. Note that these values are average costs that potential entrants would have
to face each period. Compared to stores’ values, these average sunk costs turns
out to be huge, implying a natural barrier to entry in this industry. Even for a
potential monopolist chain store entrant facing the largest market of 12.5 thousand
inhabitants, the average sunk cost is almost 80% of the expected post-entry value.
For a local store potential monopolist, the ratio is 1.4. A possible explanation for the
natural barrier is the zoning regulation. As discussed before, the zoning regulation
greatly limits the availability of business space in residential areas. When such
space is unavailable in a certain year, entry is virtually impossible. The large one-off
investment to open a chain store often yields a much higher expected rate of return
than setting up a local store. For instance, on a market with 8,000 inhabitants, an
active chain store is valued 40 to 100 times more than an local rival, depending on
that the opportunity cost of investing in a supermarket amounts to e50,000, which gives store
owners roughly 1% excess economic return.
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the market structure. This wedge is driven by the chain stores’ superior profitability
and longevity.
The probability of entry for a chain store is increasing in the number of consumers
and decreasing in the number of incumbents, as depicted in Figure 4.4. Facing the
high average sunk cost of entry, even a potential monopolist chain store only has
a chance of 31% to enter the largest market with 12,500 residents in a year. For
a potential duopolist chain store, this probability is merely 13%. According to the
model’s probabilistic prediction, over the sample period, the expected total numbers
of chain and local entrants are 466 and 599 respectively, while the actual numbers
are 503 and 486.
Figure 4.4: Entry Probability for a Chain Store
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The equilibrium value functions give the present value of stores’ expected dis-
counted profits. With the estimates in hand, I can evaluate a chain store entry’s
impact on these values. When a chain store is certain to enter, but yet to draw its
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profitability type, Table 4.5 presents the expected percentage change of incumbent
stores’ values. The first percentage value in each cell is the expected percentage
change of a type-H incumbent store’s value. The second percentage value is for a
type-L incumbent store. The percentage change of flow profit is included in the
parenthesis. The change in values are computed using the estimated post-entry
values averaged over the steady-state demand. Pre-entry markets in the same row
(column) share the same number of type-H (L) incumbent stores. Under the esti-
mated parameter values of the model, the loss of store value inflicted by the new
chain store is expected to range from 22% to 28% for a type-H incumbent retailer,
and from 25% to 62% for a type-L retailer. The entry only results in a decline of
11%-56% in the flow profit for the incumbents, suggesting that a significant share
of the damage in value is attribute to the reduced chance of survival.
0 Type-L 1 Type-L 2 Type-L 3 Type-L 4 Type-L
0 Type-H -/- -/-61.7% -/-59.9% -/-58.1% -/-56.4%
- (-55.8%) (-47.3%) (-41.2%) (-36.7%)
1 Type-H -27.7%/- -26.5%/-55.2% -25.7%/-53.2% -25.2%/-50.8% -24.8%/-48.4%
(-31.6%) (-28.9%) (-26.7%) (-24.8%) (-23.1%)
2 Type-H -24.9%/- -24.6%/-44.1% -24.4%/-41.9% -24.3%/-39.8% -24.2%/-38.0%
(-21.0%) (-19.8%) (-18.8%) (-17.8%) (-16.9%)
3 Type-H -23.2%/- -23.1%/-34.4% -23.0%/-33.0% -23.0%/-31.8% -23.0%/-30.7%
(-15.8%) (-15.1%) (-14.5%) (-13.9%) (-13.4%)
4 Type-H -22.1%/- -22.1%/-28.2% -22.1%/-27.4% -22.1%/-26.6% -22.0%/-25.8%
(-12.7%) (-12.2%) (-11.8%) (-11.4%) (-11.1%)
Table 4.5: The Expected Impact of One More Chain on Incumbents’ Values and
Flow Profits
Before proceeding to the policy experiments, I discuss the equilibrium multiplic-
ity under the estimated parameters.
4.6.2.2 Equilibrium Multiplicity
First, I examine the equilibrium’s uniqueness by checking the monotonicity of the
equilibrium value function under the estimated parameter values, following Corollary
2. I find that when market structure includes at least one active type-H retailer, this
condition is always satisfied for both type-H and type-L retailers. Given the ordering
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of Procedure 4, all the equilibrium payoffs and survival/entry rules computed prior
to the step indexed by (h = 0, l = 1) (which corresponds to the market structure ιL)
must be unique: If there were multiple RNMPE, they would have agreed on these
payoffs and rules. This means that any equilibrium prediction of market transition
involving type-H retailers is unique.
When the market is nearly saturated by only type-L stores, the entry deterrence
effect leads to non-monotone values for the incumbents. Figure 4.5 visualizes such
non-monotonicity for markets with no type-H chain store and 12,500 inhabitants
(C = cˇ). When there are no more than nine active type-L retailers, the probability
for a chain store to enter next period declines with the number of type-L stores.
When the number of post-survival type-L stores reaches ten, any chain store that
enters in the coming period will saturate the market, and will not be followed by any
other entrant. Therefore, its entry probability slightly increases. After the number
of post-survival type-L stores reaches eleven, by the definition of nˇ, no chain stores
will further enter this market next period. Without the threat of entry, an active
type-L retailer with ten type-L rivals enjoys a higher payoff from joint continuation
than with nine rivals.
Such non-monotonicity does not induce multiple equilibria if the polynomial
equation (4.7) never admits more than one root in [0, 1). I further assess the possi-
bility of multiple equilibria using simulation. To this end, I draw 5000 realizations of
wM , and compute the survival probability for each state (m, c,L, wM) where mixing
takes place by finding all the roots to polynomial (4.7) in [0, 1). In all cases, the
survival probability is unique. Though not conclusive, this is one piece of strong
evidence that the RNMPE under the estimated parameter values is unique.
4.6.3 Policy Experiments
I conduct two policy experiments to examine the effects of policy changes on market
structure: cutting the sunk cost of entry and subsidizing type-L stores.
In the Netherlands, policy makers can reduce sunk costs by abolishing zoning
regulation. To examine the impact of this policy change, I simulate 50 times the
market dynamics for 10 years, using equilibrium transition probabilities used for
the simulation are computed under 46 equidistant values of ϕC, ϕL, between the
estimated values 197.63, 30.85 and their 90%-reduced values 19.76 and 3.09. The
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Figure 4.5: Non-Monotone Post-Survival Payoffs and Chain Entry Probabilities (No
Type-H Rival & 12.5k inhabitants)
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market structure at end of 2010 are used to initialize the simulations. The other
primitive values are held constant in all simulations.
Table 4.6 presents some statistics on the market compositions for this experiment,
averaged over all the simulations for three sets of different values of ϕC and ϕL.
The first column is the benchmark case under the estimated value ϕC = 197.63
and ϕL = 30.85. The second and third column corresponds to 60% and 10% of the
estimated ϕC, ϕL. In general, creative destruction will continue to dictate the market
dynamics: local store incumbents will be gradually replaced by chain stores. For
lower values of the sunk costs, such process is considerably accelerated. According
to the prediction, if abolishing zoning regulation can reduce the sunk costs to 60%,
the number of chain store entrants in the next 10 years will almost double. If the
reduction is 90%, the number of chain store entrants in the next 10 years will be
almost seven times higher than in the benchmark case, and the number of chain store
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incumbents in 2020 will be close to twice as many as the benchmark value. With
the competition intensified, the market selection on chain stores is more pronounced:
the fraction of type-L chain stores in 2020 is only 3% under 10% sunk costs, almost
ten times lower compared to the benchmark value of 28%. The local stores are
suppressed harder under the lower sunk costs: very few local store will survive in
2020 if the sunk costs are cut to 10%. In fact, such creative destruction process will
continue beyond 2020, resulting in markets populated only by type-H chain stores
in the long run steady state.
ϕC,ϕL set at the level of 100% 60% 10%
10-Year average No. chain incumbents 1.45 1.57 2.46
10-Year average No. local incumbents 0.55 0.41 0.20
No. chains in 2020 1.40 1.61 3.04
No. locals in 2020 0.47 0.25 0.03
10-Year total No. chain entrants 0.49 0.93 3.22
10-Year total No. local entrants 0.41 0.38 0.50
10-Year total No. chain exited 0.63 0.85 1.55
10-Year total No. local exited 0.52 0.72 1.05
Average % of chains are type-L in 2020 27.20% 15.17% 3.03%
% of markets with only type-L stores in 2020 23.80% 10.34% 0.77%
Table 4.6: Market Dynamics under Different ϕC and ϕL
Figure 4.6 depicts the stores’ net present values in 2010 and 2020 against different
levels of ϕC and ϕL. One interesting finding is that for any given value of the sunk
cost parameters, although the average number of type-H stores is predicted to be
higher in 2020 than in 2010, the active type-H stores’ value is also higher. This is
because the entry of the chain stores are predicted to primarily happen in markets
populated by type-L. In 2010, around one third of the markets only had type-L
stores. In 2020, this percentage will decrease to 24% even when the sunk costs are
not cut, and to 0.8% when the sunk costs are cut to 10%. As a result, type-L stores
absorbing a large part of the impact from the new chain entrants. However, when
ϕC is cut to 10%, the fierce competition induced by chain stores’ entry completely
reverses this effect, and reduces the incumbent type-H stores’ average value in 2020
to below the level in 2010.
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Figure 4.6: Average Post-Survival Payoffs under Different ϕC and ϕL
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Anticipating the local stores’ future, policy makers may want to provide subsidy
to maintain the local stores’ presence. In the Netherlands, various aid programs
aiming at helping small supermarkets are available. In the second policy experiment,
I consider a direct subsidy scheme–tax rebate for type-L stores. Like in the first
experiment, I forward simulate 50 times the market evolution from 2010 to 2020,
using the equilibrium transition probabilities computed under 51 equidistant values
of θL between the normalized 1 (no subsidy) and 2. Recall the profit function
specification in Equation (4.8), θL = 2 implies that the subsidy scheme matches
every euro that a type-L store makes. The other primitive values are hold constant
in all simulations.
Table 4.7 presents the market composition statistics for the second experiment,
averaging over all the simulations for three different values of θL. The first column
is the benchmark case under the normalized value θL = 1. The second and third
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columns correspond to the 50% subsidy and the match-every-euro subsidy program
respectively. Increased subsidy encourages local stores’ participation. A 50% subsidy
increases the number of local store entrants two fold, and slightly reduces their exits.
In 2020, with the 50% subsidy, the average number of incumbent local stores in each
market will exceed 1. With the 100% subsidy, this number will be 1.7.
θL set at the level of 100% 150% 200%
10-Year average No. chain incumbents 1.45 1.53 1.57
10-Year average No. local incumbents 0.55 0.86 1.24
No. chains in 2020 1.39 1.53 1.58
No. locals in 2020 0.48 1.01 1.69
10-Year total No. chain entrants 0.50 0.33 0.23
10-Year total No. local entrants 0.42 0.91 1.57
10-Year total No. chain exited 0.64 0.34 0.18
10-Year total No. local exited 0.53 0.49 0.47
% of markets with only locals in 2020 9.69% 9.12% 10.03%
% of markets with only chains in 2020 66.90% 51.55% 35.32%
Table 4.7: Market Dynamics under Different θL
Though such tax rebate program is effective in preserving the local stores, it
can be costly to implement. Figure 4.7 is to help policy makers with the budgetary
planning. To achieve the target of on average one local store per market in 2020,
government will need to provide a 10-year aid package valued 180 million Euro.
Limiting the percentage of markets without a single local store to around 40% in
2020 will require investing a sizable sum of almost 400 million Euro.
4.7 Discussion and Conclusion
In this paper, I develop and estimate a tractable oligopoly model for the Dutch retail
grocery industry. The chain stores’ domination over their local rivals is estimated
to be sizable. This quantitatively explains the creative destruction process at work
in this industry. Indeed, in the long run steady state of the model, almost all local
stores are predicted to exit the market.
The attractive features of this model are threefold. First, market-level data of
local demand and store entry and exit are sufficient for the estimation. Store-level
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Figure 4.7: Policy Targets versus Budget
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performance data, which are often hard to acquire due to stores’ confidentiality poli-
cies, are not required. Second, clear-cut results on equilibrium existence, uniqueness,
and computation ensure the reliability of the estimates and the counterfactual anal-
ysis. Third, the light computational burden allows counterfactual analysis of many
policy alternatives at a very low cost.
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Appendix
5.1 Proofs
5.1.1 Proofs for Chapter 2
5.1.1.1 Proofs for Section 2.3
Proof of Lemma 1. We verify the inequalities in Lemma 1 by proving the following
two sets of conditions. For the post-entry equilibrium payoff vE under any natural
Markov-perfect equilibrium, for all c ∈ [cˆ, cˇ];
(I) (own monotonicity conditions) For all x ∈ K⋃{0},
vE(ιkˇ + ιx, c, kˇ) ≥ vE(ιkˇ−1 + ιx, c, kˇ − 1) ≥ . . . ≥ vE(ι1 + ιx, c, 1).
(II) (rival monotonicity conditions) For all k ∈ K,
vE(ιk + ιkˇ, c, k) ≤ vE(ιk + ιkˇ−1, c, k) ≤ . . . ≤ vE(ιk, c, k).
The inequalities in I state that given its rival’s type, a firm’s equilibrium payoff
is weakly increasing in its own type. We refer to this set of inequalities as the own
monotonicity conditions. The inequalities in II state that a firm’s equilibrium payoff
is weakly decreasing in its rival’s type. We refer to this set of inequalities as the
rival monotonicity conditions. The inequalities in Lemma 1 are a special case of the
rival monotonicity, so they are encompassed in II. We take kˇ steps to prove these
two sets of inequalities.
We call the series of inequalities sharing the same x in the own monotonicity
conditions the x block. In total, there are kˇ+ 1 such blocks, each consisting of kˇ− 1
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inequalities. Similarly, there are kˇ blocks of inequalities sharing the same k in the
rival monotonicity conditions, each consisting of kˇ inequalities. In the first step of the
proof, we verify all the inequalities in the kˇ block in the own monotonicity conditions
and in the kˇ block in the rival monotonicity conditions. Then, we proceed with the
recursive part of the proof. In the i-th step (i ≥ 2), we prove the inequalities in the
kˇ− i+ 1 block in the own monotonicity conditions and in the kˇ− i+ 1 block in the
rival monotonicity conditions. In addition, from the i = 2 step onwards, in each step
we prove two intermediate results which are useful in later steps. First, we verify
the first i − 1 inequalities in all the j < kˇ − i + 1 blocks in the rival monotonicity
conditions. This result ensures that firms with types inferior to kˇ − i + 1 are more
prone to exit when facing a better rival. We also prove the i − 1-th inequalities in
the 0 block and the 1 block in the own monotonicity conditions. This result ensures
that monopolist with better type receives higher payoff.
If there exists one natural Markov-perfect equilibrium with strategy (aS, aE), the
corresponding equilibrium post-entry payoff function vE is the unique fixed point of
a contraction mapping determined by the right-hand side of Equation (2.1). To
formally define the contraction mapping, denote F as the space of all functions
fE :
(n1, . . . , nkˇ) :
kˇ∑
i=1
ni ≤ 2
× [cˆ, cˇ]×K→
[
0,
βpˇi
1− β
]
,
We use fE to denote possible post-entry payoff. For any k, x ∈ {0, 1, . . . , kˇ},
let f˜E(ιk + ιx, c, k) denote the post-type-transition payoff associated with post-entry
payoff fE when current demand is c, the firm of interest has progressed to type k,
and its rival has progressed to type x,
f˜E(ιk + ιx, c, k) ≡ βE[pi(ιk + ιx, C ′, k) + aE(ιk + ιx + ι1, C ′)fE(ιk + ιx + ι1, C ′, k)
+ [1− aE(ιk + ιx + ι1, C ′)] fE(ιk + ιx, C ′, k)|C = c]
where, aE(ιk + ιx + ι1, c) ≡ 0 if k, x > 0.
Let K ′ and X ′ denote the random variables for firm types in next period condi-
tioning on current period types being k and x respectively. Then, define T a : F → F
with the following equations
If k ≥ x,
(T afE)(ιk + ιx, c, k) = max
{
0, aS(ιk + ιx, c, x)E[f˜E(ιK′ + ιX′ , c,K ′)|X = x,K = k]
+(1− aS(ιk + ιx, c, x))E[f˜E(ιK′ , c,K ′)|K = k]
}
. (5.1)
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If k < x, the type-k firm does not exit before the type-x firm does in the given
natural equilibrium, so
(T afE)(ιk + ιx, c, k) = max
{
0,E[f˜E(ιK′ + ιX′ , c,K ′)|X = x,K = k]
}
. (5.2)
The space F is a complete metric space with the supremum norm, and T a satisfies
Blackwell’s sufficient properties for a contraction mapping for any given equilibrium
strategy (aS, aE). Hence, the post-entry payoff vE is unique in the given natural
Markov-perfect equilibrium. For any given equilibrium strategy (aS, aE), we verify
the own and rival monotonicity conditions by showing that T a maps the space of
functions which satisfy these conditions to itself.
First, denote a subspace of F in which any function fE satisfies fE ≤ vE as F0.
This is also a non-empty complete metric space that includes vE. Because T
a is a
monotone operator, T a : F0 → F0. We henceforth focus on F0 as the space that T a
is operating on.
Prove the kˇ block in the own monotonicity conditions. We take two steps
to prove the inequalities in the kˇ block in the own monotonicity conditions.
1. We show that vE is also the unique fixed point of another contraction mapping
T a
kˇ
, which agrees with T a except that when k = x = kˇ, its right-hand-side is
defined as equation (5.2) instead of equation (5.1),
(T a
kˇ
fE)(2ιkˇ, c, kˇ) = max{0, f˜E(2ιkˇ, c, kˇ)}.
The operator T a
kˇ
replaces the equilibrium strategy (aS, aE) with one that dic-
tates survival if and only if joint continuation is profitable.
2. We prove that T a
kˇ
maps subspace of F0 in which all functions satisfy the in-
equalities in question into itself.
1. Define F1
kˇ
as a subspace of F0 in which any function fE satisfies fE(2ιkˇ, c, kˇ) ≤
fE(ιkˇ+ ιx, c, kˇ) for 0 ≤ x ≤ kˇ. This is a non-empty space, because the function
f ∗E that satisfies f
∗
E(ιkˇ+ιx, c, kˇ) ≡ min{vE(ιkˇ, c, kˇ), vE(ιkˇ+ι1, c, kˇ), . . . , vE(2ιkˇ, c, kˇ)}
for all x ∈ {0, . . . , kˇ} is in this space.
We will show that T a : F1
kˇ
→ F1
kˇ
. As a result, the equilibrium payoff vE also
satisfies vE(2ιkˇ, c, kˇ) ≤ vE(ιkˇ + ιx, c, kˇ) for 0 ≤ x ≤ kˇ. Like we have demon-
strated in the homogeneous duopoly example (Section 2.3.1) when building up
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towards the necessary condition for vE (Equation (2.5)), this condition ensures
that both type kˇ firms continue for sure in equilibrium when the joint contin-
uation payoff is positive. Hence the equilibrium payoff vE is the fixed point of
T a
kˇ
.
To prove T a : F1
kˇ
→ F1
kˇ
, we consider two possibilities:
(a) For c ∈ [cˆ, cˇ] such that aS(2ιkˇ, c, kˇ) < 1, we have vE(2ιkˇ, c, kˇ) = 0. This is
because in a symmetric equilibrium, a type kˇ firm in a duopoly market
with another type kˇ rival expects zero post-survival payoff when its rival
exits for sure or uses mixed strategy. For all fE ∈ F0, applying the mono-
tone operator T a on fE results in (T
afE)(2ιkˇ, c, kˇ) ≤ vE(2ιkˇ, c, kˇ) = 0.
Because (T afE)(ιkˇ + ιx, c, kˇ) ≥ 0, we have (T afE)(2ιkˇ, c, kˇ) ≤ (T afE)(ιkˇ +
ιx, c, kˇ).
(b) For c ∈ [cˆ, cˇ] such that aS(2ιkˇ, c, kˇ) = 1, Equation (5.1) gives
(T afE)(2ιkˇ, c, kˇ) = max{0, f˜E(2ιkˇ, c, kˇ)}.
Note that for all fE ∈ F1kˇ, we have f˜E(ιkˇ + ιx, c, kˇ) ≥ f˜E(2ιkˇ, c, kˇ) for
0 ≤ x ≤ kˇ. Therefore, E[f˜E(ιkˇ + ιX′ , c, kˇ)|X = x] ≥ f˜E(2ιkˇ, c, kˇ) and
f˜E(ιkˇ, c, kˇ) ≥ f˜E(2ιkˇ, c, kˇ). Then, we have
(T afE)(ιkˇ + ιx, c, kˇ)
= max{0, aS(ιkˇ + ιx, c, x)E[f˜E(ιkˇ + ιX′ , c, kˇ)|X = x]
+ (1− aS(ιkˇ + ιx, c, x))f˜E(ιkˇ, c, kˇ)}
≥ max{0, f˜E(2ιkˇ, c, kˇ)}
aS(2ιkˇ,c,kˇ)=1= (T afE)(2ιkˇ, c, kˇ)
We write aS(2ιkˇ, c, kˇ) = 1 above the last equality to clarify that this equality
holds only when aS(2ιkˇ, c, kˇ) = 1. This result implies that applying T
a to any
function fE ∈ F1kˇ gives the function T afE ∈ F1kˇ. So, we can conclude that
T a : F1
kˇ
→ F1
kˇ
, and therefore vE(2ιkˇ, c, kˇ) ≤ vE(ιkˇ + ιx, c, kˇ) for 0 ≤ x ≤ kˇ.
This result also implies that
(T afE)(2ιkˇ, c, kˇ)
= max
{
0, aS(2ιkˇ, c, kˇ)f˜E(2ιkˇ, c, kˇ) + (1− aS(2ιkˇ, c, kˇ))f˜E(ιkˇ, c, kˇ)
}
≥ max{0, f˜E(2ιkˇ, c, kˇ)}
by definition
= (T a
kˇ
fE)(2ιkˇ, c, kˇ).
124
5.1 Proofs
We write “by definition” above the last equality to clarify that this equality
holds by the definition of T a
kˇ
. When aS(2ιkˇ, c, kˇ) < 1, vE, the fixed point of T
a,
satisfies vE(2ιkˇ, c, kˇ) = 0. Because of the above inequality, at the same time,
the unique fixed point of T a
kˇ
evaluated at (2ιkˇ, c, kˇ) must be 0 too. Additionally,
note that T a and T a
kˇ
are identical when aS(2ιkˇ, c, kˇ) = 1. We can conclude that
T a
kˇ
and T a share the same fixed point, so vE is also the unique fixed point of
contraction mapping T a
kˇ
.
2. Denote the space of all functions fE satisfying that fE(ιkˇ + ιk, c, k) is weakly
increasing in k for 1 ≤ k ≤ kˇ as F2
kˇ
. In this space,
For any k, x such that 1 ≤ k ≤ x ≤ kˇ, according to Assumption 3, X ′ stochasti-
cally dominates K ′. Note that for fE ∈ F2kˇ, f˜E(ιkˇ+ιk, c, k) is weakly increasing
in k as well. For this monotone function, the stochastic dominance of X ′ over
K ′ implies that, E[f˜E(ιkˇ + ιK′ , c,K ′)|K = k] ≤ E[f˜E(ιkˇ + ιX′ , c,X ′)|X = x].
Note that for any 1 ≤ k ≤ kˇ,
(T a
kˇ
fE)(ιkˇ + ιk, c, k) = max
{
0,E[f˜E(ιkˇ + ιK′ , c,K ′)|K = k]
}
≤ max
{
0,E[f˜E(ιkˇ + ιX′ , c,X ′)|X = x]
}
= (T a
kˇ
fE)(ιkˇ + ιx, c, x)
This result means that applying T a
kˇ
to any function fE ∈ F2kˇ gives a function
T a
kˇ
fE that is weakly increasing in k for 1 ≤ k ≤ kˇ. Therefore, T akˇ : F2kˇ → F2kˇ,
and as the unique fixed point of T a
kˇ
, vE(ιkˇ + ιk, c, k) must be weakly increasing
in k. This completes the proof for the inequalities in the kˇ block in the own
monotonicity conditions.
This result has an important implication. Because in any natural equilibrium,
vS(ιkˇ + ιx, c, x) = βE [pi(ιkˇ + ιK′ , C ′, K ′) + vE(ιkˇ + ιX′ , C ′, X ′) C = c,K = k] .
under Assumption 1, we have that vS(ιkˇ + ιk, c, k) is weakly increasing in k, and so
is the survival rule aS(ιkˇ + ιk, c, k).
Prove the kˇ block in the rival monotonicity conditions. Next, we focus on
a subspace of F2
kˇ
, denoted by F3
kˇ
. This subspace contains all functions that satisfy
that fE(ιkˇ + ιx, c, kˇ) is weakly decreasing in x for any 0 ≤ x ≤ kˇ. We aim to prove
that T a
kˇ
: F3
kˇ
→ F3
kˇ
, so that vE shares the same monotonicity.
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Note that for fE ∈ F3kˇ, f˜E(ιkˇ + ιx, c, kˇ) is weakly decreasing in x as well.
Therefore, for any 0 ≤ k1 ≤ k2 ≤ kˇ, the stochastic dominance implies that
E[f˜E(ιkˇ + ιK2′ , c, kˇ)|K2 = k2] ≤ E[f˜E(ιkˇ + ιK1′ , c, kˇ)|K1 = k1], where K1′ and K2′
denote the random variables for firm types in next period conditioning on current
period types being k1 and k2 respectively. Then, recall that we have established the
monotonicity of survival rule: aS(ιkˇ + ιk, c, k) is weakly increasing in k, and we get
(T a
kˇ
fE)(ιkˇ + ιk2 , c, kˇ)
= max
{
0, aS(ιkˇ + ιk2 , c, k
2)E[f˜E(ιkˇ + ιK2′ , c, kˇ)|K2 = k2] + (1− aS(ιkˇ + ιk2 , c, k2))f˜E(ιkˇ, c, kˇ)
}
≤ max
{
0, aS(ιkˇ + ιk1 , c, k
1)E[f˜E(ιkˇ + ιK2′ , c, kˇ)|K2 = k2] + (1− aS(ιkˇ + ιk1 , c, k1))f˜E(ιkˇ, c, kˇ)
}
≤ max
{
0, aS(ιkˇ + ιk1 , c, k
1)E[f˜E(ιkˇ + ιK1′ , c, kˇ)|K1 = k1] + (1− aS(ιkˇ + ιk1 , c, k1))f˜E(ιkˇ, c, kˇ)
}
= (T a
kˇ
fE)(ιkˇ + ιk1 , c, kˇ)
This result ensures that T a
kˇ
: F3
kˇ
→ F3
kˇ
, and vE ∈ F3kˇ. So, the inequalities in the
kˇ block in the rival monotonicity conditions hold good.
To initialize the recursive part of the proof, we first need to verify the inequalities
in the kˇ − 1 blocks in the own monotonicity conditions and the rival monotonicity
conditions, together with the two intermediate results.
Prove the kˇ− 1 block in the own monotonicity conditions. We follow three
steps to achieve this end. First, we establish that vE(ιkˇ−1 + ιkˇ, c, kˇ− 1) ≤ vE(ιkˇ−1 +
ιx, c, kˇ − 1) for all 0 ≤ x ≤ kˇ − 1. Then, we show that vE is also the fixed point
of another contraction mapping T a
kˇ−1, which agrees with T
a
kˇ
except that when k1 =
k2 = kˇ − 1, its right-hand side is defined as
(T a
kˇ−1fE)(2ιkˇ−1, c, kˇ−1) = max
{
0,E[f˜E(ιK1′ + ιK2′ , c,K
1′)|K1 = kˇ − 1, K2 = kˇ − 1]
}
.
Third, we prove that T a
kˇ−1 maps a space of all functions that satisfies the inequalities
in the kˇ − 1 block in the own monotonicity conditions into itself. Consequently, vE
as the unique fixed point of T a
kˇ−1 satisfies the inequalities in the kˇ − 1 block in the
own monotonicity conditions.
1. First, consider F1
kˇ−1, the subspace of F
3
kˇ
which contains all functions fE satis-
fying fE(ιkˇ−1 + ιkˇ, c, kˇ − 1) ≤ fE(ιkˇ−1 + ιx, c, kˇ − 1) for all 0 ≤ x ≤ kˇ − 1. In
this subspace, we also have f˜E(ιkˇ + ιkˇ−1, c, kˇ − 1) ≤ f˜E(ιkˇ−1 + ιx, c, kˇ − 1) for
all 0 ≤ x ≤ kˇ − 1.
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The kˇ block of the rival monotonicity conditions requires
f˜E(2ιkˇ, c, kˇ) ≤ E[f˜E(ιX′ + ιkˇ, c, kˇ)|X = x].
This inequality together with f˜E(ιkˇ−1 + ιkˇ, c, kˇ − 1) ≤ f˜E(ιkˇ−1 + ιx, c, kˇ − 1)
for all 0 ≤ x ≤ kˇ − 1 ensure that the expected continuation payoff for a type
kˇ − 1 firm right before the type transition is weakly lower when facing a type
kˇ rival than facing a rival of any other type:
E[f˜E(ιK′ + ιkˇ, c,K ′)|K = kˇ − 1] ≤ E[f˜E(ιX′ + ιK′ , c,K ′)|X = x,K = kˇ − 1].
Therefore, for fE ∈ F1kˇ−1 and all 0 ≤ x ≤ kˇ − 1,
(T a
kˇ
fE)(ιkˇ + ιkˇ−1, c, kˇ − 1)
= max
{
0,E[f˜E(ιK′ + ιkˇ, c,K ′)|K = kˇ − 1]
}
≤ max{0, aS(ιx + ιkˇ−1, c, x)(E[f˜E(ιX′ + ιK′ , c,K ′)|X = x,K = kˇ − 1])
+(1− aS(ιx + ιkˇ−1, c, x))(E[f˜E(ιK′ , c,K ′)|K = kˇ − 1])}
= (T a
kˇ
fE)(ιkˇ−1 + ιx, c, kˇ − 1).
This result implies that T a
kˇ
: F1
kˇ−1 → F1kˇ−1, and hence the equilibrium payoff
vE satisfies vE(ιkˇ + ιkˇ−1, c, kˇ− 1) ≤ vE(ιkˇ−1 + ιx, c, kˇ− 1) for all 0 ≤ x ≤ kˇ− 1.
2. Next, consider F2
kˇ−1, the subspace of F
1
kˇ−1 of functions fE satisfying fE(2ιkˇ−1, c, kˇ−
1) ≤ fE(ιkˇ−1 + ιx, c, kˇ − 1), for all 0 ≤ x ≤ kˇ − 1. We analyze two scenarios.
(a) For c ∈ [cˆ, cˇ] such that aS(2ιkˇ−1, c, kˇ − 1) < 1, equilibrium symme-
try requires that vE(2ιkˇ−1, c, kˇ − 1) = 0. Because fE ∈ F0, applying
the monotone operator T a on fE results in (T
afE)(2ιkˇ−1, c, kˇ − 1)) ≤
vE(2ιkˇ−1, c, kˇ−1) = 0. Because (T afE)(ιkˇ−1 + ιx, c, kˇ−1) is non-negative,
we have (T afE)(2ιkˇ−1, c, kˇ − 1)) ≤ (T afE)(ιkˇ−1 + ιx, c, kˇ − 1).
(b) For c ∈ [cˆ, cˇ] such that aS(2ιkˇ−1, c, kˇ − 1) = 1, Equation (5.1) becomes
(T a
kˇ
fE)(2ιkˇ−1, c, kˇ−1) = max
{
0,E[f˜E(ιK1′ + ιK′ , c,K
′)|K1 = kˇ − 1, K = kˇ − 1]
}
.
(5.3)
To compare (T a
kˇ
fE)(2ιkˇ−1, c, kˇ − 1) and (T akˇ fE)(ιkˇ−1 + ιx, c, kˇ − 1), note
that (1) for fE ∈ F1kˇ−1, we have f˜E(ιkˇ−1 + ιkˇ, c, kˇ−1) ≤ f˜E(2ιkˇ−1, c, kˇ−1),
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and (2) for fE ∈ F2kˇ−1, we have f˜E(2ιkˇ−1, c, kˇ− 1) ≤ f˜E(ιkˇ−1 + ιx, c, kˇ− 1)
for all 0 ≤ x ≤ kˇ − 1. Using stochastic dominance, we get
E[f˜E(ιK1′ + ιkˇ−1, c, kˇ− 1)|K1 = kˇ− 1] ≤ E[f˜E(ιX′ + ιkˇ−1, c, kˇ− 1)|X = x].
Furthermore, since f˜E(2ιkˇ, c, kˇ) ≤ f˜E(ιx + ιkˇ, c, kˇ) for all 0 ≤ x ≤ kˇ (kˇ
block in the rival monotonicity conditions), stochastic dominance implies
E[f˜E(ιK1′ + ιkˇ, c, kˇ)|K1 = kˇ − 1] ≤ E[f˜E(ιX′ + ιkˇ, c, kˇ)|X = x].
These two inequalities ensure that the expected continuation payoff for
a type kˇ − 1 firm right before the type transition is weakly lower when
facing a type kˇ− 1 rival than facing a rival of any type worse than kˇ− 1.
For any x such that 1 ≤ x ≤ kˇ − 1,
Πkˇ−1,kˇ−1E[f˜E(ιK1′ + ιkˇ−1, c, kˇ − 1)|K1 = kˇ − 1] + Πkˇ−1,kˇE[f˜E(ιK1′ + ιkˇ, c, kˇ)|K1 = kˇ − 1]
≤Πkˇ−1,kˇ−1E[f˜E(ιX′ + ιkˇ−1, c, kˇ − 1)|X = x] + Πkˇ−1,kˇE[f˜E(ιX′ + ιkˇ, c, kˇ)|X = x]
.
Using the expectation on the type −ˇ1 firm’s transition, we can consolidate
this inequality to
E[f˜E(ιK1′+ιK′ , c,K
′)|K1 = kˇ−1, K = kˇ−1] ≤ E[f˜E(ιX′+ιK′ , c,K ′)|X = x,K = kˇ−1].
(5.4)
Similarly, we get
E[f˜E(ιK1′+ιK′ , c,K
′)|K1 = kˇ−1, K = kˇ−1] ≤ E[f˜E(ιK′ , c,K ′)|K = kˇ−1].
(5.5)
From the results (5.3), (5.4), and (5.5), we have the desired result
(T a
kˇ
fE)(2ιkˇ−1, c, kˇ − 1)
aS(2ιkˇ−1,c,kˇ−1)=1
= max
{
0,E[f˜E(ιK1′ + ιK′ , c,K
′)|K1 = kˇ − 1, K = kˇ − 1]
}
≤ max{0, aS(ιkˇ−1 + ιx, c, x)E[f˜E(ιX′ + ιK′ , c,K ′)|X = x,K = kˇ − 1]
+(1− aS(ιkˇ−1 + ιx, c, x))E[f˜E(ιK′ , c,K ′)|K = kˇ − 1]}
by definition
= (T a
kˇ
fE)(ιkˇ−1 + ιx, c, kˇ − 1)
After establishing that (T a
kˇ
fE)(2ιkˇ−1, c, kˇ − 1) ≤ (T akˇ fE)(ιkˇ−1 + ιx, c, kˇ − 1) for
any value of aS(2ιkˇ−1, c, kˇ − 1), we conclude that T akˇ : F2kˇ−1 → F2kˇ−1.
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This result implies that
(T a
kˇ−1fE)(2ιkˇ−1, c, kˇ − 1)
by definition
= max
{
0,E[f˜E(ιK1′ + ιK′ , c,K
′)|K1 = kˇ − 1, K = kˇ − 1]
}
≤ max{0, aS(2ιkˇ−1, c, kˇ − 1)E[f˜E(ιX′ + ιK′ , c,K ′)|X = kˇ − 1, K = kˇ − 1]
+(1− aS(2ιkˇ−1, c, kˇ − 1))E[f˜E(ιK′ , c,K ′)|K = kˇ − 1]}
by definition
= (T a
kˇ
fE)(2ιkˇ−1, c, kˇ − 1)
When aS(2ιkˇ−1, c, kˇ−1) < 1, vE, the fixed point of T akˇ , satisfies vE(2ιkˇ−1, c, kˇ−
1) = 0. Because of the above inequality, at the same time, the unique fixed
point of T a
kˇ−1 evaluated at (2ιkˇ−1, c, kˇ − 1) must be 0 too. Additionally, note
that T a
kˇ
and T a
kˇ−1 are identical when aS(2ιkˇ−1, c, kˇ − 1) = 1. We can conclude
that T a
kˇ−1 and T
a
kˇ
share the same fixed point, vE is also the unique fixed point
of contraction mapping T a
kˇ−1.
3. We move on to a subspace of F2
kˇ−1, which we denote by F
3
kˇ−1. It contains all
functions fE satisfying that fE(ιkˇ−1 + ιk, c, k) is weakly increasing with k.
Note that for fE ∈ F3kˇ−1, we have f˜E ∈ F3kˇ−1 as well. Combining it with the
result that f˜E(ιkˇ + ιk, c, k) is weakly increasing in k, we have that E[f˜E(ιX′ +
ιk, c, k)|X = kˇ−1] is weakly increasing in k. Then, for this monotone function,
stochastic dominance implies that for any k1, k2 such that 1 ≤ k1 < k2 ≤ kˇ,
the expected continuation payoff for the type k1 firm right before the type
transition is weakly lower than the type k1 firm when both face a same type
rival,
E[f˜E(ιX′+ιK1′ , c,K
1′)|X = kˇ−1, K1 = k1] ≤ E[f˜E(ιX′+ιK2′ , c,K2
′
)|X = kˇ−1, K2 = k2].
(5.6)
We then consider the following cases.
(a) For k1 < k2 ≤ kˇ − 1, (T a
kˇ−1fE)(ιkˇ−1 + ιk1 , c, k
1) and (T a
kˇ−1fE)(ιkˇ−1 +
ιk2 , c, k
2) do not depend on any equilibrium strategy. The inequality
(5.6) ensures that (T a
kˇ−1fE)(ιkˇ−1 + ιk1 , c, k
1) ≤ (T a
kˇ−1fE)(ιkˇ−1 + ιk2 , c, k
2).
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(b) For kˇ − 1 = k1 < k2 = kˇ, we have
(T a
kˇ−1fE)(ιkˇ−1 + ιk1 , c, k
1)
= max
{
0,E[f˜E(ιK1′ + ιK′ , c,K
′)|K1 = kˇ − 1, K = kˇ − 1]
}
≤ max
{
0,E[f˜E(ιkˇ + ιK′ , c, kˇ)|K = kˇ − 1]
}
≤ max{0, aS(ιkˇ−1 + ιk2 , c, kˇ − 1)E[f˜E(ιkˇ + ιK′ , c, kˇ)|K = kˇ − 1]
+(1− aS(ιkˇ−1 + ιk2 , c, kˇ − 1))f˜E(ιkˇ, c, kˇ)}
= (T a
kˇ−1fE)(ιkˇ−1 + ιk2 , c, k
2)
The first inequality is a result of (5.6) when k1 = kˇ − 1 and k2 = kˇ. The
second inequality follows from the result that f˜E(ιkˇ+ιk, c, kˇ) is decreasing
in k for fE ∈ F3kˇ−1 (kˇ block in the rival monotonicity conditions).
This result guarantees that T a
kˇ−1 : F
3
kˇ−1 → F3kˇ−1. It has an important implication.
Because vE(ιkˇ−1 + ιk, c, k) is weakly increasing in k for all 1 ≤ k ≤ kˇ, the same
monotonicity holds for vS(ιkˇ−1 + ιk, c, k) and the equilibrium survival rule aS(ιkˇ−1 +
ιk, c, k).
Prove the kˇ − 1 block in the rival monotonicity conditions. We now focus
on a subspace of F3
kˇ−1, denoted by F
4
kˇ−1. This subspace contains all functions fE
satisfying that fE(ιx + ιkˇ−1, c, kˇ − 1) is weakly decreasing in x, 0 ≤ x ≤ kˇ. We aim
to prove that T a
kˇ−1 : F
4
kˇ−1 → F4kˇ−1.
Note that for fE ∈ F4kˇ−1, f˜E(ιx + ιkˇ−1, c, kˇ − 1) is also weakly decreasing in x.
Combine it with the result that f˜E(ιx+ιkˇ, c, kˇ) is weakly decreasing in x, we conclude
that the expected continuation payoff for the type kˇ − 1 firm right before the type
transition is weakly decreasing in x, 0 ≤ x ≤ kˇ. Using the expectation on the
type kˇ− 1 firm’s type transition, we have E[f˜E(ιK′ + ιx, c,K ′)|K = kˇ− 1] is weakly
decreasing in x. For any k1, k2 such that 0 ≤ k1 < k2 ≤ kˇ, stochastic dominance
implies that
E[f˜E(ιK′+ιK1′ , c,K
′)|K = kˇ−1, K1 = k1] ≥ E[f˜E(ιK′+ιK2′ , c,K ′)|K = kˇ−1, K2 = k2].
(5.7)
We then consider the following cases.
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1. For k1 < k2 < kˇ − 1, we have
(T a
kˇ−1fE)(ιk2 + ιkˇ−1, c, kˇ − 1)
= max{0, aS(ιkˇ−1 + ιk2 , c, k2)E[f˜E(ιK′ + ιK2′ , c,K ′)|K = kˇ − 1, K2 = k2]
+(1− aS(ιk2 + ιkˇ−1, c, k2))E[f˜E(ιK′ , c,K ′)|K = kˇ − 1]}
≤ max{0, aS(ιkˇ−1 + ιk1 , c, k1)E[f˜E(ιK′ + ιK2′ , c,K ′)|K = kˇ − 1, K2 = k2]
+(1− aS(ιk1 + ιkˇ−1, c, k1))E[f˜E(ιK′ , c,K ′)|K = kˇ − 1]}
≤ max{0, aS(ιkˇ−1 + ιk1 , c, k1)E[f˜E(ιK′ + ιK1′ , c,K ′)|K = kˇ − 1, K1 = k1]
+(1− aS(ιk1 + ιkˇ−1, c, k1))E[f˜E(ιK′ , c,K ′)|K = kˇ − 1]}
= (T a
kˇ−1fE)(ιkˇ−1 + ιk1 , c, kˇ − 1)
When k1 = 0, (5.7) implies that monopoly post-survival payoff E[f˜E(ιK′ , c,K ′)|K =
kˇ−1] is always weakly better than the duopoly one E[f˜E(ιK′+ ιK2′ , c,K ′)|K =
kˇ − 1, K2 = k2]. The monotone survival rule aS(ιkˇ−1 + ιk1 , c, k1) ≤ aS(ιkˇ−1 +
ιk2 , c, k
2) that we have just proved assigns higher probability to the more prof-
itable monopoly post-survival payoff when the kˇ − 1 firm is facing a k1 rival
than it is facing a k2 rival, which leads to the first inequality. The second
inequality follows directly from (5.7).
2. For k1 < kˇ − 1 and k2 ≥ kˇ − 1, we have
(T a
kˇ−1fE)(ιk2 + ιkˇ−1, c, kˇ − 1)
= max
{
0,E[f˜E(ιK′ + ιK2′ , c,K
′)|K = kˇ − 1, K2 = k2]
}
≤ max{0, aS(ιkˇ−1 + ιk2 , c, k2)E[f˜E(ιK′ + ιK2′ , c,K ′)|K = kˇ − 1, K2 = k2]
+(1− aS(ιk2 + ιkˇ−1, c, k2))E[f˜E(ιK′ , c,K ′)|K = kˇ − 1]}
≤ (T a
kˇ−1fE)(ιkˇ−1 + ιk1 , c, kˇ − 1)
The first inequality uses the fact that monopoly post-survival payoff is always
weakly better than the duopoly one. The second inequality follows directly
from (5.7).
3. For k1 = kˇ − 1 and k2 = kˇ, we have
(T a
kˇ−1fE)(ιk2 + ιkˇ−1, c, kˇ − 1) = max
{
0,E[f˜E(ιK′ + ιK2′ , c,K
′)|K = kˇ − 1, K2 = k2]
}
≤ max
{
0,E[f˜E(ιK′ + ιK1′ , c,K
′)|K = kˇ − 1, K1 = k1]
}
= (T a
kˇ−1fE)(ιkˇ−1 + ιk1 , c, kˇ − 1)
The inequality follows directly from (5.7).
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Therefore, for any fE ∈ F4kˇ−1, (T akˇ−1fE)(ιk + ιx, c, k) is decreasing in x. So, T akˇ−1 :
F4
kˇ−1 → F4kˇ−1, and the equilibrium payoff vE(ιx + ιk, c, k) is also weakly decreasing
in x, 0 ≤ x ≤ kˇ.
Next, we prove the two useful results.
Prove the first inequality in all the j < kˇ − 1 blocks in the rival mono-
tonicity conditions. Denote a subspace of F4
kˇ−1 in which any fE function satisfies
fE(ιkˇ + ιk, c, k) ≤ fE(ιkˇ−1 + ιk, c, k) for all k such that 1 ≤ k ≤ kˇ − 1 as F5kˇ−1. This
is the space of functions that satisfy the first inequalities in all the j < kˇ− 1 blocks
in the rival monotonicity conditions. We aim to prove that T a
kˇ−1 : F
5
kˇ−1 → F5kˇ−1.
Note that f˜E(ιkˇ + ιk, c, k) ≤ f˜E(ιkˇ−1 + ιk, c, k) holds for fE ∈ F5kˇ−1. Then, the
stochastic dominance implies that
(T a
kˇ−1fE)(ιkˇ + ιk, c, k) = max
{
0,E[f˜E(ιkˇ + ιK′ , c,K ′)|K = k]
}
≤ max
{
0,E[f˜E(ιK′ + ιX′ , c,K ′)|K = k,X = kˇ − 1]
}
= (T a
kˇ−1fE)(ιkˇ−1 + ιk, c, k)
Therefore, T a
kˇ−1 : F
5
kˇ−1 → F5kˇ−1 and vE(ιkˇ + ιk, c, k) ≤ vE(ιkˇ−1 + ιk, c, k) for all k
such that 1 ≤ k ≤ kˇ − 1. In particular, this result ensures that aE(ιkˇ + ι1, c) ≤
aE(ιkˇ−1 + ι1, c) and aS(ιkˇ + ι1, c, 1) ≤ aS(ιkˇ−1 + ι1, c, 1).
Prove the first inequalities in the 0 and 1 blocks in the own monotonicity
conditions. The first inequalities in the 0 and 1 blocks in the own monotonicity
conditions are vE(ιkˇ−1, c, kˇ − 1) ≤ vE(ιkˇ, c, kˇ) and vE(ιkˇ−1 + ι1, c, kˇ − 1) ≤ vE(ιkˇ +
ι1, c, kˇ). To prove these inequalities, define a subspace of F
5
kˇ−1 which contains all
functions fE satisfying fE(ιkˇ−1, c, kˇ − 1) ≤ fE(ιkˇ, c, kˇ) and fE(ιkˇ−1 + ι1, c, kˇ − 1) ≤
fE(ιkˇ + ι1, c, kˇ), as F
6
kˇ−1. Because (1) aE(ιkˇ + ι1, c) ≤ aE(ιkˇ−1 + ι1, c) (just proved),
(2) vE(ιkˇ + ι1, c, kˇ) ≤ vE(ιkˇ, c, kˇ) (The last inequality in the kˇ block in the rival
monotonicity conditions), and (3) vE(ιkˇ−1 + ι1, c, kˇ−1) ≤ vE(ιkˇ−1, c, kˇ−1) (The last
inequality in the kˇ block in the rival monotonicity conditions), we have f˜E(ιkˇ−1, c, kˇ−
1) ≤ f˜E(ιkˇ, c, kˇ), and then (T afE)(ιkˇ−1, c, kˇ − 1) ≤ (T afE)(ιkˇ, c, kˇ). Similarly, we
have f˜E(ιkˇ−1 + ι1, c, kˇ − 1) ≤ f˜E(ιkˇ + ι1, c, kˇ), and then (T afE)(ιkˇ−1 + ι1, c, kˇ − 1) ≤
(T afE)(ιkˇ + ι1, c, kˇ).
Therefore, T a
kˇ−1 : F
6
kˇ−1 → F6kˇ−1, and the first inequalities in the 0 and 1 blocks in
the own monotonicity conditions hold good.
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Now suppose that we have proceeded the recursive proof to the inequalities in the
k block in the own monotonicity conditions and the k block in the rival monotonicity
conditions with the following results in hand
(A) vE is the fixed point of the contraction mapping T
a
k+1, which agrees with T
a
except that for all k1 = k2 ≥ k + 1, its right-hand-side is defined as equation
(5.2) instead of equation (5.1),
(T ak+1fE)(2ιk1 , c, k
1) = max
{
0,E[f˜E(ιK1′ + ιK2′ , c,K
1′)|K1 = k1, K2 = k1]
}
.
(B) T ak+1 maps a space of functions satisfying the inequalities in the k+1, k+2, . . . , kˇ
blocks in the own monotonicity conditions into itself. Therefore, vE lies in this
subspace. That is, vE(ιk+1 + ιx, c, x), vE(ιk+2 + ιx, c, x), . . . , vE(ιkˇ + ιx, c, x) are
all weakly increasing in x, 1 ≤ x ≤ kˇ.
(C) T ak+1 maps a space of functions satisfying the inequalities in the k+1, k+2, . . . , kˇ
blocks in the rival monotonicity conditions into itself. Therefore, vE lies in this
subspace. That is, vE(ιx+ιk+1, c, k+1), vE(ιx+ιk+2, c, k+2), . . . , vE(ιx+ιkˇ, c, kˇ)
are all weakly decreasing in x, 0 ≤ x ≤ kˇ.
(D) T ak+1 maps a space of functions satisfying the first kˇ − k − 1 inequalities in all
the j ≤ k + 1 blocks in the rival monotonicity conditions into itself. Therefore,
vE lies in this subspace. That is, vE(ιk+1 + ιx, c, x) ≥ vE(ιk+2 + ιx, c, x) ≥ . . . ≥
vE(ιkˇ + ιx, c, x) for all 1 ≤ x ≤ k.
(E) T ak+1 maps a space of functions satisfying the first kˇ−k−1 inequalities in the 0
and 1 blocks in the own monotonicity conditions into itself. Therefore, vE lies in
this subspace. That is, vE(ιk+1, c, k+ 1) ≤ vE(ιk+2, c, k+ 2) ≤ . . . ≤ vE(ιkˇ, c, kˇ)
and vE(ιk+1 + ι1, c, k + 1) ≤ vE(ιk+2 + ι1, c, k + 2) ≤ . . . ≤ vE(ιkˇ + ι1, c, kˇ).
Then, we prove the inequalities in the k block in the own monotonicity conditions
and the k block in the rival monotonicity conditions, and the two sets of useful
inequalities in other blocks in the own and rival monotonicity conditions.
Prove the k block in the own monotonicity conditions. We follow three
steps to prove these inequalities. First, we show that vE(ιx + ιk, c, k) is weakly
decreasing in x, k ≤ x ≤ kˇ and vE(ιk+1 + ιk, c, k) ≤ vE(ιx+ ιk, c, k) for all 0 ≤ x ≤ k.
133
5. APPENDIX
Then, we show that vE is also the fixed point of another contraction mapping T
a
k ,
which agrees with T ak+1 except that when k
1 = k2 = k, it is defined as
(T ak fE)(2ιk, c, k) = max
{
0,E[f˜E(ιK1′ + ιK2′ , c,K
1′)|K1 = k,K2 = k]
}
.
Finally, we prove that T ak maps a space of all functions that satisfies the inequalities
in the k block in the own monotonicity conditions into itself.
1. First, consider F1k, the subspace of F
6
k+1 in which any function f satisfies that
fE(ιkˇ + ιk, c, k) ≤ . . . ≤ fE(ιk+1 + ιk, c, k) ≤ fE(ιx + ιk, c, k) for all 0 ≤ x ≤ k.
In this subspace, f˜E shares the same mentioned property with fE. Combining
the inequalities in the k + 1, . . . , kˇ blocks in the rival monotonicity conditions
(the results stated in C), we get
E[f˜E(ιK′+ιkˇ, c,K ′)|K = k] ≤ . . . ≤ E[f˜E(ιX′+ιK′ , c,K ′)|X = k+1, K = k], and
E[f˜E(ιX′+ιK′ , c,K ′)|X = k+1, K = k] ≤ E[f˜E(ιX′+ιK′ , c,K ′)|X = x,K = k], 0 ≤ x ≤ k.
Therefore, for fE ∈ F1k and all 0 ≤ x ≤ k,
(T ak+1fE)(ιkˇ + ιk, c, k)
≤ . . .
≤ (T ak+1fE)(ιk+1 + ιk, c, k)
= max
{
0,E[f˜E(ιX′ + ιK′ , c,K ′)|X = k + 1, K = k]
}
≤ max{0, aS(ιx + ιk, c, x)(E[f˜E(ιX′ + ιK′ , c,K ′)|X = x,K = k])
+(1− aS(ιx + ιk, c, x))(E[f˜E(ιK′ , c,K ′)|K = k])}
= (T ak+1fE)(ιk + ιx, c, k).
This result implies that T ak+1 : F
1
k → F1k, and hence the equilibrium payoff vE
satisfies vE(ιkˇ + ιk, c, k) ≤ . . . ≤ vE(ιk+1 + ιk, c, k) ≤ vE(ιx + ιk, c, k) for all
0 ≤ x ≤ k.
2. Next, consider F2k, the subspace of F
1
k in which any function fE satisfies
fE(2ιk, c, k) ≤ fE(ιk + ιx, c, k), for all 0 ≤ x ≤ k. We look at two scenar-
ios.
(a) For c ∈ [cˆ, cˇ] such that aS(2ιk, c, k) < 1, equilibrium symmetry requires,
vE(2ιk, c, k) = 0 when aS(2ιk, c, k) < 1. Moreover, because fE ∈ F0, ap-
plying the monotone operator T a on fE(2ιk, c, k) results in (T
afE)(2ιk, c, k)) ≤
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vE(2ιk, c, k) = 0. Because (T
afE)(ιk + ιx, c, k) is non-negative, we have
(T afE)(2ιk, c, k)) ≤ (T afE)(ιk + ιx, c, k).
(b) For c ∈ [cˆ, cˇ] such that aS(2ιk, c, k) = 1, by Equation (5.1), we have
(T a
kˇ
fE)(2ιk, c, k) = max
{
0,E[f˜E(ιK1′ + ιK′ , c,K
′)|K1 = k,K = k]
}
.
(5.8)
To compare (T a
kˇ
fE)(2ιk, c, k) and (T
a
kˇ
fE)(ιk + ιx, c, k), note that for fE ∈
F2k, we have f˜E(ιk + ιkˇ, c, kˇ− 1) ≤ . . . ≤ f˜E(2ιk, c, k) ≤ f˜E(ιk + ιx, c, k) for
all 0 ≤ x ≤ k. Using stochastic dominance, we get
E[f˜E(ιK′ + ιk, c, k)|K = k] ≤ E[f˜E(ιX′ + ιk, c, k)|X = x].
Furthermore, combining it with the results from C, we get
E[f˜E(ιK1′+ιK′ , c,K
′)|K1 = k,K = k] ≤ E[f˜E(ιX′+ιK′ , c,K ′)|X = x,K = k].
(5.9)
Similarly, we get
E[f˜E(ιK1′ + ιK′ , c,K
′)|K1 = k,K = k] ≤ E[f˜E(ιK′ , c,K ′)|K = k]. (5.10)
From the results (5.8), (5.9), and (5.10), we have the following inequalities
(T ak+1fE)(2ιk, c, k)
aS(2ιk,c,k)=1
= max
{
0,E[f˜E(ιX′ + ιK′ , c,K ′)|X = k,K = k]
}
≤ max{0, aS(ιk + ιx, c, x)E[f˜E(ιX′ + ιK′ , c,K ′)|X = x,K = k]
+(1− aS(ιk + ιx, c, x))E[f˜E(ιK′ , c,K ′)|K = k]}
by definition
= (T ak+1fE)(ιk + ιx, c, k)
These results also imply that when aS(2ιk, c, k) < 1,
(T ak fE)(2ιk, c, k)
by definition
= max
{
0,E[f˜E(ιX′ + ιK′ , c,K ′)|X = k,K = k]
}
≤ max{0, aS(2ιk, c, k)E[f˜E(ιX′ + ιK′ , c,K ′)|X = k,K = k]
+(1− aS(2ιk, c, k))E[f˜E(ιK′ , c,K ′)|K = k]}
by definition
= (T ak+1fE)(2ιk, c, k)
Because vE satisfies that vE(2ιk, c, k) = 0 as the unique fixed point of T
a
k+1,
and because (T ak fE)(2ιk, c, k) ≤ (T ak+1fE)(2ιk, c, k), the unique fixed point of
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T ak evaluated at (2ιk, c, k) must be 0 too. Additionally, note that T
a
k and T
a
k+1
are identical when aS(2ιk, c, k) = 1. We can conclude that vE is also the unique
fixed point of contraction mapping T ak .
3. We move on to a subspace of F2k, which we denote by F
3
k. It contains all
functions fE satisfying that fE(ιk + ιx, c, x) is weakly increasing with x. Note
that for fE ∈ F3k, f˜E(ιk + ιx, c, x) is weakly increasing in x as well. Combine
it with the inequalities in C, and then we have that f˜E(ιd + ιx, c, x) is weakly
increasing in x for all d such that k ≤ d ≤ kˇ. Therefore, E[f˜E(ιK′+ιx, c, x)|K =
k] is weakly increasing in x. For any k1, k2 such that 1 ≤ k1 ≤ k2 ≤ kˇ, the
stochastic dominance of K2
′
over K1
′
implies that
E[f˜E(ιK′+ιK1′ , c,K
1′)|K = k,K1 = k1] ≤ E[f˜E(ιK′+ιK2′ , c,K2
′
)|K = k,K2 = k2].
(5.11)
We then consider the following cases.
(a) For k1 ≤ k2 ≤ k, (T ak fE)(ιk + ιk1 , c, k1) and (T ak fE)(ιk + ιk1 , c, k1) do not
depend on equilibrium strategy. Then, equation (5.2)gives
(T ak fE)(ιk + ιk1 , c, k
1) = max{0,E[f˜E(ιK′ + ιK1′ , c,K1
′
)|K = k,K1 = k1]}
≤ max{0,E[f˜E(ιK′ + ιK1′ , c,K2
′
)|K = k,K1 = k2]} = (T ak fE)(ιkˇ + ιk2 , c, k2).
(b) For k < k1 ≤ k2 ≤ kˇ, from D, we have aS(ιk+ ιk1 , c, k) ≥ aS(ιk+ ιk2 , c, k).
Also, using the inequalities in B and stochastic dominance’s implication
on monotone functions, we have
E[f˜E(ιK′+ιKi′ , c,K
i′)|K = k,Ki = ki] ≤ E[f˜E(ιKi′ , c,Ki
′
)|Ki = ki], i = 1, 2.
Using the inequalities in E and the stochastic dominance’s implication,
E[f˜E(ιK2′ , c,K
2′)|K2 = k2] ≤ E[f˜E(ιK1′ , c,K1
′
)|K1 = k1].
Then, (T ak fE)(ιk + ιk1 , c, k
1) ≤ (T ak fE)(ιk + ιk2 , c, k2) follows from the
inequalities in equation (5.1).
(c) For k1 ≤ k ≤ k2 ≤ kˇ, similarly we can show (T ak fE)(ιk + ιk1 , c, k1) ≤
(T ak fE)(ιk + ιk2 , c, k
2) with the above results.
This result guarantees that T ak : F
3
k → F3k, so vE ∈ F3k, which leads to the same
monotonicity for vS(ιx + ιk, c, k) and the equilibrium survival rule aS(ιx + ιk, c, k).
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Prove the k block in the rival monotonicity conditions. Next, we focus
on a subspace of F3k, denoted by F
4
k. In this subspace, any function fE satisfies
that fE(ιx + ιk, c, k) is weakly decreasing in x, 0 ≤ x ≤ kˇ. We aim to prove that
T ak : F
4
k → F4k
Note that for fE ∈ F4k, f˜E(ιx+ ιk, c, k) is also weakly decreasing in x. Recall that
B implies that f˜E(ιx + ιk+1, c, k+ 1), . . . , f˜E(ιx + ιkˇ, c, kˇ) are weakly decreasing in x,
0 ≤ x ≤ kˇ. Therefore, E[f˜E(ιK′ + ιx, c,K ′)|K = k] is weakly decreasing in x. For
any k1, k2 such that 0 ≤ k1 ≤ k2 ≤ kˇ, stochastic dominance implies that
[E[f˜E(ιK′ + ιK1′ , c,K
′)|K = k]|K1 = k1] ≥ [E[f˜E(ιK′ + ιK2′ , c,K ′)|K = k]|K2 = k2].
Also, we have just proven aS(ιk+ιk1 , c, k
1) ≤ aS(ιk+ιk2 , c, k2). Therefore, (T ak fE)(ιk+
ιk2 , c, k) ≤ (T ak fE)(ιk+ιk1 , c, k) follows. So, T ak : F4k → F4k, and the equilibrium payoff
vE(ιx + ιk, c, k) is weakly decreasing in x, 0 ≤ x ≤ kˇ.
Now we are left with the two intermediate results to prove.
Prove the kˇ − k-th inequalities in all the j < k blocks in the rival mono-
tonicity conditions. Next, we further look into a subspace of F4k, denoted by F
5
k,
in which any function fE satisfies that fE(ιk + ιx, c, x) ≥ fE(ιk+1 + ιx, c, x) for all
x < k. Note that the inequalities in C ensure that fE(ιk+ιx, c, x) ≥ fE(ιk+1+ιx, c, x)
for all x ≥ k, so for any fE ∈ F5k, f˜E(ιk+1 + ιx, c, x) ≤ f˜E(ιk + ιx, c, x) for all x. Com-
bine it with the results in D, and then we have E[f˜E(ιk1 +ιX′ , c,X ′)|X = x] is weakly
decreasing in k1 for k ≤ k1 ≤ kˇ. Stochastic dominance implies that,
E[f˜E(ιK1′ + ιX′ , c,X
′)|K1 = k1, X = x] ≤ E[f˜E(ιK′ + ιX′ , c,X ′)|K = k,X = x].
Then (T afE)(ιk1 + ιx, c, x) ≤ (T afE)(ιk + ιx, c, x) for any x < k follows from the
definitions in Equation (5.2). Therefore, T a : F5k → F5k and vE(ιk1 + ιx, c, x) ≤
vE(ιk + ιx, c, x) for all x and all k
1 such that k ≤ k1 ≤ kˇ. In particular, this result
ensures that aE(ιk+1 + ι1, c) ≤ aE(ιk + ι1, c) and aS(ιk+1 + ι1, c, 1) ≤ aS(ιk + ι1, c, 1).
Prove the kˇ−k-th inequality in the 0 and 1 block in the own monotonicity
conditions. Finally, define a subspace of F5k, in which any function fE satisfies
fE(ιk, c, k) ≤ fE(ιk+1, c, k + 1) and fE(ιk + ι1, c, k) ≤ fE(ιk+1 + ι1, c, k + 1), as F6k.
We then prove T a : F6k → F6k.
Because aE(ιk+1 + ι1, c) ≤ aE(ιk + ι1, c), we have f˜E(ιk, c, k) ≤ f˜E(ιk+1, c, k + 1)
as well. Combine it with the inequalities in E, and then we have that f˜E(ιx, c, x) is
weakly increasing in x for k ≤ x ≤ kˇ. Using stochastic dominance’s implication on
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monotone functions, we have (T ak fE)(ιk, c, k) ≤ (T ak fE)(ιk+1, c, k + 1). Similarly we
can show that (T ak fE)(ιk + ι1, c, k) ≤ (T ak fE)(ιk+1 + ι1, c, k + 1), so T ak : F5k → F6k
and vE satisfies the kˇ − k inequality in the 0 and 1 block in the own monotonicity
conditions.
This completes the recursive verification for all the inequalities in the own and
rival monotonicity conditions. Since (aS, aE) is arbitrarily chosen, in any natural
Markov-Perfect Equilibrium, vE satisfies all the inequalities stated in the own and
rival monotonicity conditions.
With these two sets of inequalities in hand, we are ready to prove Lemma 1.
First, note that as a special case of the rival monotonicity conditions, vE(2ιk, c, k) ≤
vE(ιk, c, k) for all c ∈ [cˆ, cˇ] and k ∈ K.
To prove vS(2ιk, c, k) ≤ vS(ιk, c, k), note that
vS(2ιk, c, k) = βE[pi(ιK′ + ιX′ , C ′, K ′) + vE(ιK′ + ιX′ , C ′, K ′)|C = c,K = k,X = k],
vS(ιk, c, k) =βE[pi(ιK′ , C ′, K ′) + aE(ιK′ + ι1, C ′)vE(ιK′ + ι1, C ′, K ′)
+ [1− aE(ιK′ + ι1, C ′)] vE(ιK′ , C ′, K ′)|C = c,K = k],
For any realizations of X ′, denoted by x, pi(ιK′ + ιx, C ′, K ′) ≤ pi(ιK′ , C ′, K ′)
(Assumption 1.3). In addition, the inequalities in the rival monotonicity condi-
tions ensure that for any x ∈ K, vE(ιK′ + ιx, C ′, K ′) ≤ vE(ιK′ + ι1, C ′, K ′) and
vE(ιK′ + ιx, C
′, K ′) ≤ vE(ιK′ , C ′, K ′). Therefore, for any equilibrium strategy aE,
vS(2ιk, c, k) ≤ vS(ιk, c, k).
To prove Proposition 1, we first establish a lemma on the candidate post-entry
payoff wE computed by Algorithm 1.
Lemma 3. For all c ∈ [cˆ, cˇ], all k1, k2 ∈ K and k1 > k2, the candidate post-entry
payoff wE computed by Algorithm 1 satisfies wE(ιk1 + ιk2 , c, k
1) ≥ wE(ιk1 + ιk2 , c, k2).
Proof. Define F to be the space of all functions
fE :
(n1, . . . , nkˇ) :
kˇ∑
i=1
ni ≤ 2
× [cˆ, cˇ]×K→
[
0,
βpi(ιkˇ, cˇ, kˇ)
1− β
]
,
and Tα : F → F with
(TαfE)(ιk1+ιk2 , c, k
1) =
{
(Tk1,k2f)(C), f(C) ≡ g(ιk1 + ιk2 , c, k2) if k1 ≤ k2
(Tk1f)(C, k
2), f(C, k2) ≡ g(ιk1 + ιk2 , c, k2) if k1 > k2
}
.
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Thus, Tα is exactly assembled by Tk1,k2 and Tk1 in Algorithm 1, and wE computed
by Algorithm 1 is the unique fixed point of Tα. Now consider a subspace of F,
which we denote as FN . In this space, any function fE satisfies that fE ≤ wE,
fE(ιk1 + ιk2 , ·, k1) ≥ fE(ιk1 + ιk2 , ·, k2) for all k1 > k2.
We aim to prove Tα : FN → FN . For all fE ∈ FN , f˜E ∈ FN as well. Consider
the following cases
1. If Algorithm 1 computes αS(ιk1 + ιk2 , c, k
2) = 1, then Algorithm 1 also pre-
scribes αS(ιk1 + ιk2 , c, k
1) = 1. Substitute these survival rules into Equation
(5.1) and use stochastic dominance’s implication on monotone functions, we
obtain that (TαfE)(ιk1 + ιk2 , c, k
1) ≥ (TαfE)(ιk1 + ιk2 , c, k2).
2. If Algorithm 1 computes αS(ιk1 + ιk2 , c, k
2) = 0, then it must be the case
that wE(ιk1 + ιk2 , c, k
2) = 0. For any fE ∈ F, fE(ιk1 + ιk2 , c, k2) ≤ wE(ιk1 +
ιk2 , c, k
2) = 0. Since wE(ιk1 + ιk2 , c, k
2) = (Tα∞fE)(ιk1 + ιk2 , c, k2) and Tα is
a monotone operator, (TαfE)(ιk1 + ιk2 , c, k
2) ≤ wE(ιk1 + ιk2 , c, k2) = 0. Thus,
(TαfE)(ιk1 + ιk2 , c, k
1) ≥ 0 ≥ (TαfE)(ιk1 + ιk2 , c, k2).
By point-wise comparison, we conclude that Tα : FN → FN hence wE(ιk1 +
ιk2 , ·, k1) ≥ wE(ιk1 + ιk2 , ·, k2) for all k1 > k2. This means that whenever wE(ιk1 +
ιk2 , ·, k2) > 0, wE(ιk1 + ιk2 , c, k1) > 0 as well.
Lemma 3 ensures that, under the construction of Algorithm 1, αS satisfies the
requirement in Definition 1. With this result in place, we prove Proposition 1.
Proof of Proposition 1. We prove the proposition in two steps. First, we verify that
the candidate equilibrium computed by Algorithm 1 is indeed a natural Markov-
perfect equilibrium. To this end, we show that (αS, αE) satisfy the one-shot deviation-
proof conditions in (2.3) and (2.4). Then, we use Lemma 1 to prove that the con-
structed equilibrium is essentially unique.
Verify one-shot deviation proofness. To verify one-shot deviation proofness
for αS, we need to show that for any k
1, k2, c, 1 ≤ k1 ≤ kˇ and 0 ≤ k2 ≤ kˇ,
αS(ιk1 + ιk2 , c, k
1) ∈ arg max
a∈[0,1]
aE[wS(M ′, c, k1)|M = ιk1 + ιk2 ] (5.12)
139
5. APPENDIX
where
E[wS(M ′, c, k1)|M = ιk1+ιk2 ] =

aS(ιk1 + ιk2 , c, k
2)wS(ιk1 + ιk2 , c, k
1)
+(1− aS(ιk1 + ιk2 , c, k2))wS(ιk1 , c, k1) if k1 ≥ k2
wS(ιk1 + ιk2 , c, k
1) if k1 < k2
(5.13)
and wS is defined analogously as vS by equation 2.2. To verify (5.12), consider the
following cases
1. For all c such that αS(ιk1 + ιk2 , c, k
1) = 1, we know wE(ιk1 + ιk2 , c, k
1) > 0.
Then, we show that E[wS(M ′, c, k1)|M = ιk1 + ιk2 ] > 0.
(a) If k1 ≤ k2, then wE(ιk1 + ιk2 , c, k1) is computed by Tk2,k1 and wE(ιk1 +
ιk2 , c, k
1) = max {0, wS(ιk1 + ιk2 , c, k1)} > 0. Then, from (5.13), E[wS(M ′, c, k1)|M =
ιk1 + ιk2 ] = wS(ιk1 + ιk2 , c, k
1) > 0.
(b) If k1 > k2, then wE(ιk1 + ιk2 , c, k
1) is computed by Tk1 and wE(ιk1 +
ιk2 , c, k
1) = max {0,E[wS(M ′, c, k1)|M = ιk1 + ιk2 ]} > 0, so E[wS(M ′, c, k1)|M =
ιk1 + ιk2 ] > 0.
So, arg maxa∈[0,1] aE[wS(M ′, c, k1)|M = ιk1 + ιk2 ] = {1} 3 αS(ιk1 + ιk2 , c, k1) =
1.
2. For all c such that αS(ιk1 + ιk2 , c, k
1) = 0, we know wE(ιk1 + ιk2 , c, k
1) = 0.
Then, we show that E[wS(M ′, c, k1)|M = ιk1 + ιk2 ] = 0.
(a) If k1 < k2, then wE(ιk1 + ιk2 , c, k
1) is computed by Tk2,k1 and wE(ιk1 +
ιk2 , c, k
1) = max {0, wS(ιk1 + ιk2 , c, k1)} = 0. Then, from (5.13), E[wS(M ′, c, k1)|M =
ιk1 + ιk2 ] = wS(ιk1 + ιk2 , c, k
1) ≤ 0.
(b) If k1 ≥ k2, then in natural equilibrium it must be that αS(ιk1 +ιk2 , c, k2) =
0, and hence (5.13) gives E[wS(M ′, c, k1)|M = ιk1 + ιk2 ] = wS(ιk1 , c, k1).
Because wE(ιk1 + ιk2 , c, k
1) is computed by Tk1 and wE(ιk1 + ιk2 , c, k
1) =
max {0, wS(ιk1 , c, k1)} = 0, E[wS(M ′, c, k1)|M = ιk1 + ιk2 ] ≤ 0.
So, arg maxa∈[0,1] aE[wS(M ′, c, k1)|M = ιk1 +ιk2 ] 3 αS(ιk1 +ιk2 , c, k1) = 0. Note
that if we require default to inactivity, arg maxa∈[0,1] aE[wS(M ′, c, k1)|M =
ιk1 + ιk2 ] = {0}.
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3. For all c such that αS(2ιk1 , c, k
1) is determined by (2.16), then k1 = k2 and
E[wS(M ′, c, k1)|M = ιk1 + ιk2 ]
=αS(2ιk1 , c, k
1)wS(2ιk1 , c, k
1) + (1− αS(2ιk1 , c, k1))wS(ιk1 , c, k1)
=0.
The last equality is due to equation (2.16). So, arg maxa∈[0,1] aE[wS(M ′, c, k1)|M =
ιk1 + ιk2 ] = [0, 1] 3 αS(2ιk1 , c, k1).
To verify one-shot-deviation-proofness for αE, we need to show that for any k, c,
0 ≤ k ≤ kˇ,
αE(ιk + ι1, c) ∈ arg max
a∈[0,1]
a(E[wE(M ′, c, 1)|M = ιk + ι1]− ϕ) (5.14)
where
E[wE(M ′, c, 1)|M = ιk+ι1] =
{
wE(ιk + ι1, c, 1) if k > 0
(1− αE(2ι1, c))wE(ι1, c, 1) + αE(2ι1, c)wE(2ι1, c, 1) if k = 0
By construction, αE(ιk + ι1, c) satisfies (5.14) except for k = 0. Thus, at this
moment, we can assert that αE(ιk + ι1, c) is a natural Markov-perfect equilibrium
strategy for all k > 0. Since no operator T in Algorithm 1 depends on αE(ι1, c), this
result is sufficient to ensure that the fixed points, wE is the natural Markov-perfect
equilibrium payoff corresponding to (αS, αE). Lemma 1 then guarantees that wE
also exhibits wE(2ι1, c, 1) ≤ wE(ι1, c, 1). Thus,
1. when αE(2ι1, c) = 1, it must be the case that wE(ι1, c, 1) ≥ wE(2ι1, c, 1) > ϕ
so αE(ι1, c) = 1. The right-hand-side of (5.14) is
arg max
a∈[0,1]
a(E[wE(M ′, c, 1)|M = ιk+ι1]−ϕ) = arg max
a∈[0,1]
a(wE(2ι1, c, 1)−ϕ) = {1} 3 αE(ι1, c).
2. when αE(2ι1, c) = 0, E[wE(M ′, c, 1)|M = ιk + ι1] = wE(ι1, c, 1). So αE(ι1, c) =
I[wE(ι1, c, 1) > ϕ] satisfies (5.14).
So, we conclude that (αS, αE) forms a natural Markov-perfect equilibrium and
wE, wS are the associated payoffs.
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Prove uniqueness. We prove the uniqueness of natural Markov-perfect equi-
librium following the order of Procedure 1, starting from k11 = kˇ. First, ob-
serve that in a symmetric equilibrium, if vS(2ιkˇ, c, kˇ) ≤ 0, then vE(2ιkˇ, c, kˇ) = 0.
Then, if vS(2ιkˇ, c, kˇ) > 0, Lemma 1 ensures that in any equilibrium, vS(ιkˇ, c, kˇ) ≥
vE(2ιkˇ, c, kˇ) > 0 for any n < mˇ. This means that continuation dominates any other
action when vS(2ιkˇ, c, kˇ) > 0. Therefore, any equilibrium post-entry payoff must be
a fixed point of Tkˇ,kˇ in Algorithm 1, vE(2ιkˇ, ·, kˇ) = wE(2ιkˇ + ιk, ·, k). Consequently,
for any k < kˇ, wE(ιkˇ + ιk, ·, k) is determined as the unique natural Markov-perfect
equilibrium payoff. Note that the optimal strategy sets for type-k firm are singletons.
Therefore, αS(ιkˇ + ιk, ·, k) and αE(ιkˇ + ι1, ·) is the unique natural Markov-perfect
equilibrium strategy, which guarantees that wE(ιkˇ + ιk, ·, kˇ) is the unique post-entry
equilibrium payoff. The uniqueness of wS(ιkˇ+ιk, ·, kˇ) readily follows and the unique-
ness of aS(2ιkˇ, ·, kˇ) is ensured by equation (2.16).
In the i-th steps in Procedure 1, suppose the pair of types considered is (h, l) =
(k1, k2). When k
1 = k2, Lemma 1 and equilibrium symmetry again ensure that
any equilibrium post-entry payoff vE(2ιk1 , ·, k1) must be a fixed point of Tk1,k1 .
Hence, vE(2ιk1 , ·, k1) = wE(2ιk1 , ·, k1) is the unique natural Markov-perfect equi-
librium payoff. Then, for any k2 < k1, since Tk1,k2 does not depend on any strategy,
wE(ιk1 + ιk2 , ·, k2) is determined as the unique post-entry equilibrium payoff and
αS(ιk1 + ιk2 , ·, k2), αE(ιk1 + ι1, ·) as the unique natural Markov-perfect equilibrium
strategy that is consistent with payoff-maximization. Because Tk1 only depends on
natural Markov-perfect equilibrium strategy that has been verified to be unique,
wE(ιk1 + ιk2 , ·, k1) is then uniquely determined as the post-entry equilibrium payoff.
The uniqueness of wS(ιk1 +ιk2 , ·, k1) and wS(ιk1 +ιk2 , ·, k2) are then straightforwardly
verified. Equation (2.16) ensures the uniqueness of aS(2ιk1 , ·, k1).
5.1.1.2 Proofs for Section 2.4
To prove Propositions 2 and 3, we prove a useful lemma first.
Lemma 4. Algorithm 2 always delivers some (αS, αE) as outcome. Furthermore,
(αE, αS) forms a natural Markov-perfect equilibrium, with payoffs wE and wS.
Proof. We follow four steps to prove this lemma. We first show that Algorithm 2
computes wE, wS, αS, and αE for all (m, c, k). Second, we prove that Algorithm 2
always delivers some well-defined (αS, αE) as outcome. This is a nontrivial step.
Because we need to show that wE as the fixed point of T always exist, and αS is
well defined when Procedure 3 assigns p from equation (2.18) to it.
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After proving the first part of the lemma, we verify in the third step of the proof
that αS satisfies the requirement in Definition 1. Eventually, we prove that in each
step of Algorithm 2, wE is constructed as an equilibrium post-entry value, and the
corresponding wS gives the equilibrium post-survival payoff. Along the way, we also
show that (αS, αE) is an natural equilibrium strategy.
First, note that the set of all indexing market structures is M ≡ {m ∈ Zkˇ; 1 ≤
|m| ≤ mˇ}, which is also the set of all payoff-relevant market structures. Consider
any (m, k) pair such that m ∈ M and mk > 0, wE(m, ·, k) and wS(m, ·, k) are
computed in the step with indexing market structure (0, . . . , 0,mk,mk+1, . . . ,mkˇ).
For any (m, k) pair such that m ∈ M, αS(m, ·, k) is computed in the step with
indexing market structure (0, . . . , 0, 1,mk+1, . . . ,mkˇ). For any m such that m ∈ M
and m1 > 0, αE(m, k) is computed in the step with indexing market structure m.
Therefore, wE, wS, αS, αE for all payoff-relevant (m, c, k) are computed in Algorithm
2.
Second, because all αS, αE, wE, wS required to compute the fixed point of T in
each step have been either initialized or determined in previous steps, T is always
a well-defined contraction mapping with a unique fixed point. Then, wE is always
uniquely determined, as well as wS and αE. It remains to show that αS is also always
well-defined, in particular when it is determined from equation (2.18). Note that for
any (m, c, k) such that k = k(m) ≡ min{j;mj > 0}, when computing wE(m, c, k)
using T , we always use the initialized value αS(m, c, k
+) = 1 for all k+ ≥ k, which
leads to the condition that
wE(m, c, k) = max{0, wS(m, c, k)}.
This implies that when wE(m, c, k) = 0, wS(m, c, k) ≤ 0. Recall that tn Procedure
3, when determining p using equation (2.18) in step i, it is indeed the case that
wE(m, c, k
i) = 0 and wS(m, c, k
i) ≤ 0. Then, (i) if wS(mi, c, ki) = wS(m − (mki −
1)ιki , c, k
i) > 0, then the right hand side of equation (2.18) changes continuously
from wS(m − (mki − 1)ιki , c, ki) > 0 to wS(m, c, k) ≤ 0 when p changes from 0 to
1. This means that there exists at least one p ∈ [0, 1) to satisfy equation (2.18);
(ii) if wS(m
i, c, ki) ≤ 0, 0 can be assigned if no p is found to satisfy equation (2.18).
Therefore, we conclude that αS is always well-defined (although it can take multiple
values if multiple p solve equation (2.18)).
Next, we show that αS satisfies the requirement in Definition 1 by proving
wE(m, c, k
1) ≥ wE(m, c, k2) for all m, c and k1 ≥ k2. To this end, for any computed
wE, define a functional space G
N containing all functions gE : M × [cˆ, cˇ] × K →
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[
0,
βpi(ιkˇ,cˇ,kˇ)
1−β
]
such that gE ≤ wE, and gE(m, c, k1) ≥ gE(m, c, k2) for all (m, c) and
k1 = k2 + 1, with equality holds only when gE(m, c, k
1) = gE(m, c, k
2) = 0. We aim
to prove T : GN → GN .
Let gS denote the analogous post-exit value computed by equation (2.2) using gE.
Under Assumptions 1, for all gE ∈ GN , gS(m, c, k1) > gS(m, c, k2) for all m, c and
k1 = k2 + 1. Consider the following cases when (TgE)(m, c, k
1) is being computed
in Algorithm 2, noting that by the OLS ordering of the algorithm, at this moment,
αS(m, c, k
1) remains at its initial value 1 and αS(m, c, k
2) has been determined in
previous computation by Procedure 3.
1. If αS(m, c, k
2) = 1, since both type-k1, k2 firms survive with probability one,
they expect same post-exit market structure, denoted by MS.
(TgE)(m, c, k
1) =E
[
gS(MS, c, k
1) ME = m
]
>E
[
gS(MS, c, k
2) ME = m
]
=(TgE)(m, c, k
2).
2. If 0 < αS(m, c, k
2) < 1, then αS(m, c, k
2) = p with p ∈ [0, 1) solving
mk2−1∑
j=0
pmk2−1−j(1− p)j
(
mk2 − 1
j
)
gS(m− jιk2 −
k2−1∑
i=1
miιi, c, k
2) = 0.
The right hand side is nothing but (TgE)(m, c, k
2). Therefore, (TgE)(m, c, k
2) =
0. Since gS ∈ GN , we have
(TgE)(m, c, k
1)
= max
0,
mk2−1∑
j=0
pmk2−1−j(1− p)j
(
mk2 − 1
j
)
gS(m− jιk2 −
k2−1∑
i=1
miιi, c, k
1)

> 0.
3. If αS(m, c, k
2) = 0, then gE(m, c, k
2) ≤ wE(m, c, k2) = 0 for gE ∈ GN .
Since wE(m, c, k
2) = (T∞gE)(m, c, k2) and T is a monotone operator, 0 =
wE(m, c, k
2) ≥ (TgE)(m, c, k2) for all gE ∈ GN . Thus, (TgE)(m, c, k1) ≥ 0 ≥
(TgE)(m, c, k
2).
By point-wise comparison, we conclude that T : GN → GN , hence wE(m, c, k1) ≥
wE(m, c, k
2) for allm, c and k1 = k2+1. The proof also verifies that (TgE)(m, c, k
1) >
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0 whenever αS(m, c, k
2) > 0. Since T is a monotone operator, it means that
wE(m, c, k
1) = (T∞gE)(m, c, k1) > 0. Given that in Algorithm 2 αS is set to be
1 if and only if wE(m, c, k
1) > 0, αS(m, c, k
1) = 1 whenever αS(m, c, k
2) > 0. So αS
satisfies the requirement in Definition 1.
Finally, we prove that (αS, αE) forms an Markov-perfect equilibrium. To this
end, we first show that wE constructed by Algorithm 2 is the post-entry payoff
under strategy (αS, αE). Then, we show that given wE as payoff, (αS, αE) satisfies
one-shot deviation proofness.
We begin with showing that wE is the post-entry payoff under (αS, αE) in the
first step of Algorithm 2, where m1 = mˇιkˇ. In this step, H1S = {(m1, c, kˇ)|c ∈ [cˆ, cˇ]}.
When computing wE(H
1
S), we use αS(H
1
S) = 1 for all H
S
1 , αE(·) = 0, and wE(·) = 0.
According to equation (2.1), if wE is the post-entry payoff under strategy (αS, αE),
then it satisfies
wE(H
1
S) = αS(H
1
S)E
[
wS(MS, c, kˇ) ME = m
1, C = c,K = kˇ
]
.
The construction of αS in Procedure 3 implies that αS(m
1, c, kˇ) = 1 if and only
if wE(m
1, c, kˇ) > 0, and αS(m
1, c, kˇ) < 1 if and only if wE(m
1, c, kˇ) = 0. Also, note
that E
[
wS(MS, c, kˇ) ME = m
1, C = c,K = kˇ
]
= wS(m
1, c, kˇ) if αS(m
1, c, kˇ) = 1.
Then, the above condition for wE(H
1
S) under the constructed αS is equivalent to
wE(H
1
S) = max{0, I(wE(H1S) > 0)wS(H1S)} = max{0, wS(H1S)}.
By setting αS(H
1
S) = 1, the right hand side of T is identical to this condition. There-
fore, setting αS(H
1
S) = 1 is computationally equivalent to using αS(H
1
S) determined
by Procedure 3, i.e., both give the same wE(H
1
S). Also, under αE(·) = 0, no firm
will further enter. This means that wE(H
1
S) computed as the fixed point of T is the
post-entry payoff under strategy (αS, αE).
Consequently, for all c, wS(m
1, c, kˇ) computed by equation (2.2) using wE(m
1, ·, kˇ)
is the post-survival payoff under strategy (αS, αE).
Then suppose that the 1, . . . , i − 1-step of Algorithm 2 have computed the
wE(m, c, k) and wS(m, c, k) for all (m, k) ∈
⋃j=i−1
j=1 Mmj × {k(mj)} and all c as
the payoffs under (αS, αE). Then, Procedure 3 in the first i − 1-step computes the
following part of (αS, αE) for all c,
• αS(m, c, k) for all (m, k) ∈ {(m, k); (m, k) ∈
⋃j=i−1
j=1 Mmj×{k(mj)},m−nιki 6=
mi,∀n ∈ N}.
• αE(m, c) for all m ∈ {m;m ∈
⋃j=i−1
j=1 Mmj with k(mj) = 1}.
145
5. APPENDIX
Recall that k(m) ≡ min{j;mj > 0}. Now, in the i-th step of the algorithm, H iS ∈
{(m, c, k);m ∈Mmi , c ∈ [cˆ, cˇ] , k = ki}. To make sure that wE(H iS) and wS(H iS) take
their values under (αS, αE), we need to use in the construction of T the strategy
αS(m, ·, k) for all m ∈Mmi and k such that mk > 0, αE(n′+ jι1, ·) for all j ∈ N and
all possible n′, and wE(H
i,′
S ) for (m
′, k′) such that m′ /∈Mmi and k′ 6= ki, conditional
on type-ki firms having positive payoff.
We check if the required values are in place.
1. From the argument for step-1 computation, the initialized value αS(m, c, k
i) =
1 leads to the same condition for wE(m, c, k
i) as the αS(m, c, k
i) computed by
Procedure 3. So, although αS(m, c, k
i) has not been obtained, we can set it to
1.
2. For any (m, k+) such thatm ∈Mmi and k+ > ki, as we have shown, αS(m, c, k+) =
1 conditional wE(m, c, k
i) > 0, which is the same as the initialized value. For
any (m, k−) such that m ∈ Mmi and k− < ki, note that m 6= mi because
mik− = 0. By the definition of Mmi , for all m ∈ Mmi\{mi}, m  mi (so
there is some j < i-step such that its indexing market structure mj = m)
and m − bιik 6= mi,∀b ∈ N. Therefore, αS(m, c, k−) for all k− < ki have been
computed.
3. Since according to αS, all firms with type equal or better than k
i survive,
which, together with non-regressive type evolution, implies that n′  mi and
n′ + bι1  mi for all n′ and all b ∈ N. Therefore, for |n′ + bι1| ≤ mˇ, there is
some j < i-th step with indexing market structure mj = n′ + bι1. So, these
αE(n
′+ bι1)’s values have been computed in the j-th step by Procedure 3. For
any n′ such that |n′ + ι1| > mˇ, we use the initialized value αE(n′ + ι1) = 0.
4. Based on the above argument, for any (m′, k′) following the transition gov-
erned by (αS, αE), m
′  mi and k′ ≥ ki. If m′ /∈ Mmi and k′ 6= ki, define
m′(k′) = (0, . . . , 0,m′k′ , . . . ,m
′
kˇ
), the market structure which has exactly the
same number of type-k′ or better firms as m′ does, but no type-k′ − 1 or
worse firm. Then, m′(k′)  mi, which means that there is some j < i-th step
such that its indexing market structure mj = (0, . . . , 0,m′k′ , . . . ,m
′
kˇ
). Since
m′ ∈ Mmj , wE(m′, ·, k′) is then computed in the j-th step. So, all necessary
wE’s values have been computed.
Since all the required values of wE, αS, αE have been obtained in earlier steps,
wE(H
i
S) is computed as the payoff under (αS, αE), so as wS(H
i
S).
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Then, we verify that (αS, αE) is an equilibrium strategy corresponding to wE, wS.
To this end, we show that αS(m, c, k) satisfies (2.4) for all (m, c, k), if all other firms
follow αS as well. For any (m, c, k), consider the following cases
1. If wE(m, c, k) > 0, the algorithm sets αS(m, c, k) = 1. The right-hand-side of
(2.4) is
arg max
a∈[0,1]
awE(m, c, k) = {1} 3 αS(m, c, k).
2. If wE(m, c, k) = 0, then the algorithm sets αS ∈ [0, 1). Since any αS computed
by Algorithm 2 satisfies the requirement in Definition 1, it is implied that
αS(m, c, k
−) = 0 for all k− < k. Hence, wE(m, c, k) = wE(m−
∑k−1
i=1 miιi, c, k) =
max{0, wS(m−
∑k−1
i=1 miιi, c, k)} and wS(m−
∑k−1
i=1 miιi, c, k) ≤ 0. We look at
three subcases,
(a) If wS(m−(mk−1)ιk−
∑k−1
i=1 miιi, c, k) > 0, the algorithm sets αS(m, c, k) =
p ∈ [0, 1) to satisfy
mk−1∑
j=0
pmk−1−j(1− p)j
(
mk − 1
j
)
wS(m− jιk −
k−1∑
i=1
miιi, c, k) = 0,
The right-hand side of (2.4)
arg max
a∈[0,1]
a
mk−1∑
j=0
pmk−1−j(1− p)j
(
mk − 1
j
)
wS(m− jιk −
k−1∑
i=1
miιi, c, k)
=[0, 1] 3 αS(m, c, k).
(b) If wS(m− (mk−1)ιk−
∑k−1
i=1 miιi, c, k) > 0 and αS(m, c, k) ∈ [0, 1) solves
the same polynomial as above, same result holds for αS(m, c, k).
(c) If wS(m−(mk−1)ιk−
∑k−1
i=1 miιi, c, k) ≤ 0 and αS(m, c, k) = 0. All other
type-k firms will exit from the market, so the right-hand-side of (2.4) is
arg max
a∈[0,1]
awS(m− (mk − 1)ιk −
k−1∑
i=1
miιi, c, k) = {0} 3 αS(m, c, k).
For any (m, c, k) such that mk = 1, consider the following cases
1. If wE(m, c, k) > 0, then the algorithm sets αS(m, c, k) = 1. The right-hand
side of (2.4) is arg maxa∈[0,1] awS(m, c, k) = {1} 3 αS(m, c, k).
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2. If wE(m, c, k) = 0, then αS can not be 1. From the same argument as above,
wE(m, c, k) = wE(m−
∑k−1
i=1 miιi, c, k) = max{0, wS(m−
∑k−1
i=1 miιi, c, k)}. So
wS(m−
∑k−1
i=1 miιi, c, k) ≤ 0 and the right-hand side of (2.4) is arg maxa∈[0,1] awS(m−∑k−1
i=1 miιi, c, k) = {0} 3 αS(m, c, k).
Therefore, αS satisfies (2.4). To show that αE satisfies (2.3), first note that
αE(m, c) is determined in the step with indexing market structure m, while wE(m+
bι1, c, 1) is computed in step with indexing market structurem+bι1, which is (weakly)
lexicographically superior than m. Therefore, wE(m+ bι1, c, 1) has been determined
as a post-entry payoff under αS. Then, if all potential entrants are using αE, ac-
cording to (2.1), post-entry payoff is wE(m+Jι1, c, 1) where J is the largest possible
number such that wE(m + Jι1, c, 1) − ϕ > 0. Therefore, αE satisfies (2.3). So,
(αS, αE) is the equilibrium strategy.
This completes the proof of Lemma 4.
With Lemma 4 in hand, we proceed to prove Propositions 2 and 3.
Proof of Proposition 2. To prove this proposition, we again establish a lemma first.
Lemma 5. If vE is the post-entry payoff in a payoff-monotone natural Markov-
perfect equilibrium, it necessarily satisfies that vE(m, c, k) > 0 if and only if
E[vS(MS, c, k)|ME = m] > 0, or
vE(m, c, k) = max{0,E[vS(MS, c, k)|ME = m]},
where the expectation is computed given all equilibrium values aS(m, c, k
−) for all
k− < k, a tentative rule aS(m, c, k) = 1, and aS(m, c, k+) = 1 for all k+ > k.
Proof. In any symmetric equilibrium, vE(m, c, k) > 0 only if all firms with type k
survive. In any natural equilibrium, this also implies that all firms with type k+
survive as well. Therefore, the “only if” part is true.
The “if” part is true because (i) if E[vS(MS, c, k)|ME = m] > 0 and aS(m, c, k−
1) > 0, then it must be the case that in natural equilibrium vE(m, c, k−1) > 0. Also,
according to Definition 1, aS(m, c, k) = 1 and aS(m, c, k
+) = 1. Then, vE(m, c, k) ≥
vE(m, c, k− 1) > 0; (ii) if E[vS(MS, c, k)|ME = m] > 0 and aS(m, c, k− 1) < 0, then
in a natural equilibrium aS(m, c, k
−) = 0 for all k− < k, and E[vS(MS, c, k)|ME =
m] = vS(m −
∑k−1
i=1 miιi, c, k) > 0. Recall that we have shown in the proof of
Proposition 1 that in the duopoly model, Lemma 1 ensures that vE(2ιk, c, k) > 0 if
and only if vS(2ιk, c, k) > 0. Applying an analogous reasoning, we know that in a
payoff-monotone equilibrium, vE(m, c, k) > 0 if vS(m−
∑k−1
i=1 miιi, c, k) > 0.
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Lemma 5 gives a necessary condition for the post-entry payoff in a payoff-
monotone natural Markov-perfect equilibrium. For vE(m
1, c, kˇ), where m1 = mˇιkˇ is
the indexing market structure in the first step of Algorithm 2, this condition can be
written as
vE(m
1, c, kˇ) = max{0, vS(m1, c, kˇ)}.
In the first step of Algorithm 2, wE(m
1, c, kˇ) is uniquely computed by the contraction
mapping generated by the above condition. Thus, it is the only payoff function
satisfying the necessary condition for a payoff-monotone equilibrium. Providing
that such equilibrium exists, its post-entry payoff vE(m
1, c, kˇ) has a unique value
wE(m
1, c, kˇ) for all c. Also, vS(m
1, c, kˇ) = wS(m
1, c, kˇ) for all c.
In any succeeding step i of Algorithm 2, with αS either properly initialized or
computed in the previous steps as its equilibrium value (this is shown in Lemma
4), wE(m, c, k
i) is computed as the unique payoff under (αS, αE) that satisfies such
necessary condition for all c and all m ∈Mmi .
Moreover, the (αS, αE) constructed in Procedure 3 is also the unique equilibrium
strategy given that the wE, wS computed in previous steps are unique equilibrium
payoffs vE, vS. αE’s uniqueness trivially follows its construction. The uniqueness of
αS is due to the monotonicity of (the previously computed part of) wS: When using
(2.18) to compute the mixing probability p, because wS(m − (mki − 1)ιki , c, ki) ≥
wS(m − (mki − 2)ιki , c, ki) ≥ . . . ≥ wS(m, c, ki), the right hand side (2.18) changes
continuously and monotonically from wS(m−(mki−1)ιki , c, ki) > 0 to wS(m, c, ki) ≤
0 when p changes from 0 to 1. Therefore, there is only one p ∈ [0, 1) that satisfies
(2.18). So, αS is single valued.
Therefore, if there exists a payoff-monotone equilibrium, (αS, αE) forms the
unique equilibrium and wE and wS are the unique equilibrium payoffs. The equilib-
rium is subsequently unique.
Proof of Proposition 3. First, note that from the definition of a renegotiation-proof
natural Markov-perfect equilibrium, all firms with a same type survive for sure if and
only if joint continuation gives them positive post-survival payoff. This implies that
(i) any such equilibrium’s post-entry equilibrium payoff must satisfy the condition in
Lemma 5; (ii) if any natural Markov-perfect equilibrium’s post-entry payoff satisfies
the condition in Lemma 5, such equilibrium is renegotiation-proof.
Since we have shown in Lemma 4 that Algorithm 2 always gives some (αS, αE)
to form a natural Markov-perfect equilibrium. We have also shown in the proof
of Proposition 2 that wE satisfies the necessary condition in Lemma 5. Therefore,
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(αS, αE) forms a renegotiation-proof natural Markov-perfect equilibrium.
5.1.2 Proofs for Chapter 3
Proof of Proposition 5. In any Markov-perfect equilibrium, aS necessarily satisfies
aS(x, c, n, w) ∈ arg max
a∈[0,1]
aEW ′,C′ [pi(N ′n(x, c, w), C ′)− κ exp(w)
+ v(N ′n(x, c, w)− n,C ′, n,W ′) C = c,W = w]
(5.15)
in which
N ′n(x, c, w) = n+
Nˇ−n∑
j=1
[I {j ≤ x, (c, w) ∈ Sn+j}+ I {j > x, (c, w) ∈ En+j}] ,
To prove that aS(x, c, n, w) is also determined by Equation (3.3), note that
1. When N ′n(x, c, w) = n, Equation (3.3) coincide with Equation (5.15).
2. When N ′n(x, c, w) > n, it must be the case that either (c, w) ∈ Sn+k or (c, w) ∈
En+k for some k ≥ 1, which implies aS(x−k, c, n+k, w) = 1 or aE(c, n+k, w) =
1. According to the monotonicity in survival/entry strategy in Proposition 4,
the operation of the n + k-ranked firm means that the n-ranked firm is also
active in a LIFO equilibrium, so aS(x, c, n, w) = 1.
In Equation (3.3), when N ′n(x, c, w) > n, because v(x, c, n, w) is weakly de-
creasing in x (Proposition 4) and pi(n, c) is weakly decreasing in n we have
vS(c, n, w)
≥EW ′,C′ [pi(N ′n(x, c, w), C ′) + v(N ′n(x, c, w)− n,C ′, n,W ′) C = c,W = w]
>κ exp(w).
This means that under (3.3), we also get aS(x, c, n, w) = 1.
Therefore, Equation (3.3) always gives the equilibrium strategy aS(x, c, n, w).
Similarly, we can prove that aE determined by (3.4) is the equilibrium entry
strategy.
Proposition 8. Define W to be the space of all functions:
g : Z+ ×
[
Cˆ, Cˇ
]
× Z→
[
0,
βpi(0, Cˇ, v˜min, κ)
1− β
]
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and define the Bellman operator K : W→W with
K(g)(x, c, r) = Pr((W, c) ∈ Jgr)β
(
EC′ [EW [pi (N ′r(x, c,W ), C ′, ζ)− κ exp(W )
+g(N ′r(x, c,W )− r, C ′, r) (W, c) ∈ Jgr , C = c] C = c]
)
where
Jgr ≡
{
(w, c)
(
EC′ [pi (r, C ′) C = c]− κ exp(w)
+EC′ [g(0, C ′, r) C = c]
)
> 0
}
,
Then K is a contraction mapping.
The unique fixed point of this contraction mapping is EW [v(x, c,W, r) C = c].
This is an integrated value function, with its domain in a reduced state space Z+ ×[
Cˆ, Cˇ
]
×Z instead of Z+×
[
Cˆ, Cˇ
]
×R×Z. This simplification significantly reduces
the dimensionality of the problem.
5.1.3 Proofs for Chapter 4
Sketch Proof of Proposition 6. The proof of Proposition 6 requires straightforward
extension to the equilibrium existence proof in Abbring, Campbell, and Yang (2012a).
Therefore, I only review the four key steps here, and refer interested readers to their
paper.
1. Show that Procedure 4 covers νE, νS, and PE for all (m, c, k). The descending
order of (h, l) ensures such completeness.
2. Show that Procedure 4 always produces well-defined νE, νS for all (m, c, k).
This is a nontrivial step. It is achieved by first proving that TL and TH are
contraction mappings in Procedure 4. As discussed in Section 4.5, the de-
scending order of (h, l) ensures it. Then, when equation (5.20) is invoked
to compute the survival rules, it needs to have a root in [0, 1) if the equi-
librium survival rule cannot imply pure exit. Note that the right-hand side
of equation (5.20) collapses to νS(m − (mk − 1)ιk, c, k) − ϕM exp(wM) when
p = 0 and to νS(m, c, k) − ϕM exp(wM) when p = 1. When mixing takes
place, νS(m, c, k) ≤ ϕM exp(wsM); If the survival rule cannot imply pure
exit, the monopoly post-survival payoff overcomes the profitability shock and
νS(m−(mk−1)ιk, c, k) > ϕM exp(wM). Therefore, intermediate value theorem
ensures that at least one root in [0, 1) always exists.
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3. Verify that the choice probabilities are generated by survival rules satisfying
the requirement in Definitions 7 and 8.
4. Verify that νE is constructed as an equilibrium post-entry payoff, and νS an
equilibrium post-survival payoff. The computed PE is consequently verified to
be the choice probabilities under RNMPE, andPE andPE to be the transition
probabilities.
Sketch Proof of Proposition 7. Proposition 7, as well as its proof, is based on the
uniqueness proposition for the payoff-monotone equilibrium in Abbring, Campbell,
and Yang (2012a). I hence avoid reiterating on the details and only give the sketch
here.
The contraction property of the functional operators TL and TH ensures that
if fed with unique choice/transition probability, they always produce unique fixed
points. Consequently, the uniqueness of the RNMPE solely rests on the uniqueness
of the choice/transition probability under each state. It is rather simple to show
that multiplicity of choice probability only arises when stores are mixing between
continuation and exit, and polynomial equation 5.20 admits multiple roots between
0 and 1.
When the monotonicity condition in Corollary 2 is satisfied for some (m, c, k),
the right-hand side of equation (5.20) changes monotonically from νS(m − (mk −
1)ιk, c, k) − ϕM exp(wM) > 0 when p = 0 to νS(m, c, k) − ϕM exp(wM) < 0 when
p = 1. Therefore, the polynomial only have one root between 0 and 1, if mixing
takes place under (m, c, k). If this condition is satisfied for all (m, c, k), the RNMPE
is unique.
5.2 Computational Details
5.2.1 Computational Details for Chapter 2
5.2.1.1 Computing A Firm’s Beliefs about Next Period’s State
The computation of the expectation in (2.1) requires the distribution of MS con-
ditional on ME, given that the firm of interest survives and that all other firms
use the common strategy aS. Denote the density (with respect to the appropri-
ate dominating measure) of this distribution with pmS (·|ME = mE). Decompose
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mS =
∑
im
i
S ≡
∑
imS,iιi and mE =
∑
imE,iιi, with mS,i the number of firms
who have type-i in the current period and continue to next period, and mE,i the
number of firms who are active when the current period’s continuation decisions
are made. Then, because M iS,. . . , M
kˇ
S are independent conditional on ME and
given that the firm of interest survives, pmS (·|ME = mE) is the convolution of the
corresponding conditional densities pmiS (·|ME = mE) of miS; i = 1, . . . , kˇ. Denote
m˜i ≡ mE,i − I(i = k) and m˜S,i ≡ mS,i − I(i = k). Note that m˜i is the number
of type-i firms active when continuation decisions are made in the current period,
excluding the firm of interest; and m˜S,i is the number of firms who have type-i in
the current period and continue to next period, excluding the firm of interest. Then,
for mS,i such that 0 ≤ mS,i ≤ mE,i, we have that
pmiS (·|ME = mE) =
(
m˜i
m˜S,i
)
aS(mE, c, i)
m˜S,i(1− aS(mE, c, i))m˜i−m˜S,i
Computing the expectation in (2.2) requires the distribution of (N ′,M ′, C ′, K ′)
conditional on MS, C,K, given that all potential entrants use the common strat-
egy aE. Denote the density of this distribution with p (·|MS, C,K). Conditional
on (N ′, C ′), M ′ is independent of (K ′,MS, C,K); conditional on (K ′,MS, K), N ′
is independent of C ′; conditional on C, C ′ is independent of (K ′,MS, C,K); and
conditional on K, K ′ is independent of HS. Consequently,
p (n′,m′, c′, k′|MS = mS, C = c,K = k)
= pM (m
′|N ′ = n′, C ′ = c′)× pN (n′|K ′ = k′,MS = mS, K = k)× q(c′|C = c)× Πk′k.
Here, pM (·|N ′, C ′) is the density of next period’s post-entry market structure M ′,
conditional on next period’s pre-entry market structure N ′ and demand state C ′.
And, pN (·|K ′,MS, K) is the density of next period’s pre-entry market structure N ′
conditional on MS, given that the firm of interest survives with productivity type
K ′.
First, note that
pM (m
′|N ′ = n′, C ′ = c′) =

1− aE (m′ + ι1, c′) if M ′ = n′;
(1− aE(m′ + (m′1 − n′1 + 1)ι1, c′)) if m′1 > n′1
×∏m′1−n′1j=1 aE(n′ + jι1, c′), and m′2 = n′2, . . . ,m′kˇ = n′kˇ;
0 otherwise.
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Next, consider pN (·|K ′,MS, K). Decompose n′ =
∑
i n
i, with ni the contribution
to next period’s pre-entry market structure by the mS,i firms who are of type-i in the
previous period and choose to continue. Then, because N1,. . . , N kˇ are independent
conditional on MS and given that the firm of interest survives with productivity type
K ′, pN (·|K ′,MS, K) is the convolution of the corresponding conditional densities
pN i (·|K ′,MS, K) of N i; i = 1, . . . , kˇ. Denote n˜i(k, k′) ≡ ni − I(i = k)ιk′ . This is
the contribution of the mS,i firms excluding the firm of interest, to next period’s
pre-entry market structure. Then, for mS such that m˜S,i ≥ 0, we have that
pN i
(
nk|K ′ = k′,MS = mS, K = k
)
=
kˇ∏
i′=i
(∑kˇ
m=i′ n˜
i
m(k, k
′)
N˜ ii′(k, k
′)
)
Π
n˜i
i′ (k,k
′)
i′i
if N˜ im = 0 for all m < i, n˜
i
m ≥ 0 for all m ≥ i, and
∑
i′ n˜
i
i′ ≤ m˜i; and zero otherwise.
5.2.1.2 Constructing the Type Transition Matrices in Matlab
The Problem Given any finite mˇ and kˇ and a kˇ × kˇ transition matrix Π, or the
triple (kˇ, mˇ,Π), we need to compute all the transition matrices for 1, 2, . . . , mˇ-firm
market structures, conditioning on all realized exits and one surviving firm’s type
transition. Since any single firm’s type transition is characterized by Π, the non-
trivial part of this problem is computing all the transition matrices for 1, 2, . . . , mˇ−1-
firm market structures. W.L.O.G., we discuss how to construct mˇ such matrices for
the triple (kˇ, mˇ+ 1,Π). For every ordering of all possible market structures with m
firms, m ∈ {1, . . . , mˇ}, there is a representation of transition matrix corresponding
to that ordering. We henceforth focus on the transition matrices for OL-ordered
market structures. For any m, we denote the transition matrix as Πm.
The Dimensionality For the triple (kˇ, mˇ+1,Π), we know that if there are m sur-
viving firms, the OL-ordered sequence of all possible market structures has (m+kˇ−1)!
m!(kˇ−1)!
elements. Therefore, Πm’s dimension is (m+kˇ−1)!
m!(kˇ−1)! ×
(m+kˇ−1)!
m!(kˇ−1)! .
Recursive Construction of Πm We recursively construct Πm using Πm−1 and
Π1, for all 2 ≤ i ≤ mˇ. Note that Π1 = Π. To describe the construction, we very
often use examples. We use Italic to distinguish the discussion on general case and
the discussion on an example.
The link between an element in Πm and the elements in Πm−1 and Π1 is explained
below.
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1. The (a, b) element in Πm corresponds to a transition probability from an initial
m-firm market which has index a in the m-firm OL sequence to a destined m-
firm market with index b.
2. Suppose that i is the index for the highest type in the initial market a. Taking
out one type-i firm from the a leaves an initial m − 1-firm market structure.
Suppose that this market structure has index c in the m−1-firm OL sequence.
3. Next, suppose that the type-i firm transits to one of the possible types j in
the destined market b. This transition has probability Πi,j.
1
4. Excluding this type-j firm from the destined market leaves a destined m− 1-
firm market. Suppose that this market has index d in the m − 1-firm OL
sequence.
5. The transition between the initial and the destined m − 1-firm markets is
characterized by Πm−1c,d .
6. The transition from the initial m-firm market to the destined one then has the
probability
Πma,b =
∑
j:bj>0
Πi,jΠ
m−1
c,d .
Example Suppose that kˇ = 3, mˇ = 2. In slightly abused notations, we denote the
types as L,M,H. Π2 is a 6× 6 matrix. Now, take its (2, 3) element as an example
to demonstrate the above procedure.
1. This (2, 3) element corresponds to the transition from the market HM to HL.
2. Taking out the firm with the highest type H from the initial market HM leaves
an initial 1-firm market M , which has index 2 in the 1-firm OL sequence.
3. Suppose that the H firm transits to H in the destined market. This transition
has probability Π1,1.
4. Excluding the H firm from the destined market leaves a destined 1-firm market
L, which has index 3 in the 1-firm OL sequence.
1Note that we also consider the impossible regression in the types here and throughout this
notes. So, we consider all j’s including those are lower than i. In such cases, Πi,j = 0.
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5. The transition between the initial and the destined 1-firm market M and L is
characterized by Π12,3.
6. Note that H can also transit to L (with 0 probability), the transition from the
initial market HM to the destined HL then has the probability
Π22,3 = Π1,1Π
1
2,3 + Π1,3Π
1
2,1.
In short-hand notations, we rewrite the equation Πmab =
∑
j:bj>0
ΠijΠ
m−1
cd using
indices only: (a, b) :=
∑
j:bj>0
(i, j)×(c, d), with the understanding that (a, b) always
indexes the element in Πm, (i, j) in Π, and (c, d) in Πm−1. We connect these indices
to the objects that they index.
1. i indexes the highest type in the market a. Therefore, for each given a, i is
unique. This implies that in each row of Πm, all entries share the same i.
2. All j’s indicate all possible types in market b. Therefore, in each column of
Πm, all entries share the same j’s. For any (a, b) entry, there are at most kˇ
possible values of j.
3. c indexes the m − 1 market structure resulted by subtracting a type-i firm
from the market a. Therefore, for each (a, b), c is unique and in each row of
Πm, all entries share the same c.
4. All d’s index all possible m − 1 market structures resulted by subtracting a
type-j firm from the market b. Therefore, in each column of Πm, all entries
share the same d’s. For any (a, b) entry, there are at most kˇ possible values of
d.
Henceforth, we call i the first index, all j’s the second indices, c the third, and d’s
the fourth. One may have already developed some intuition that there are regularity
patterns in these indices, which can be used to vectorize the calculation of Πm. Next,
we make the regularity pattern visible to intellectual eyes by an example.
Example As an example, we write Π2 for kˇ = 3, mˇ = 2 using the indices
representation. Again, bear in mind that the first two indices index the element in
Π while the last two index the element in Π1.
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H
H
H
M
H
L
M
M
M
L
L
L
H
H
(1
,1
)
×
(1
,1
)
(1
,1
)
×
(1
,2
)
(1
,1
)
×
(1
,3
)
+
(1
,2
)
×
(1
,1
)
(1
,2
)
×
(1
,2
)
(1
,2
)
×
(1
,3
)
+
(1
,3
)
×
(1
,1
)
+
(1
,3
)
×
(1
,2
)
(1
,3
)
×
(1
,3
)
H
M
(1
,1
)
×
(2
,1
)
(1
,1
)
×
(2
,2
)
(1
,1
)
×
(2
,3
)
+
(1
,2
)
×
(2
,1
)
(1
,2
)
×
(2
,2
)
(1
,2
)
×
(2
,3
)
+
(1
,3
)
×
(2
,1
)
+
(1
,3
)
×
(2
,2
)
(1
,3
)
×
(2
,3
)
H
L
(1
,1
)
×
(3
,1
)
(1
,1
)
×
(3
,2
)
(1
,1
)
×
(3
,3
)
+
(1
,2
)
×
(3
,1
)
(1
,2
)
×
(3
,2
)
(1
,2
)
×
(3
,3
)
+
(1
,3
)
×
(3
,1
)
+
(1
,3
)
×
(3
,2
)
(1
,3
)
×
(3
,3
)
M
M
(2
,1
)
×
(2
,1
)
(2
,1
)
×
(2
,2
)
(2
,1
)
×
(2
,3
)
+
(2
,2
)
×
(2
,1
)
(2
,2
)
×
(2
,2
)
(2
,2
)
×
(2
,3
)
+
(2
,3
)
×
(2
,1
)
+
(2
,3
)
×
(2
,2
)
(2
,3
)
×
(2
,3
)
M
L
(2
,1
)
×
(3
,1
)
(2
,1
)
×
(3
,2
)
(2
,1
)
×
(3
,3
)
+
(2
,2
)
×
(3
,1
)
(2
,2
)
×
(3
,2
)
(2
,2
)
×
(3
,3
)
+
(2
,3
)
×
(3
,1
)
+
(2
,3
)
×
(3
,2
)
(2
,3
)
×
(3
,3
)
L
L
(3
,1
)
×
(3
,1
)
(3
,1
)
×
(3
,2
)
(3
,1
)
×
(3
,3
)
+
(3
,2
)
×
(3
,1
)
(3
,2
)
×
(3
,2
)
(3
,2
)
×
(3
,3
)
+
(3
,3
)
×
(3
,1
)
+
(3
,3
)
×
(3
,2
)
(3
,3
)
×
(3
,3
)
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To illustrate the regularity in the above matrix, the first trick is to introduce an
auxiliary ”impossible destined market structure”, which possesses index (m+kˇ−1)!
m!(kˇ−1)! +1
in the OL sequence of m-firm market structures. Its impossibility means that no
m-firm market structure can transit to it. For instance, when m = 1, this market
structure has index 4. To accommodate such impossible destined market structure,
we can expand Π1 by a fourth column of zeros, so Π1i,4 = 0, i = 1, 2, 3.
Then, we can rewrite the above matrix as
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H
H
H
M
H
L
M
M
M
L
L
L
H
H
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+
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L
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The second trick towards detecting the regularity is to partition the matrix into
kˇ row-blocks. In each row-block, all rows correspond to initial market structures
that share the same highest type. In the above matrix, row 1-3 correspond to initial
market structures whose highest type is H, row 4-5 M , and row 6 L. Because of OL,
the index of the row-block is also the index for the highest type. So, in the above
matrix, the first block connects to type 1, the second block to type 2, and the third
block to type 3.
The first row-block of any Πm matrix contains all initial market structures that
has one type-kˇ firm and m − 1 other firms with any type. There are (m−1+kˇ−1)!
(m−1)!(kˇ−1)!
such market structures. So the length of the first block is just (m−1+kˇ−1)!
(m−1)!(kˇ−1)! . The
second block contains all initial market structures that has one type-kˇ − 1 firm and
m− 1 other firms with type no better than kˇ− 1. There are (m−1+kˇ−2)!
(m−1)!(kˇ−2)! such market
structures. So is the length of the second block. In total, there are kˇ such blocks.
The t-th block has the length (m−1+kˇ−t)!
(m−1)!(kˇ−t)! .
Now each entry of the matrix has four columns of indices. All columns have the
same length kˇ (3 in this example). Next, we present the regularity on these columns.
1. Recall that the first index represents the highest type in the initial market
structure. Also recall that in each row-block, all initial market structures
share the same highest type. Therefore, the column of first indices in each
entry has a single value, which is simply the index of the row-block that this
entry is in. Therefore, it remains unchanged for every row in a same block.
2. Recall that the second indices represent all the possible types in the destined
market structure. After the introduction of the impossible market structure,
the column of the second indices in each entry is simply (1, . . . , kˇ).
3. Recall that the third index represents the m− 1 market structure resulted by
subtracting a highest type firm from the initial market structure. Therefore,
the column of the third indices has a single value and remains unchanged
for every entry in a same row. In each row, this value equals the index of
the m − 1 market structure resulted by subtracting a highest type from the
initial market structure. In the current example, in row 1, the 1-firm market
structure resulted by subtracting H from HH is H, which has index number 1
in 1-firm OL sequence. So, in the first row, the third index is 1. In row 2, the
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1-firm market structure resulted by subtracting H from HM is M . So, in the
first row, the third index is 2. Observing the following facts
(a) Within each block, this index increases by 1 each row.
(b) The last row in each block corresponds to the most inferior market struc-
ture in the OL sense. Hence, this index in the last row of each block
must equal to the length of the OL sequence of the m − 1-firm market
structures. In the current example, the length is 3, which is the value of
the third index in row 3, 5, 6.
(c) The t-th block has the length (m−1+kˇ−t)!
(m−1)!(kˇ−t)! .
We can conclude that in the t-th row-block, the third index grows from (m−1+kˇ−1)!
(m−1)!(kˇ−1)!−
(m−1+kˇ−t)!
(m−1)!(kˇ−t)! + 1 to
(m−1+kˇ−1)!
(m−1)!(kˇ−1)! row by row.
4. Recall that the fourth indices represents the m−1 market structure resulted by
subtracting a highest type firm from the destined market structure. Therefore,
the column of the fourth indices remains unchanged for every entry in a same
column. The regularity pattern of this column is more subtle than any of the
above columns. We further explore it. We write down this column in the above
example
HH HM HL MM ML LL
1 2 3 4 4 4
4 1 4 2 3 4
4 4 1 4 2 3
This matrix of the fourth indices can be engineered from the following 0-1
matrix.
HH HM HL MM ML LL
1 1 1 0 0 0
0 1 0 1 0 0
0 0 1 0 1 1
We can transform the 1’s in each row of the above matrix into the ordinals of
1’s (the first 1 stays 1, the second 1 is transformed to 2, the third to 3) and the
0’s into 4 to go back to the matrix of the fourth indices. This transformation
is unique and can always be done for any matrix of the fourth indices. Hence
we focus on constructing the later matrix, which we simply call the indexing
matrix.
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Since the fourth indices are related to the destined market structures, we
construct the indexing matrix by exploring Πm from its column dimension.
Now, we introduce the third trick. We partition the Πm matrix into kˇ column-
blocks. Analogously to the row-blocks, in each column-block, all columns
correspond to destined market structures that share the same highest type.
In the example matrix, column 1-3 correspond to destined market structures
whose highest type is H, column 4-5 M , and column 6 L. Again, the index of
the column-block is also the index for the highest type. So, in the above matrix,
the first block connects to type 1, the second block to type 2, and the third block
to type 3. Observing the following facts
(a) The indexing matrix for m = 1 is a kˇ × kˇ identity matrix.
(b) The indexing matrix has kˇ rows. Its (e, f) element indicates if the destined
market structure f has a type-e firm. If it does, then the (e, f) element
of the indexing matrix is 1. Otherwise it is 0. In the above example, the
(1, 1) element of the indexing matrix is 1, because the market structure
HH contains a type-H firm. The (2, 1) element is 0, because the market
structure HH does not contain a type-M firm.
(c) The indexing matrix can also be partitioned into kˇ column-blocks.
(d) In its t-th column-block, since the highest type in the destined market
structure is t, the first t− 1 rows of the indexing matrix in this block are
all 0’s and the t-th row is full of 1’s. In the above example, the first row
is full of 1’s in block 1 and full of 0’s in block 2.
(e) In its t-th column-block, since them−1-firm market structures resulted by
subtracting the highest type firm from the destined market structure are
the (m−1+kˇ−1)!
(m−1)!(kˇ−1)! −
(m−1+kˇ−t)!
(m−1)!(kˇ−t)! + 1 to
(m−1+kˇ−1)!
(m−1)!(kˇ−1)! destined market structures
in Πm−1, from the t + 1-th row onward, the indexing matrix is identical
to the (m−1+kˇ−1)!
(m−1)!(kˇ−1)! −
(m−1+kˇ−t)!
(m−1)!(kˇ−t)! + 1 to
(m−1+kˇ−1)!
(m−1)!(kˇ−1)! columns of the indexing
matrix corresponding to m− 1. In column-block 1 in the above example,
the 1-firm market structures are H,M , and L, which are the 1,2, and 3
destined market structures of Π1. Hence, from the second row onwards in
block 1, the indexing matrix is identical to the 1,2, and 3 columns of the
indexing matrix for m = 1, which is a 3× 3 identity matrix. In column-
block 2 in the above example, the 1-firm market structures are M and L,
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which are the 2, and 3 destined market structures of Π1. Hence, the third
row in block 2 of the indexing matrix is identical to the third row and the
2 and 3 columns of the indexing matrix for m = 1.
With all the regularity patterns pointed out as above, we create a Matlab function
to generate all the transition matrices.
The typetransition.m Function The matlab function typetransition.m takes
the triple (kˇ, mˇ,Π) as input, and produces a (mˇ+kˇ−1)!
mˇ!(kˇ−1)! × (
(mˇ+kˇ−1)!
mˇ!(kˇ−1)! + 1) × mˇ array,
in which each page contains a transition matrix and the page number m indicates
the number of firms. On each page, the first (m+kˇ−1)!
m!(kˇ−1)! rows and the first
(m+kˇ−1)!
m!(kˇ−1)!
columns form the transition matrix for the m-firm market.
This function has several layers of loops. The most outside loop runs from m = 2
to m = mˇ. Within this loop, for each given m, the indexing matrix is first created
and than transformed to the matrix of the fourth indices. Then, we use the above
mentioned regularity patterns to construct the other three columns of indices and
compute the transition matrix Πm row-by-row.
Last, a few words on the computational speed. When kˇ = mˇ = 7, the transition
matrix is computed within 3 seconds. When kˇ = mˇ = 8, around 60 seconds. When
kˇ = mˇ = 9, a normal PC runs out of memory.
5.2.1.3 Computing All Renegotiation-proof Natural Markov-Perfect Equi-
libria
In this appendix, we first show that when C is discrete, we can compute all renegotiation-
proof natural Markov-perfect equilibria. Then, we discuss how to modify Algorithm
2 to compute all such equilibria.
The multiplicity of renegotiation-proof equilibria comes from the multiple mixing
probabilities that can solve (2.18). Therefore, to compute any single equilibrium
using Algorithm 2, we always need to select the probability corresponding to this
equilibrium. To this end, we introduce a flexible selection mechanism which enables
us to do so.
A selection rule of such mechanism is summarized by Γ : Zkˇ? × [cˆ, cˇ] × K →
{1, . . . , mˇ}. It works as follows. Suppose that a renegotiation-proof Markov-perfect
equilibrium exists, and aS(m, c, k), as a mixing probability, can take σ(m, c, k) val-
ues. Sort all these possible values in a (weakly) descending sequence. Then, we use Γ
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to uniquely pin down aS(m, c, k) by setting aS(m, c, k) = min{σ(m, c, k),Γ(m, c, k)}-
th possible value in this sequence. To give an example of Γ, if for any (m, c, k),
Γ(m, c, k) = 1. Then, we always pick the first one in the sequence or the largest
probability as the survival rule. With a pre-specified Γ, we can modify Procedure 3
to include this mechanism and compute a renegotiation-proof Markov-perfect equi-
librium.
Because the number of possible mixing probabilities is bounded by the number
of roots of the polynomial in equation (2.18), which is in turn bounded by the
polynomial’s order. In the general model, the highest order of any polynomial in
equation (2.18) is mˇ. Thus, from the definition of Γ, it is clear that if C is a discrete
variable, the number of distinct Γ mappings is finite. Therefore, we can compute
all renegotiation-proof natural Markov-perfect equilibria for the general model by
implementing Algorithm 2 repeatedly for all possible Γ’s. Although this procedure
can be completely parallelized, it is still computationally cumbersome for large mˇ, kˇ
and large number of possible realizations of C.
Practically, we can reduce the computational burden by avoiding running the
algorithm for ”redundant” Γ’s. For some (m, c, k) ∈ S such that σ(m, c, k) < mˇ,
suppose that under a selection rule Γ, Γ(m, c, k) = σ(m, c, k). Then any Γ˜ with
Γ˜(m, c, k) > σ(m, c, k) and Γ(n, d, g) = Γ˜(n, d, g), for all (n, d, g) 6= (m, c, k) selects
the same Markov-perfect equilibrium as Γ. Therefore, all such Γ˜ (there are mˇ −
σ(m, c, k) of them) are redundant, provided that we have run the algorithm for
Γ. This suggests that to find all the renegotiation-proof natural equilibria in a
computationally efficient way, we should run the algorithm with no pre-specified
Γ but ”branch” the algorithm once multiplicity arises. To be more specific, after
starting the algorithm, once we reach a (m, c, k) such that σ(m, c, k) > 1, we create
σ(m, c, k) branches with αS(m, c, k) set differently. Different branches then can be
computed in parallel. The same branching exercise is done for each parallel session
when a new state with multiple choices emerges.
5.2.2 Computational Details for Chapter 4
5.2.2.1 Computational Details for the Duopoly Example in Section 4.4.1
In this appendix, I supplement Section 4.4.1 with more details on the five-step
procedure computing the RNMPE.
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mi, ki
Specify c ∈ [cˆ, cˇ] and m ∈ mmi+jιki ,∀0 ≤ j ≤ mˇ − |mi|
mki = 1 ?
αS(m, c, k
i) =
I[w(m, c, ki) > 0]
wE(m, c, k
i)
> 0?
αS(m, c, k
i) = 1
Find all p’s ∈ [0, 1) satisfying,
mki−1∑
j=0
(1− p)mki−1−jpj
(
mki − 1
j
)
wS(m− (mki − 1− j)ιki , c, ki) = 0.
wS(m
i, c, ki)
> 0?
Sort p’s and 0 in
a decreasing array
Sort p’s in a de-
creasing array
σ(m, c, ki)← Length of the array, αS(m, c, k(m))←
the min{σ(m, c, ki),Γ(m, c, ki)}-th element of this array
ki = 1 ?
αE(m, c) = I[w(m +
jι1, c, 1) − ϕ >
0,∀0 ≤ j ≤ mˇ − |m|]
CONTINUE
Yes
No
Yes
No
No Yes
No
Yes
Procedure 3: Calculation of Candidate Entry/Survival Rule for the General Model,
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Step 1: Duopoly Market with Two Type-H Retailers For some distribu-
tions of WM , the expectation over WM in Equation (4.6) has a closed-form ex-
pression. For instance, if WM is assumed to be independent of C and normally
distributed with mean 0 and variance σ2C, then,
vE(2ιH, c,H)
= Pr
(
vS (2ιH, c,H) > ϕM exp(W
′
M)
)
×
(
vS (2ιH, c,H)−
∫ log max{0,vS(2ιH,c,H)}
−∞
ϕM exp(W
′
M)φ(W
′
M)dW
′
M
)
=Φ
(
log max
{
0, vS (2ιH, c,H)
}− logϕM
σM
)
vS (2ιH, c,H)
− exp(σ2M/2)Φ
(
log max
{
0, vS (2ιH, c,H)
}− logϕM − σ2M
σM
)
,
where Φ is the c.d.f. for standard normal distribution. In this expression,
log max
{
0, vS (2ιH, c,H)
}− logϕM is the “ceiling” value of WM to ensure profitable
continuation for a type-H incumbent. The expectation over WM is hence computed
only on the interval (−∞, log max{0, vS (2ιH, c,H)} − logϕM). By using this ex-
pression to compute vE(2ιH, c,H), one can avoid the numerical integration over WM .
This is one of the major consequence and benefit of Assumption 7. In the remain-
ing part of the duopoly example, as well as in the empirical implementation of the
model, I maintain the normality assumption on WM .
Step 2: Duopoly Market with Both Types of Retailers. Next, consider a
type-L retailer who faces a type-H competitor. In a natural Markov-perfect equi-
librium, this retailer’s survival implies the survival of the type-H rival. Following
its survival, a chain store may further enter in next period, and regardless of this
chain store’s realized type, the type-L retailer receives zero continuation value in
next period. Equation (4.1) defines vE(ιL + ιH, C,L) as
vE(ιL + ιH, c,L) =EWM [max{0, βEC [piL(ιL + ιH, C ′)− ϕM exp(W ′M)
+ (1− PE(ιC + ιL|ιL + ιH, C ′))vE(ιL + ιH, C ′,L) C = c]}].
Given the value of PE(ιC+ιL|ιL+ιH, C) for all C, the right-hand side of the equation
defines a contraction mapping. Its unique fixed point determines vE(ιL + ιH, c,L).
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Using Equation (4.2), the associated post-survival payoff vS(ιL + ιH, c,L) can be
quickly computed.
Next, consider a type-L retailer who faces a type-H competitor. In a natural
MPE, this retailer’s survival implies the survival of the type-H rival. Moreover, no
retailer will further enter this market following its survival, given the formidable
sunk cost of entry. Equation (4.1) defines vE(ιL + ιH, C,L) as
vE(ιL + ιH, c,L) = EWM
[
max{0, vS (ιL + ιH, c,L)− ϕM exp(W ′M)}
]
(5.16)
in which vS (ιL + ιH, c,L) = βEC
[
piL(ιL + ιH, C
′) + vE(ιL + ιH, C ′,L) C = c
]
.Again,
the right-hand side of the equation defines a contraction mapping. Its unique fixed
point determines vE(ιL + ιH, c,L), and subsequently v
S(ιL + ιH, c,L). Again, the
expectation over WM on the interval (−∞, log(vS (ιL + ιH, c,L)) − logϕM) has a
closed-form expression.
Then, the entry rule to a market occupied by a type-H monopolist and the
survival rule for a type-L retailer facing a type-H rival are determined as
aE(ιH, c, wC,C) = I{ωvE (2ιH, c,H) + (1− ω)vE (ιL + ιH, c,L) > ϕC exp(wC)},
aE(ιH, c, wL,L) = I{vE(ιL + ιH, c,L) > ϕL exp(wL)},
aS(ιL + ιH, c, wM ,L) = I{vS(ιL + ιH, c,L) > ϕM exp(wM)}.
By imposing distributional assumptions on wC, wL, I can compute the (joint)
choice probability for a chain store or a local store to enter when the market is
monopolized by a type-H retailer, the demand is c, and the shocks on sunk costs
are integrated out. Denote these probabilities by PE(ιC|ιH, c) and PE(ιL|ιH, c). In
this duopoly example and in the empirical implementation, I assume that wC and
wL independently and normally distributed, with mean 0 and standard deviations
σC, σL respectively. Then,
PE(ιC|ιH, c) = Pr(aE(ιH, c, wC,C) = 1)
= Φ
((
log
(
ωvE (2ιH, c,H) + (1− ω)vE (ιL + ιH, c,L)
)− logϕC) /σC) ,
PE(ιL|ιH, c) = Pr(aE(ιH, c, wL,L) = 1) = Φ
((
log
(
vE (ιL + ιH, c,L)
)− logϕC) /σL)
Because at most one extra retailer can rationally enter this market in a RN-
MPE, the entry and the subsequent type realization outcome leads to one out of
three possible post-entry market structures with non-trivial probabilities. A func-
tion PE(mE|mS, c, aE) computes the transition probability of entry for the post-entry
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market structure to become mE, when the pre-entry market structure is mS, the
demand is c, and the entry rule is given by aE. With PE(ιC|ιH, c) and PE(ιL|ιH, c)
computed as the functions of the entry rules, the transition probabilities for the
pre-entry market with one type-H monopolist are compactly expressed as
PE(2ιH|ιH, c, aE) = ωPE(ιC|ιH, c),
PE(ιL + ιH|ιH, c, aE) = (1− ω)PE(ιC|ιH, c) + PE(ιL|ιH, c),
PE(ιH|ιH, c, aE) = (1− PE(ιC|ιH, c))(1− PE(ιL|ιH, c)).
Let function PS(mS|mE, c, aS) defines the transition probability of survival for
the post-survival market to become mS, when the post-entry market is mE, the
demand is c, and the survival rule is defined by aS. Because the type-H retailer
never exits before the type-L rival, the probability for market structure ιL + ιH to
remain solely relies on the type-L retailer’s choice. Hence,
PS(ιL + ιH|ιL + ιH, c, aS) = Pr(aS(ιL + ιH, c, wM ,L) = 1)
= Φ
(
log max
{
0, vS (ιL + ιH, c,L)
}
/σM
)
.
For econometrician who does not observe the shocks wL, wC and wM , the tran-
sition probabilities and the choice probabilities are essential in forming the expec-
tations in the equilibrium payoff function vE’s computation, and in building the
likelihood function towards recovering Θ.
Step 3: Type-H Monopolist & Type-H Duopolist Facing One Type-L
Rival. The post-entry payoff for a type-H monopolist, vE(ιH, ·,H), is
vE(ιH, c,H) = EWM
[
max{0, vS (ιH, c,L)− ϕM exp(W ′M)}
]
,
= Φ
(
log vS (ιH, c,H)− logϕM
σM
)
vS (ιH, c,H)
− exp(σ2M/2)Φ
(
log vS (2ιH, c,H)− logϕM − σ2M
σM
)
,
(5.17)
where log(vS (ιH, c,H)) is the ceiling value of WM to ensure profitable continuation
for the type-H incumbent.
If this incumbent faces a type-L rival in the post-entry market, the transition
probability PS(ιL + ιH|ιL + ιH, c, aS) gives the likelihood that this type-L retailer
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rationally chooses to leave the market. The post-entry payoff for the type-H retailer
is
vE(ιL + ιH, c, ιH)
= (1− PS(ιL + ιH|ιL + ιH, c, aS))EWM [max{0, vS (ιH, c, ιH)− ϕM exp(W ′M)}]
+ PS(ιL + ιH|ιL + ιH, c, aS)
(
vS (ιL + ιH, c, ιH)
− EWM [exp(W ′M)|vS(ιL + ιH, c,L) > ϕM exp(W ′M)]
)
.
(5.18)
Because one more retailer may join the monopoly market, the post-survival pay-
offs in Equations (5.17) depends on the transition probabilities of entry defined by
PE.
vS (ιH, c,H) = βEC [piH(ιH, C ′) + PE(2ιH|ιH, C ′, aE)vE(2ιH, C ′,H)
+ PE(ιL + ιH|ιH, C ′, aE)vE(ιL + ιH, C ′,H) + PE(ιH|ιH, C ′, aE)vE(ιH, C ′,H)|C = c].
Since entry is not possible in the duopoly market, the post-survival payoff in
Equations (5.18) is
vS (ιL + ιH, c,H) = βEC [piH(ιL + ιH, C ′) + vE(ιL + ιH, C ′,H)|C = c].
Given that the relevant transition probabilities in Equations (5.17) and (5.18)
have been determined, the expectations in the above post-survival payoffs are taken
only over exogenously evolving variables C. In addition, the post-entry payoff
vE(2ιH, ·,H) has been determined in Step 1. Therefore, Equations (5.17) and (5.18)
together define a contraction mapping with its fixed point determining vE(ιH, ·,H)
and vE(ιL + ιH, ·,H). Obtaining vS(ιH, ·,H) and vS(ιL + ιH, ·,H) from there is
straightforward.
The continuation decision for the type-H monopolist is a single-agent problem.
Hence, the survival rule for this retailer is aS(ιH, c, wM ,H) = I{vS(ιH, c,H) >
ϕM exp(wM)}. Under the normality assumption, the associated choice probability
P S(ιH|ιH, c,H) and the transition probabilities PS(ιH|ιH, c, aS) and PS(ι0|ιH, c, aS)
follow immediately.
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The continuation decision for the type-H duopolist may depend on the type-
L rival’s choice. If vS(ιH, c,H) < v
S(ιH + ιL, c,L), after the type-L rival’s exit,
the type-H retailer’s solo continuation becomes unprofitable. This situation arises
because the type-L retailer’s continuation deters future entry by a chain store. Be-
cause the new chain store entrant is likely to become another type-H retailer, the
incumbent type-H retailer is better off if continuing with the type-L rival than with-
out. Hence, this type-H incumbent’s continuation decision is dictated by the type-L
rival’s payoff vS(ιH + ιL, c,L). If v
S(ιH, c,H) > v
S(ιH + ιL, c,L), the type-H’s con-
tinuation decision is unaffected by the type-L rival’s choice. Combining these two
cases, the survival rule for the type-H duopolist is determined as
aS(ιH + ιL, c, wM ,H) = I{max{vS(ιH, c,H), vS(ιH, c,L)} > ϕM exp(wM)}.
The associated choice probability P S(ιH + ιL, c,H) and the transition proba-
bilities PS(ιH|ιH + ιL, c, aS) and PS(ι0|ιH + ιL, c, aS) are easily obtained under the
normality assumption. In light of how the type-L’s presence affects the continuation
of the type-H retailer, the ceiling value of WM for the type-H incumbent’s survival in
Equation (5.18) is hence determined by log max{0, vS (ιH, c,H) , vS (ιL + ιH, c,L)}.
Under the normality specification, the expectation over WM still has a closed-form
expression.
Step 4: Duopoly Market with Two Type-L Retailers. The survival prob-
lem on a duopoly market with two type-L retailers is a carbon copy of the static
game presented in Figure 4.3. In a RNMPE, if simultaneous survival is individually
profitable, then retailers will both choose to survive. Otherwise, the strategy in the
static game assign non-negative probability to “Exit”, and results in zero expected
payoff. Therefore, vE(2ιL, ·,L) satisfies
vE(2ιL, c,L) = EWM
[
max{0, vS(2ιL, c,L)− exp(W ′M)} C = c
]
= Φ
(
log vS (2ιL, c,L)− logϕM
σM
)
vS (2ιL, c,L)
− exp(σ2M/2)Φ
(
log vS (2ιL, c,L)− logϕM − σ2M
σM
)
,
in which vS(2ιL, c,L) = βEC
[
piL(2ιL, C
′) + vE(2ιL, C ′,L) C = c
]
.
Similar to Equation (4.6), the necessary condition for vE(2ιL, ·,L) defines a
contraction mapping, with its fixed point determining vE(2ιL, ·,L). Consequently,
vS(2ιL, c,L) can be computed.
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Then, the entry rule to a market occupied by a type-Lmonopolist are determined
as
aE(ιL, c, wC,C) = I{ωvE (ιL + ιH, c,H) + (1− ω)vE (2ιL, c,L) > ϕC exp(wC)},
aE(ιL, c, wL,L) = I{vE(2ιL, c,L) > ϕL exp(wL)}
The associated choice probabilities are
PE(ιC|ιL, c) = Φ
(
(log
(
ωvE (ιL + ιH, c,H) + (1− ω)vE (2ιL, c,L)
)− logϕC)/σC) ,
PE(ιL|ιL, c) = Φ
(
log vE (2ιL, c,L− logϕL) /σL
)
The transition probability for the post-entry market structure are
PE(ιL + ιH|ιL, c, aE) = ωPE(ιC|ιH, c),
PE(2ιL|ιL, c, aE) = (1− ω)PE(ιC|ιL, c) + PE(ιL|ιL, c),
PE(ιL|ιL, c, aE) = (1− PE(ιC|ιL, c))(1− PE(ιL|ιL, c)).
Step 5: The Rest. A type-L monopolist’s survival decision depends on if en-
try happens next period. The likelihood of entry is given by PE(ιC|ιL, c) and
PE(ιL|ιL, c). Therefore, the post-entry value satisfies
vE(ιL, c,L) =EWM
[
max{0, vS(ιL, c,L)− exp(W ′M)} C = c
]
=Φ
(
log vS (ιL, c,L)− logϕM
σM
)
vS (ιL, c,L)
− exp(σ2M/2)Φ
(
log vS (ιL, c,L)− logϕM − σ2M
σM
)
,
(5.19)
in which
vS (ιL, c,L) = βEC [piL(ιL, C ′) + PE(ιL + ιH|ιL, C ′, aE)vE(ιL + ιH, C ′,L)
+ PE(2ιL|ιL, C ′, aE)vE(2ιL, C ′,L) + PE(ιL|ιL, C ′, aE)vE(ιL, C ′,L)|C = c].
Given the quantities calculated in Steps 1–4, the right-hand side of (5.19) defines
a contraction mapping with vE(ιL, ·,L) as its fixed point. With this, vS(ιL, ·,L)
follows. The entry rule to an empty market by a chain store depends on whether
the local store following this chain store in the entry sequence enters. The local
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store’s entry choice is characterized by the entry rules to a monopoly market, which
have been determined in Step 2 and 4. Hence,
aE(ι0, c, wC,C)
=I{ωEWL((aE(ιH, c, wL,L)vE (ιL + ιH, c,H) + (1− aE(ιH, c, wL,L))vE (ιH, c,H))
+ (1− ω)(aE(ιH, c, wL,L))vE (2ιL, c,L)
+ (1− aE(ιH, c, wL,L))vE (ιL, c,L)) > ϕC exp(wC))}
.
Because WC and WL are independent, the associated choice probability of entry
is
PE(ιC|ι0, c) = Φ
((
log
(
ω(PE(ιL|ιH, c)vE (ιL + ιH, c,H) + (1− PE(ιL|ιH, c))vE (ιH, c,H))
+ (1− ω)(PE(ιL|ιL, c)vE (2ιL, c,L) + (1− PE(ιL|ιL, c))vE (ιL, c,L))
)
− logϕC
)
/σC
) .
The entry rule and the choice probability of entry by a local store is similarly
determined. The associated transition probabilities are
PE(ιL + ιH|ι0, c, aE) = ωPE(ιC|ι0, c)PE(ιL|ιH, c),
PE(2ιL|ι0, c, aE) = (1− ω)PE(ιC|ι0, c)PE(ιL|ιL, c),
PE(ιH|ι0, c, aE) = ωPE(ιC|ι0, c)(1− PE(ιL|ιH, c)),
PE(ιL|ι0, c, aE) = (1− ω)PE(ιC|ι0, c)(1− PE(ιL|ιL, c)) + (1− PE(ιC|ι0, c))PE(ιL|ι0, c),
PE(ι0|ι0, c, aE) = (1− PE(ιC|ι0, c))(1− PE(ιL|ι0, c)),
PS(ι0|ιL, c, aS) = Φ
(
log
(
vS (ιL, c,L)− logϕM
)
/σM
)
.
Finally, all that remain undetermined is the survival rule for duopoly retailers
of identical type and the associated choice and transition probabilities. Reconsider
the static game presented in Figure 4.3: in a RNMPE, if the post-survival value for
a duopolist exceeds ϕM exp(wM), then both retailers continue for sure. Otherwise,
checking the post-survival value for a monopolist is essential.
If the monopoly post-survival value also exceeds ϕM exp(wM), the reduced-form
continuation game has no pure strategy equilibrium. Instead, it admits a unique
mixed-strategy equilibrium, in which each retailer chooses a survival probability to
leave its rival indifferent between exiting and surviving. The equilibrium thus has
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the following survival rules for k ∈ {H,L}.
aS(2ιk, c, wM , k) =

1 if vS(2ιk, c, k) > ϕM exp(wM),
vS(ιk,c,k)−ϕM exp(wM )
vS(ιk,c,k)−vS(2ιk,c,k) if v
S(2ιk, c, k) ≤ ϕM exp(wM)
and vS(ιk, c, k) > ϕM exp(wM)
0 otherwise.
If the monopoly post-survival value is low than ϕM exp(wM), pure exit is the
only equilibrium strategy of the static game–no unilateral deviation not improve the
payoff, and no mixing is possible. In this case, the survival rule in the RNMPE is
aS(2ιk, c, wM , k) =
{
1 if vS(2ιk, c, k) > ϕM exp(wM),
0 otherwise.
Under either equilibrium, the transition probabilities for a duopoly market with
two type-k retailers are
PS(2ιk|2ιk, c, aS) = Pr(aS(2ιk, c,W ′M , k) = 1) + EWM [aS(2ιk, c,W ′M , k)2|0 < aS(2ιk, c,W ′M , k) < 1],
PS(ιk|2ιk, c, aS) = EWM [2aS(2ιk, c,W ′M , k)(1− aS(2ιk, c,W ′M , k))|0 < aS(2ιk, c,W ′M , k) < 1],
PS(ι0|2ιk, c, aS) = 1− PS(2ιk|2ιk, c, aS)− PS(ιk|2ιk, c, aS) Pr(aS(2ιk, c,W ′M , k) = 0)
+ EWM [(1− aS(2ιk, c,W ′M , k))2|0 < aS(2ιk, c,W ′M , k) < 1]
= Φ
(
log vS (2ιK , c,K)− logϕM
σM
)
+ max
{
0,Φ
(
log vS (ιK , c,K)− logϕM
σM
)
− Φ
(
log vS (2ιK , c,K)− logϕM
σM
)}
×
vS(ιK , c,K)− exp(σ2M/2)Φ
(
log vS(ιK ,c,K)−logϕM−σ2
σ
)
vS(ιK , c,K)− vS(2ιK , c,K)
With this part of the survival rule and choice and transition probabilities deter-
mined, the equilibrium construction is concluded. Finally, note that when computing
PS(·|2ιk, c, aS), the expectation over WM has a closed-form expression under normal-
ity specification in this duopoly case. However, when the number of retailers involved
in mixing exceeds three, closed-form expression in general fails to exist. Therefore, I
use important sampling to numerically integrate over WM to compute the transition
probabilities. Because the calculation of the transition probabilities for every state
is only conducted once for every set of parameter values, this numerical integration
does not pose formidable computational challenge.
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5.2.2.2 Computation Details for Algorithm 3
Choice Probabilities & Transition Probabilities of Entry As demonstrated
in Section 4.4.1, the choice probabilities of entry for a local store depends on the
post-entry payoffs. A chain store’s choice probabilities depend on if the local store
after it enters or not, and the post-entry payoffs generated from the sequence of
entries.
PE(ιL|m, c) = Φ
((
log
(
νE (m + ιL, c,L)− ϕL
)− logϕL) /σL) ,
PE(ιC|m, c) = Φ
((
log
(
ω(PE(ιL|m + ιH, c)νE (m + ιH + ιL, c,H)
+ (1− PE(ιL|m + ιH, c))νE (m + ιH, c,H))
+ (1− ω)(PE(ιL|m + ιL, c)νE (m + 2ιL, c,L)
+ (1− PE(ιL|m + ιL, c))νE (m + ιL, c,L))
)
− logϕC
)
/σC
)
.
.
The candidate transition probabilityPE can be computed directly as the function
of PE, instead of αE,
PE(mE|mS, c,PE) =
ωPE(ιC|mS, c)PE(ιL|mS + ιH, c) if mE = mS + ιH + ιL,
(1− ω)PE(ιC|mS, c)PE(ιL|mS + ιL, c) if mE = mS + 2ιL,
ωPE(ιC|mS, c)(1− PE(ιL|mS + ιH, c)) if mE = mS + ιH,
(1− ω)PE(ιC|mS, c)(1− PE(ιL|mS + ιL, c))
+(1− PE(ιC|mS, c))PE(ιL|mS, c) if mE = mS + ιL,
(1− PE(ιC|mS, c))(1− PE(ιL|mS + ιH, c)) if mE = mS,
0 otherwise.
Choice Probabilities & Transition Probabilities of Survival When type-k
stores are mixing between survival and exit under m, c, k, wM), the following poly-
nomial equation determines the equilibrium survival rules as its roots in [0, 1), if νS
gives the (candidate) post-survival equilibrium payoffs,
mk−1∑
i=0
(1−αS)mk−1−i(αS)i
(
mk − 1
i
)
(νS(m− (mk− 1− i)ιk, c, k)−ϕM exp(wM)) = 0.
(5.20)
where m = m if k = L, and m = m −mLιL if k = H. If there are more than one
roots in [0, 1), the equilibrium survival rules are multiple. To compute the choice
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probability under (m, c, k) and the transition probabilities conditional on (m, c), one
would need to integrate the probabilistic survival rules over the random variable WM .
A blunt force implementation of such integration is to first discretize or draw WM ,
then to solve (5.20) repeatedly and compute αS under each grid point or realization
of WM . This approach is not only computationally expensive, owing to the task of
finding high order polynomials’ roots, but also inaccurate, due to the fact that the
infinite support of WM challenges the precision of the approximation. As a solution,
I work with a “reversed approach” which first discretizes αS on the interval [0, 1],
then finds wM satisfying
mk−1∑
i=0
(1− αS)mk−1−i(αS)i
(
mk − 1
i
)
νS(m− (mk − 1− i)ιk, c, k) = ϕM exp(wM).
This equation makes use of the observation that ϕM exp(wM) in all of the polynomial
coefficients, except the scaler, cancels out. Note that computing wM only requires
summation and multiplication, operations that computers can execute with much
higher speed and precision than solving polynomials. Once all wM are nailed, its
density function fWM defines the probability that each corresponding α
S has in
forming the choice/transition probabilities. Suppose that there are S grids points
for αS between [0, 1]. Denote these points as p[1], . . . , p[S] with p[1] = 0 and p[S] =
1, and the associated market-level shocks as wM [1], . . . , wM [S]. When the payoff-
monotone condition in Proposition 7 is violated, wM [1], . . . , wM [S] might not be an
increasing sequence. I then use only the J ≤ S wM which follow a descending order
from wM [S]. Relabel them as x[1], . . . , x[J ], and the associated survival probabilities
as q[1], . . . , q[J ]. The choice probability of survival under the normality assumption
is1
J∑
j=2
(Φ(xM [j]/σM)− Φ(xM [j − 1]/σM)) (q[j] + q[j − 1])/2 + Φ(xM [J ]/σM).
The transition probabilities are computed using the same approach. Again, the
computation of αS is not necessary. The computational details for the choice proba-
bilities and the transition probabilities of survival are demonstrated in the flow chart
below.
1This is equivalent to picking the largest mixing probability when equilibrium multiplicity
occurs. When equilibrium multiplicity occurs, ideally, the RNMPE that generates the highest
likelihood value should be picked. However, the iterative nature of the NFXP algorithm forbids a
straightforward selection of the equilibria.
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HS =
(m, c, k)
k = L?
w(HS) ← log max{0, νS(HS)}
w(HS) ←
log max{0, νS(mHιH + ιL, c,L)}
m ← m.
w(HS) ←
max{log max{0, νS(HS)}, w(m, c,L), w(m, c,L)}
w ← log max{0, νS(ιH, c,H)}
m ← m − mLιL.
w(HS) ≥
w(HS)?
For all i ∈ {0, . . . ,mk},
PS(m − iιk|m, c, αS) ←{
Φ(w(HS)/σM) if i = 0,
0 otherwise.
Discretize [0, 1] into S equal-distance points p[1], . . . , p[S].
For any probabilities p[s], s ∈ {1, . . . , S}, find corresponding w[s] satisfying,
mk−1∑
i=0
(1− p[s])mk−1−i(p[s])i
(
mk − 1
i
)
(νS(m− (mk − 1− i)ιk, c, k) = exp(wsM)).
If w[s] is not a monotone sequence, pick and relabel the monotone sub-sequence as x[j]
(descending from w[S]), and relabel the associated probabilities as q[j]
For all i ∈ {0, . . . ,mk}, PS(m − iιk|m, c) ←
Φ(w(HS)/σM) +
J∑
j=2
(Φ(xM [j]/σM)− Φ(xM [j − 1]/σM)) (q[j] + q[j − 1])/2 if i = 0,
J∑
j=2
(Φ(xM [j]/σM)− Φ(xM [j − 1]/σM))
(
mk
mk−i
)
((q[j])mk−i(1− q[j])i + (q[j − 1])mk−i(1− q[j − 1])i)/2 if 0 < i < mk,
(1− Φ(w(HS)/σM)) +
J∑
j=2
(Φ(xM [j]/σM)− Φ(xM [j − 1]/σM)) ((1− pj)mk + (1− pj−1)mk)/2 if i = mk,
0 otherwise.
STOP
NoYes
Yes
No
Procedure 4: Compute the Candidate Choice/Transition Probabilities of Survival
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Functional Operator TL and TH Finally, the functional operators TL and TH
are defined as
(TLf)(H
h,l
S ) =Φ
 log max
{
0, fS
(
Hh,lS
)}
− logϕM
σM
 fS (Hh,lS )
− exp(σ2M/2)Φ
 log max
{
0, fS
(
Hh,lS
)}
− logϕM − σ2M
σM

(5.21)
and
(THf)(H
h,l
S ) =
mL∑
j=0
PS(mHιH + jιL|m, c)fS(mHιH + jιL, c,H)− exp(σ2M/2)
× Φ
 log max
{
0, fS
(
Hh,lS
)
, νS (mHιH + ιL, c,L) , ν
S (mHιH +mLιL, c,L)
}
− logϕM − σ2M
σM

(5.22)
in which
PS(mHιH|m, c) = max
{
0,Φ
 log max
{
0, fS
(
Hh,lS
)}
− logϕM
σM

−max
{
Φ
(
log max
{
0, νS (mHιH + ιL, c,L)
}− logϕM
σM
)
,
Φ
(
log max
{
0, νS (mHιH +mLιL, c,L)
}− logϕM
σM
)}}
,
and
fS (m, c, k) = βEC
[
pik(m, C
′) +
∑
ME
PE(ME|m, C ′,PE)gE(ME, C ′, k) C = c
]
.
with
gE(ME, C ′, k) =

f(ME, C ′, k) if (ME, C ′, k) ∈ Hh,lS
νE(ME, C ′, k) if (ME, C ′, k) ∈ Hh+,l+S , for h+ ≥ h, l+ > l
or h+ > h, l+ ≥ l.
At last,
νS (m, c, k) = βEC
[
pik(m, C
′) +
∑
ME
PE(ME|m, C ′,PE)νE(ME, C ′, k) C = c
]
.
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Market Structure Distribution Function P The distribution function for un-
derlying market structure P is computed by considering all active retailers’ type
distributions. Formally, it is
P(N|p, nL) ≡
∑
j counts of H,|p|−j counts of L among k1,k2,...,knC
pk1k2...knC if N = jιH + (|p| − j + nL)ιL,
j ∈ {0, . . . , |p|}
0 otherwise.
For a market structure with j type-H stores and (|p| − j + nL) type-L stores,
its probability is the sum of all elements in the type distribution vector p whose
sequences of types {k1, k2, . . . , knC} have j counts of H and |p| − j counts of L.
5.3 Supplementary Materials
5.3.1 An Example of Multiple Equilibria in Chapter 2
We construct a three-firm two-type example where the equilibrium payoff is not
weakly decreasing in the number of same-type competitors (mˇ = 3 (by setting
pi(n, c, k) < 0 for any (n, c, k) if n has more than 3 firms) and kˇ = 2).
Consider the following sequence of ct: c1 = 1, c2 = 1e
−6, ct = 5, for all t ≥ 3. The
number of consumers drops to nearly zero in the second period but is boosted to a
high level in the third period, and stays high afterwards. We set β = 0.5, κ(L) =
κ(H) = 4, ϕ = 1, and ΠLH = ΠLL = 0.5. We specify pi as pi(n, c, k) = cpi(n, k) − κ.
Some parts of the per-consumer producer surplus pi are summarized in the following
table:
pi(·,L)/pi(·,H) 1ιH 2ιH 3ιH
+0ιL /102 /100 /1
+1ιL 99/101 0.89/1.24
+2ιL 1.23/1.25
One feature of this surplus structure is that a duopoly market promises much
higher per consumer surplus than a triopoly market does. The duopoly-triopoly
surplus difference overwhelmingly dominates the L,H-type difference in surplus.
Since from period 3 onwards, the model is essentially an infinitely repeated game,
we can use backward induction to compute the equilibrium payoffs:
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1. Since c3piH(3ιH) > κ, if three type-H firms are active in the second period,
they can always recover fixed cost and make positive profit by remaining active
from the third period onwards. Moreover, if less type-H firms are active in
the second period, they receive higher profit from the third period onward.
Therefore, for t ≥ 2, aS(3ιH, ct,H) is a dominant strategy and
vE(3ιH, ct,H) =
β(c3piH(3ιH)− κ)
1− β = 1.
2. Since c3piL(2ιH + ιL) > κ, c3piH(ιH + 2ιL) > κ and c3piL(ιH + 2ιL) > κ, for the
same reason, for t ≥ 2,
vE(2ιH + ιL, ct,L) = vS(2ιH + ιL, ct,L)
=
β(1− ΠLH)
1− β(1− ΠLH)(c3piL(2ιH + ιL)− κ)
+
(
β
1− β −
β(1− ΠLH)
1− β(1− ΠLH)
)
(c3piH(3ιH)− κ)
= 0.8167
vE(2ιH + ιL, ct,H) = vS(2ιH + ιL, ct,H)
=
β(1− ΠLH)
1− β(1− ΠLH)(c3piH(2ιH + ιL)− κ)
+
(
β
1− β −
β(1− ΠLH)
1− β(1− ΠLH)
)
(c3piH(3ιH)− κ)
= 1.4
vE(ιH + 2ιL, ct,L) = vS(ιH + 2ιL, ct,L)
=
1
1− β(1− ΠLH)2 ((1− ΠLH)
2(c3piL(ιH + 2ιL))
+(1− ΠLH)ΠLH(c3piH(2ιH + ιL) + vE(2ιH + ιL, ct+1,H))
+(1− ΠLH)ΠLH(c3piL(2ιH + ιL) + vE(2ιH + ιL, ct+1,L))
+Π2LH(c3piH(3ιH) + vE(3ιH, ct+1,L))− κ)
= 1.2881
3. Since vE(2ιH+ιL, c2,L) < ϕ and vE(ιH+2ιL, c2,L) > ϕ, we have that aE(2ιH+
ιL, c2,L) = 0 and aE(ιH+2ιL, c2,L) = 1. This means that in the second period,
two type-L firms will enter a market occupied by a type-H monopoly, while
no firm will enter a market occupied by two type-H duopoly. Since demand
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stays constant from the third period on, the market structures at the end of
the second period will never be changed. Therefore, for t ≥ 2,
vE(2ιH, ct,H) = vS(2ιH, ct,H)
=
β(c3piH(2ιH)− κ)
1− β
= 496
vE(ιH + 2ιL, ct,H) = vS(ιH + 2ιL, ct,H)
=
1
1− β(1− ΠLH)2 ((1− ΠLH)
2(c3piH(ιH + 2ιL))
+2(1− ΠLH)ΠLH(c3piH(2ιH + ιL) + vE(2ιH + ιL, ct+1,H))
+Π2LH(c3piH(3ιH) + vE(3ιH, ct+1,L))− κ)
= 1.6357
4. For a type-H monopolist who is active in the first period, the payoff to con-
tinuation is
vS(ιH, c1,H) = β ((c2piH(ιH)− κ) + vE(ιH + 2ιL, c2,H)) = −1.1821.
For a type-H duopolist who is active in the first period together with another
type-H rival, the payoff to continuation, given the rival also continues, is
vS(2ιH, c1,H) = β ((c2piH(2ιH)− κ) + vE(2ιH, c2,H)) = 246.
For a type-H triopolist who is active in the first period together with another
two type-H rivals, the payoff to continuation, given the rivals also continue, is
vS(3ιH, c1,H) = β ((c2piH(3ιH)− κ) + vE(3ιH, c2,H)) = −1.5.
Unlike the results stated in Lemma 1, vS is not always monotonic in the number
of firms,
vS(ιH, c1,H) = −1.1821, vS(2ιH, c1,H) = 246, vS(3ιH, c1,H) = −1.5
Not surprisingly, the low triopoly surplus implies a low payoff if continuing as one
of three type-H firms. What is counter-intuitive is that the payoff to continuing as
a duopolist is better than the payoff to continuing as a monopolist under c1. This is
because in period 2, under a low c2, a duopoly firm and a monopoly firm make similar
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flow profit and similar large losses. However, duopoly firms can, by jointly remaining
active, preempt any further entrants and enjoy a high duopoly profit after demand
increases to a high level in period 3. The future duopoly payoff compensates the
loss in period 2, and make vS(2ιH, c1,H) positive. In contrast, a monopoly market
attracts two entrants for sure in period 2, which results in a triopoly market from
period 3 onwards. Because demand increases to a high level in period 3, none of
these firms will exit and, given the per consumer surplus structure, they will all earn
a substantially lower payoff than duopoly firms, which can not compensate the loss
in period 2. Consequently, vS(ιH, c1,H) is negative.
Given the computed non-monotone equilibrium payoff, (aS, aE) with aS(2ιH, c1,H) =
1 is still an natural equilibrium. However, if one duopoly firm chooses to exit
with probability 1, the rival firm receives -1.1821 if continuing alone and hence will
choose to exit with probability 1 as well. Similarly, if one firm chooses to survive
with probability −1.1821−1.1821−246 = 4.782e
−3, the other firm is indifferent between exiting
and survival. Therefore, two other natural equilibria with aS(2ιH, c1,H) = 0 and
aS(2ιH, c1,H) = 4.782e
−3 exist.
Note that when both firms choose aS(2ιH, c1,H) = 0 or aS(2ιH, c1,H) = 4.782e
−3,
they receive zero payoffs. By ”renegotiating” on jointly choosing aS(2ιH, c1,H) = 1,
they can strictly improve their equilibrium payoffs. Henceforth, we only restrict
attention to equilibria in which there is no room for this type of one-shot joint
improvement.
Unfortunately, this type of equilibria may not be unique. Since joint contin-
uation and continuing as monopolist both render payoffs negative, in a one-shot
renegotiation-proof equilibrium, a triopoly firm either chooses aS(3ιH, c1,H) = 0 or
set aS(2ιH, c1,H) = p, where p solves
p2v¯(3ιH, c1,H) +
(
2
1
)
p(1− p)v¯(2ιH, c1,H) + (1− p)2v¯(ιH, c1,H) = 0.
This quadratic equation has two roots, p1 = 0.0024 and p2 = 0.997, both be-
tween 0 and 1. Hence, there are three one-shot renegotiation-proof equilibria with
aS(3ιH, c1,H) equal to 0, p1 and p2, respectively.
5.3.2 Comparison Between BR’s and Our Data in Chapter
3
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Samenvatting (Summary in Dutch)
Binnen het onderzoeksgebeid van de industrile organisatie heeft de oligopolie
altijd in de schijnwerpers gestaan, om goede redenen: beleidsmakers willen sociaal
optimale mededingingsbeleid opstellen, terwijl ondernemers strategische interacties
bestuderen om de concurrentie te kunnen verslaan. Dit proefschrift presenteert mod-
ellen die een markov-perfecte marktdynamiek weergeven. Ook past dit proefschrift
de modellen toe op het proces van competitief gedrag binnen een oligopolie.
De modellen die in dit proefschrift worden bestudeerd behoren tot de structurele
modellen. In de afgelopen decennia, dankzij de vooruitgang in speltheorie, econome-
trie, en het vervaardigen van economische modellen, hebben structurele modellen
een plaats ingenomen op de onderzoeksagenda van de empirische industrile organ-
isatie. In dit nieuwe onderzoek paradigma modelleren onderzoekers het gedrag van
bedrijven om zo het een stevige micro-economische ondergrond te leggen voor het
empirische werk. De onderliggende parameters van deze modellen kunnen worden
geschat door gebruik te maken van informatie over uitkomsten in de markt.
Het huwelijk van de economische theorie en econometrie heeft ten minste twee
voordelen. Ten eerste, het helpt onderzoekers om problemen vanwege een gebrek
aan data in empirisch onderzoek te omzeilen. Bijvoorbeeld, gegevens over toetred-
ingskosten en baten van toetreding zijn vaak niet beschikbaar voor onderzoekers.
Bresnahan en Reiss (1991) bouwen een model die de interactie in een oligopolie
beschrijft, zodat ze deze waarden kunnen afleiden door gebruik te maken van ad-
ministratieve informatie omtrent het aantal bedrijven en marktaandelen. Ten tweede
kunnen met modellen uitkomsten van verschillende beleidsopties worden doorgerek-
end. Omdat de causale relatie tussen de parameters en de marktuitkomsten expliciet
is gemodelleerd, zijn de structurele modellen niet onderworpen aan de ”Lucas kri-
tiek” (Lucas 1976). Daarom zijn onderzoekers in staat om de effecten van beleid
(die zorgen voor een verschuiving van de parameters in het model) te kwantificeren.
Onder leiding van Maskin en Tirole (1988a, 1988b) en Ericson en Pakes (1995),
worden modellen die een markov-perfecte markdynamiek bestuderen ontwikkeld van-
wege hun theoretisch en empirisch aantrekkelijke eigenschappen. Ten eerste zijn
deze modellen gebaseerd op plausibele aannames met betrekking tot het gedrag van
bedrijven. Ze hebben meerdere perioden waarin bedrijven optimale beslissingen
maken gebaseerd op tijdsafhankelijke informatie. Vergeleken met statische modellen
sluiten de markov-perfecte modellen beter aan op het dynamische karakter van een
oligopolie. Ten tweede kunnen de markov-perfecte modellen niet alleen de ”snap-
shot” van marktstructuren verklaren, maar ook de ontwikkeling van deze structuren
over de tijd. Ze vergemakkelijken daarom de econometrische analyse van longitudi-
nale datasets, die in toenemende mate beschikbaar zijn.
Ondanks deze aantrekkelijke kenmerken, beperkt de complexiteit van de mod-
ellen de toepassing ervan. Zoals aangetoond door Besanko, Doraszelski, Kryukov,
en Satterthwaite (2010), hebben deze modellen vaak meerdere evenwichten. Over
het algemeen is ook het aantal evenwichten onduidelijk, waardoor de berekening
van alle evenwichten bijna onmogelijk is en de resultaten van het beleidssimulaties
dubieus. En wat erger is: onderzoekers hebben geen betrouwbaar algoritme om snel
een evenwicht te berekenen.
In de modellen die zijn ontwikkeld voor dit proefschrift, probeer ik om een door-
braak te bewerkstelligen wat betreft het bewijzen en berekenen van een uniek even-
wicht. In hoofdstuk 2 (gebaseerd op Abbring, Campbell, en Yang 2012a) van het
proefschrift, ontwikkelen mijn co-auteurs en ik een handelbaar model voor de em-
pirische analyse van markov-perfecte oligopolie dynamiek met oneindige horizon.
Het model beschikt over vraag onzekerheid, ”sunk entry costs”, stochastische bedri-
jfsspecifieke technologische vooruitgang, en onomkeerbare uittreding. Wij ontwikke-
len een algoritme dat een symmetrische evenwicht snel kan berekenen, door de vaste
punten van een eindige reeks van laag-dimensionale ”contraction mappings” op te
sporen. Indien hooguit twee heterogene bedrijven de markt bedienen, is het resultaat
een uniek natuurlijk evenwicht waarbij een bedrijf met een hoge winstmarge de markt
nooit verlaat terwijl een concurrent met een lage winstmarge achterblijft. Met meer
dan twee bedrijven vindt het algoritme altijd een natuurlijk evenwicht.1 We presen-
teren een eenvoudige regel waarmee we ex post kunnen controleren of het berekende
1In een ander paper (Abbring, Campbell, Tilly en Yang 2012), analyseren we een eenvoudigere
versie van dit model waarin alle bedrijven dezelfde technologie hebben. We laten zien dat het een-
voudigere model een uniek symmetrisch markov-perfect evenwicht heeft. Het eenvoudigere model
is rijk genoeg voor verschillende toepassingen, zoals welvaartsanalyse van vergunningsvoorwaarden,
start-up subsidies en milieuwetgeving. Hoewel heterogeniteit op bedrijfsniveau genegeerd wordt, is
het in het model wel mogelijk om heterogeniteit op marktniveau toe te staan. Bovendien kan de
analyse van dit model dienen als het startpunt voor meer algemene modellen. Door de voorlopige
status van dit werk, is het niet opgenomen in dit proefschrift.
evenwicht uniek is, en we illustreren de toepassing van het model door de robuus-
theid van een bevinding van Fershtman en Pakes (2000) te beproeven: namelijk dat
heimelijke prijsafspraken het consumentensurplus kunnen verhogen door het stim-
uleren van productontwikkeling. De honderden berekeningen van het evenwicht die
hiervoor zijn vereist duren slechts een paar minuten op laptop. We presenteren ook
een haalbaar algoritme voor de schatting van het model dat gebruik maakt van
GMM.
In hoofdstuk 3 (gebaseerd op Abbring, Campbell, en Yang 2012b), ontwikkelen
we een dynamisch econometrisch kader voor de analyse van toegang, uittreding, en
competitief gedrag in een oligopolie. Dit kader vereist enkel panel data over het
aantal afnemers en producenten van geografisch verspreide markten over de tijd.
Het is een dynamische uitbreiding van het model van Bresnahan en Reiss (1990,
1991) voor de analyse van statische concurrentie in een crossectie van markten.
Onze uitbreiding maakt de empirische analyse eenvoudiger: ”sunk entry costs” en
onzekerheid. Bovendien is de uitbreiding nodig voor de consistente meting van
parameters van de statische markt, zoals de mate van concurrentie. De aannames
met betrekking tot timing en verwachtingen helpen om een uniek markov-perfect
evenwicht te selecteren dat snel kan worden berekend door het oplossen van een
eindige reeks van dynamisch programeer problemen met laag-dimensionale ”state
spaces”. We passen ons model toe op de empirische heranalyse van ”sunk costs” en
de mate van concurrentie op de Amerikaanse markt voor tandheelkundige diensten,
met behulp van de panel data van Bresnahan en Reiss (1993) die informatie geeft
over het aantal tandartsen over alle geografische markten in de VS.
In hoofdstuk 4 (gebaseerd op Yang 2012), breid ik het model dat is ontwikkeld
in Hoofdstuk 2 uit en pas ik het toe op de ”creative destruction” in de Neder-
landse supermarkt. In deze markt geven technologische innovaties in voorraad-
beheer, logistiek en verkoop de supermarktketen een voordeel ten opzichte van
ouderwetse lokale winkels. Wanneer winkelketens toetreden, sluiten plaatselijke
bestaande winkels geleidelijk hun deuren. Twee vragen met betrekking tot dit
proces van ”creative destruction” staan centraal in het mededingingsbeleid. Hoe
maken winkelketens toetredingsbeslissingen? Hoe benvloedt toetreding door een
winkelketen de winstmarge en overlevingskansen van de bestaande winkels? In dit
artikel ontwikkel ik een handelbaar dynamisch model om deze beide vragen te kun-
nen onderzoeken. Alle markov-perfecte evenwichten kunnen snel worden berekend
door de ”fixed points” van een reeks van laag-dimensionale contractie mappings te
vinden. Ik schat dit model aan de hand van waarnemingen van toe- en uittreding
van supermarkten in kleine Nederlandse gemeenten. De gemiddelde ”sunk costs” van
toetreding beslaat in een aantal gevallen meerdere malen de verwachte verdiscon-
teerde winst, mogelijk omdat de Nederlandse wetgeving de locaties voor mogelijke
toetreders aanzienlijk beperkt. De hoge gemiddelde ”sunk costs” vertraagt de uit-
breiding van de winkelketens aanzienlijk. Een toetredende winkelketen vermindert
de netto contante waarde van bestaande winkelketens met 26% tot 62%. Een belei-
dsexperiment met het geschatte model laat zien dat het verminderen van de ”sunk
costs” met 40% de toetreding van winkelketens bijna verdubbelt.
Bewijzen, details omtrent berekeningen en aanvullende informatie is verzameld in
de bijlagen. De Matlab-code bedoelt voor het uitvoeren van de berekeningen vormen
een belangrijk onderdeel van dit proefschrift. Omdat elk hoofdstuk een op zichzelf
staand onderzoek is, zijn drie pakketten met Matlab code afzonderlijk gepubliceerd
op de websites van de auteurs.
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